Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 19STCV46989, Date: 2024-12-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 19STCV46989, Date: 2024-12-05 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

The court rules on plaintiffs Adela Sanchez and Livia Larios’s evidentiary objections, filed on November 21, 2024, as follows:

The court does not rule on defendant Kia America, Inc.’s evidentiary objections, filed on November 27, 2024 because they are directed to evidence that is not material to the court’s disposition of this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

The court denies plaintiffs Adela Sanchez and Livia Larios’s request for judicial notice because it is not relevant to the court’s disposition of this motion. (Malek Media Group LLC v. AXWG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 825 [“Any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue”].)

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Defendant Kia America, Inc., f/k/a Kia Motors America, Inc. (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order granting summary adjudication in its favor and against plaintiffs Adela Sanchez (“Sanchez”) and Livia Larios (“Larios”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) on (1) their second, fourth, and fifth causes of action, and (2) their claim for punitive damages.

“In California, an implied warranty of merchantability arises under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act: ‘Unless disclaimed in the manner prescribed by this chapter, every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are merchantable.’” (Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 24 [quoting Civ. Code, § 1792].) “Any buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (a).)

The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of showing that the second cause of action for breach of implied warranty has no merit because Defendant has not shown that (1) the affirmative defense of the statute of limitation bars this cause of action, and (2) the elements of the cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of fitness cannot be established.

First, the court finds that Defendant has not met its burden to show that the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations bars this cause of action.

“The Song-Beverly Act does not include its own statute of limitations. [Citation.] California courts have held that the statute of limitations for an action for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is governed by the same statute that governs the statute of limitations for warranties arising under the Uniform Commercial Code: section 2725 of the Uniform Commercial Code.” (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305-1306 [internal citation omitted].) Pursuant to that statute, the statute of limitations for breach of warranty actions is four years after the cause of action has accrued. (Ibid.; Com. Code, § 2725, subd. (1); Montoya v. Ford Motor Company (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 493, 495 [“The statute of limitations for breaches of the implied warranty of merchantability is four years”].) “A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.” (Com. Code, § 2725, subd. (2); Mexia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1306 [under Commercial Code section 2725, “a cause of action for breach of warranty accrues, at the earliest, upon tender of delivery”].)

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs (1) purchased the subject vehicle on September 19, 2013, and (2) filed this action on December 30, 2019. (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-2; Orquiola Decl., Ex. 2 to Ex. A [purchase contract dated September 19, 2013].) However, Defendant did not present evidence or argument establishing that the date of purchase of the subject vehicle was the date that tender of delivery was made, such that Defendant has not shown that the breach of the implied warranties occurred on September 19, 2023.[1] (Com. Code, § 2725, subd. (2) [stating that a breach of warranty occurs, inter alia, when tender of delivery is made].)

Second, the court finds that Defendant has not met its burden to show that it cannot be held liable for breach of the implied warranty of fitness.

“Every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state by a retailer or distributor who has reason to know at the time of the retail sale that the goods are required for a particular purpose, and that the buyer is relying on the retailer’s or distributor’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods shall be accompanied by such retailer’s or distributor’s implied warranty that the goods are fit for that purpose.” (Civ. Code, § 1792.2.) Defendant does not dispute that, as a distributor, it may be held liable for a breach of the implied warranty of fitness. (Ibid.; UMF No. 5 [Defendant is a distributor]; Lewis Decl., ¶ 4; Mot., pp. 7:27-6.)

The court finds that Defendant has not presented competent evidence showing that it did not know, at the time of the sale of the subject vehicle, that the vehicle was required for a particular purpose. The court has sustained Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections to portions of the declaration of Mandyjay Lewis on the ground that Lewis did not state facts or lay a foundation to establish that that Lewis had personal knowledge of the matters regarding Defendant’s knowledge of the purpose for which Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle at the time of sale.

Thus, the court finds that Defendant has not shown that the sale of the subject vehicle was not accompanied by Defendant’s implied warranty that the vehicle was fit for the purpose for which Plaintiffs purchased it, such that Defendant has not shown that Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied warranty of fitness has no merit. (Civ. Code, § 1792.2, subd. (a).)

