Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 19STCV44140, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling
Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.
Case Number: 19STCV44140 Hearing Date: December 8, 2022 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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December
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[Tentative]
Order RE: (1)
defendant’s
demurrer to aivazian’s complaint; (2)
defendant’s
motion to strike portions of aivazian’s complaint |
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Simple Bar, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Haroutioun Aivazian
(1)
Demurrer
to Complaint
(2)
Motion
to Strike Portions of Complaint
The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in
connection with the demurrer and motion to strike.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff David Dallakian (“Dallakian”) filed this action against Simple
Bar, Inc. (“Simple Bar”) and Doe defendants on December 6, 2019. Dallakian filed his operative First Amended
Complaint on April 9, 2020 against Simple Bar and additional defendant Adroit
Private Security, Inc. based on an alleged assault of Dallakian at A Simple Bar
on November 15, 2019.
Plaintiff Haroutioun Aivazian (“Aivazian”) filed a complaint against
Simple Bar on November 12, 2021, based on an alleged assault of Aivazian during
the same November 15, 2019 altercation.
The parties stipulated, and the court ordered on May 31, 2022, that
the actions filed by Dallakian and Aivazian are consolidated.
Defendant Simple Bar now moves the court for an order (1) sustaining
its demurrer to plaintiff Aivazian’s second, third, and fourth causes of
action, and (2) striking Aivazian’s prayer for punitive damages and all related
allegations.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The court denies Simple Bar’s requests for
judicial notice, filed on December 1, 2022, as improper attempts to introduce
new evidence in reply. (Jay v.
Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537.)
DEMURRER
The court sustains Simple Bar’s demurrer to Aivazian’s second
cause of action for premises liability because it does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Aivazian does not
allege (1) a dangerous condition existed on Simple Bar’s property, or (2) that
Simple bar did not take reasonable steps to secure its property against
criminal acts by third parties (i.e., the stranger), because this cause
of action appears to be based on the injury suffered by Aivazian as a result of
the attack by Simple Bar’s security guard (Compl., ¶ 35). (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Delgado
v. American Multi-Cinema (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406, fn. 1 [“Broadly
speaking, premises liability alleges a defendant property owner allowed a
dangerous condition on its property or failed to take reasonable steps to
secure its property against criminal acts by third parties”]; Delgado v.
Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 229.)
The court overrules Simple Bar’s
demurrer to Aivazian’s third cause of action for assault and battery
because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since
Aivazian alleges facts establishing that Simple Bar is liable for the acts of
its security guards, whom Aivazian alleges (1) were “agents” of the bar
(Compl., ¶¶ 8, 16), and (2) were acting within the scope of their
employment (Compl., ¶ 8). (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2019) 40
Cal.App.5th 1077, 1106 [“An allegation of agency constitutes an averment of
ultimate fact, which we accept as true on a demurrer”].)
The court overrules Simple Bar’s demurrer to
Aivazian’s fourth cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because it states facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action since the Complaint alleges that the
alleged assault of Aivazian (Compl., ¶ 15) was committed by one of Simple Bar’s
security guards, who was acting as an agent of Simple Bar and within the scope
of their employment (Compl., ¶ 8).
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
MOTION TO STRIKE
Simple Bar moves the court for an order
striking from the Complaint (1) Aivazian’s
prayer for punitive damages, and (2)
paragraphs 20, 41, and 50 of the Complaint.
The court grants Simple Bar’s motion to
strike the prayer for punitive damages and paragraphs 20, 41, and 50.
The court finds that the allegations in Aivazian’s Complaint do not sufficiently
allege that Simple Bar, as a corporate employer, may be held liable for
punitive damages because Aivazian does not allege facts establishing (1) Simple
Bar had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employees and employed them
with a conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others, or authorized or
ratified the wrongful conduct for which punitive damages are sought, or (2) the
advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, or ratification was
on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of Simple Bar. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) The court notes that Aivazian argues that (1)
the court denied “an almost identical motion” filed by Simple Bar as to
plaintiff Dallakian, and (2) Aivazian alleged that Simple Bar’s “general
manager stood by and did nothing to prevent the violent act of its
employee/agent.” (Opp., pp. 2:7-10,
5:9-17.) However, Dallakian’s First Amended
Complaint contained allegations establishing that Simple Bar authorized
security guards with known violent propensities to work at the subject
premises, and that Simple Bar’s general manager authorized the assault on
Dallakian by failing to stop the assault.
Aivazian’s Complaint, by contrast, does not include the same factual
allegations with regard to Simple Bar.
Finally, the court notes that Simple Bar’s memorandum of points and
authorities filed in connection with its motion to strike appears to request that
the court strike Aivazian’s prayer for attorney’s fees. (Mot., p. 7:13-14.) Simple Bar presents no argument explaining
why Aivazian’s request for attorney’s fees should be stricken, and the court
therefore denies any request to strike Aivazian’s prayer for attorney’s fees
and costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)
ORDER
The court sustains Simple Bar, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiff
Haroutioun Aivazian’s second
cause of action for premises liability.
The court overrules Simple Bar, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiff
Haroutioun Aivazian’s third
cause of action for assault and battery and fourth cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court
grants Simple Bar, Inc.’s motion to strike from Haroutioun Aivazian’s Complaint (1) the prayer for
punitive damages, and (2) paragraphs 20, 41, and 50.
The court grants Haroutioun Aivazian
20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint to cure the deficiencies discussed
in this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court