The court notes that Defendant has argued that Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability has no merit because (1) the Song-Beverly Act states that “every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are merchantable, and (2) it is undisputed that Defendant is not a manufacturer, but rather, is a distributor. (Civ. Code, § 1729 [emphasis added]; UMF Nos. 5-6; Lewis Decl., ¶¶ 4-5 [Defendant “is a distributor of new vehicles” and “does not manufacture, assemble, or produce any vehicles or consumer products”].) However, Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for breach of implied warranty is based on alleged breaches of the implied warranty of merchantability and the breach of the implied warranty of fitness, such that the court cannot grant summary adjudication solely on the ground that the claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability has no merit. (Compl., ¶¶ 114-118; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1) [“A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action . . . .”].)

The court therefore denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the second cause of action for breach of implied warranty.

“[T]he elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 311 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

The court finds that Defendant (1) has not met its burden of showing that the fourth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment has no merit on the grounds that (i) it is barred by the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, (ii) Plaintiffs cannot establish the element of concealment or suppression of a material fact, and (iii) it is barred by the economic loss rule, and (2) has met its burden of showing that the fourth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment has no merit on the ground that Defendant did not have a duty to disclose material facts to Plaintiffs.

First, the court finds that Defendant has not shown that this cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.

The statute of limitations for “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake” is three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) “The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Ibid.) Defendant has asserted, without adequate argument, authority, and evidence, that this cause of action began to accrue on the date of purchase (i.e., September 19, 2013). (Mot., p. 9:21-22 [“Any alleged fraud must have predated that date”].) However, Defendant did not support this assertion, for example, by presenting argument and evidence to show that Plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the facts constituting the fraud on the date of purchase. (Ibid.) Thus, the court finds that Defendant (1) has not shown that this cause of action accrued on September 19, 2013, i.e., more than three years before the date that the Complaint was filed, and therefore (2) has not met its burden to show that the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations bars this cause of action.

Second, the court finds that Defendant has not shown that Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed facts.

The court acknowledges that Defendant has submitted evidence showing that Plaintiffs did not rely on commercials and marketing brochures before purchasing the subject vehicle. (UMF Nos. 21-24, 30-32.) However, that evidence does not show that Defendant did not breach its duty to disclose the engine defect to Plaintiffs at the time of the sale. Thus, the court finds that Defendant has not shown that it did not conceal or fail to disclose a material fact to Plaintiffs.

Third, the court finds that Defendant has not shown that this cause of action is barred by the economic loss rule because (1) that rule provides that “there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted ‘purely economic losses,’ meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage[,]” but only to the extent that the claims “arise from—or are not independent of—the parties’ underlying contracts[,]” and (2) the conduct that is the subject of this cause of action does not arise from the parties’ underlying contract (i.e., the warranties). (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 921, 923; Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 841, review granted Feb. 1, 2023, No. S277568 [“a defendant’s conduct in fraudulently inducing someone to enter a contract is separate from the defendant’s later breach of the contract or warranty provisions that were agreed to”][2].) Moreover, although Defendant has presented evidence showing that Plaintiffs were not “physically harmed” when using the vehicle, Defendant’s own evidence shows that plaintiff Larios suffered “the trauma of when the car left [plaintiff Larios] stranded[,]” including the stress of that occurrence, such that Defendant’s evidence shows that Plaintiffs did not suffer purely economic losses. (Orquiola Decl., Ex. A, Pl. Larios Dep., p. 66:7-13.)

Finally, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show that it did not have a duty to disclose to Plaintiffs material facts regarding the engine defect that is the subject of this action.

Nondisclosure or concealment may constitute fraud in four circumstances: “(1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.” (Bigler-Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 311 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].) The last three circumstances “presuppose[] the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise. [Citation.] A duty to disclose facts arises only when the parties are in a relationship that gives rise to the duty, such as seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual arrangement.” (Ibid. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

Defendant has presented evidence showing that (1) Plaintiffs purchased the subject vehicle from Kia of Downtown; (2) while Kia of Downtown is one of Defendant’s authorized third-party dealers, Defendant does not control its day-to-day operations, it is an independently owned and operated dealership, and its employees are not employees of Defendant and they are not under Defendant’s control; and (3) Defendant was not a party to the contract between Plaintiffs and Kia of Downtown. (UMF Nos. 10-14; Lewis Decl., ¶¶ 7-9, 11; Orquiola Decl., Ex. 2 to Ex. A [purchase contract between plaintiff Sanchez and Kia of Downtown].) Thus, the court finds that Defendant has submitted evidence showing that there was no transaction between Plaintiffs and Defendant (e.g., as buyer and seller) that gave rise to the duty to disclose since Defendant has shown that it, or its agents, were not involved in the sale of the subject vehicle. (Bigler-Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 311.)

The court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of Defendant’s duty to disclose since Plaintiffs have shown that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the existence of a transactional relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendant since Defendant issued an express warranty to Plaintiffs for the subject vehicle, which created a contractual relationship between them. (Bigler-Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 311 [a relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose includes “parties entering into any kind of contractual arrangement”]; Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 928 [describing an express warranty to be a contractual promise from the seller to the buyer]; Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 845, rev. granted Feb. 1, 2023, No. S277568 [concluding that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a duty to disclose based on a buyer-seller relationship since plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from the defendant’s authorized dealership, which was its authorized agent for purposes of the sale of its vehicles to consumers, and that the defendant backed the car with an express warranty]; Zepeda v. General Motors, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2024) 2024 WL 3732479 at *5 [“the Court agrees that the allegation that Defendant provided an express warranty is sufficient to establish a transactional relationship at the pleading stage”].)

The court notes that Plaintiffs have also argued that Defendant had a duty to disclose material facts to Plaintiffs on the ground that vendors, such as Defendant, owe such a duty to subsequent purchasers. The court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that Defendant owed a duty to disclose material facts to Plaintiffs on this ground.

The court acknowledges that, “[u]nder California law, a vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold.” (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 839 [emphasis in original].) However, the vendor must have reason to expect that the facts will be repeated to the subsequent purchasers, and that it will influence their conduct in that transaction. (Geernaert v. Mitchell (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 601, 605-606, 607-608.) Plaintiffs did not present adequate authority, argument, and evidence showing that Defendant had reason to expect that the material facts regarding the engine would be repeated to subsequent purchasers such as Plaintiffs and would influence their conduct in transactions. Thus, Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the duty to disclose on this ground.

The court further notes that, in reply, Defendant asserts that “the alleged material fact was not known or accessibly only to [Defendant] as it had no knowledge of Theta II issues until after Plaintiffs purchased the subject vehicle.” (Reply, p. 6:10-11 [emphasis in original].) However, Defendant did not raise this argument in its moving papers. (Notice of Mot., p. ii:10-19 [moving for summary adjudication on fourth cause of action on grounds that it did not owe a duty to disclose facts to Plaintiffs, it is barred by the economic loss rule, and it is barred by the statute of limitations].)

The court therefore denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the fourth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment.

3. Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement – Intentional Misrepresentation

“The elements of intentional misrepresentation ‘are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.’” (Aton Center, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1245 [internal citation omitted].)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – intentional misrepresentation has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (actual and justifiable reliance on misrepresentations) cannot be established.

Defendant has presented evidence showing that (1) plaintiff Larios did not rely on marketing brochures or statements made during the sales process when she purchased the subject vehicle; (2) plaintiff Larios did not rely on anything that anyone might have told her regarding the engine when purchasing the vehicle; and (3) Plaintiff Sanchez did not participate in the shopping process, did not speak to any salesperson at Kia of Downtown, and did not review any marketing brochures regarding the subject vehicle. (UMF Nos. 70-71, 73, 74-76; Orquiola Decl., Ex. A, Pl. Larios Dep., pp. 25:13 [answering “No” to the questions “Did you rely on anything that you saw from the commercials when purchasing the Kia Sorrento?” and “Did you rely on any radio commercials, brochures, when purchasing the Kia Sorrento?”], 26:12-15 [answering “No. It’s just that I liked the truck” to the question “Did you rely on any statement made during the sales process and in the marketing brochures to buy your Kia Sorrento?”], 29:11-13 [answering “Exactly” to the question “So – so you didn’t rely on anything anyone told you regarding the engine to purchase the vehicle; correct?”]; Orquiola Decl., Ex. B, Pl. Sanchez Dep., pp. 18:22-24 [Sanchez did not speak to salespersons at Kia of Downtown], 19:8-10 [Sanchez did not review marketing brochures regarding the Kia Sorrento], 20:22-25 [“I didn’t participate in the purchase of the car”]; Compl., ¶¶ 156-157 [alleging that Defendant intended that Plaintiffs rely on, and that Plaintiffs did so rely on, representations made in its marketing brochures related to the engine to induce them to purchase the vehicle].)

Thus, the court finds that Defendant has shown that Plaintiffs did not rely on any representations made by Defendant in purchasing the subject vehicle and therefore has shown that this cause of action does not have merit.

The court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of their reliance on false representations made by Defendant because Plaintiffs (1) did not present evidence to show that they relied on the marketing brochures and statements made by Defendant, (2) have not disputed that they did not rely on the marketing brochures and the sales agents in the separate statement, and (3) did not address this cause of action in their opposition papers, such that they did not present adequate argument and authority to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to this element.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – intentional misrepresentation.

“An employer shall not be liable for [punitive damages], based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, §¿3294, subd. (b).) “[O]n a motion for summary adjudication with respect to a punitive damages claim, the higher evidentiary standard applies.¿ If the plaintiff is going to prevail on a punitive damages claim, he or she can only do so by establishing malice, oppression or fraud by clear and convincing evidence.”¿ (Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1121.)¿ “Under the clear and convincing evidence standard, the evidence must be ‘ “ ‘ “so clear as to leave no substantial doubt” ’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘ “sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. ” ’ ” ’¿ [Citation.]¿ Although the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is a stringent one, ‘it does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to “prove” a case for punitive damages at summary judgment [or summary adjudication].’”¿ (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158 [internal citations omitted].)¿ However, the court must take this higher standard of proof into account in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.¿ (Ibid.)¿¿

The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of showing that the claim for punitive damages has no merit because Defendant has not shown that the element of advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification, or act of oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant cannot be established.

Defendant argues that, “at best, Plaintiffs can only point to purported communications they had with a dealer salesperson, though Plaintiffs admit they do not remember anything the dealership salesperson said.” (Mot., p. 19:8-10.) However, Defendant (1) does not cite to any evidence in support of that assertion, such as discovery responses from Plaintiffs to show that they have based their claim for punitive damages on statements made by salespersons at Kia of America, and (2) has not addressed Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendant—and not any salespersons at Kia of America—concealed the engine defect from Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 141-142.) Moreover, the testimony that plaintiff Larios could not recall the name of the salesperson that facilitated the purchase and that plaintiff Sanchez did not talk to a salesperson at Kia of Downtown does not show that Plaintiffs cannot establish the element of advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification, or act of oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant. (Orquiola Decl., Ex. A, Pl. Larios Dep., pp. 18:25-19:2 [Larios does not remember the name of the salesperson that sold them the vehicle]; Orquiola Decl., Ex. B, Pl. Sanchez Dep., p. 18:22-24 [Sanchez never spoke to any salesperson at Kia of Downtown].)

The court therefore denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.

The court denies defendant Kia America, Inc., f/k/a Kia Motors America, Inc.’s motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiffs Adela Sanchez and Livia Larios’s second cause of action for breach of the implied warranty, fourth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment, and claim for punitive damages.

The court grants defendant Kia America, Inc., f/k/a Kia Motors America, Inc.’s motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiffs Adela Sanchez and Livia Larios’s fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – intentional misrepresentation.

The court orders plaintiffs Adela Sanchez and Livia Larios to give notice of this ruling.

[1] The court notes that Plaintiffs allege that they delivered the subject vehicle to Defendant’s authorized repair facility on or about September 27, 2013, after the front right tire blew out, which suggests that tender of delivery was made at least as of September 27, 2013. (Compl., ¶ 51.) However, Defendant did not raise this point in its moving papers and, as set forth above, did not present any other evidence regarding the date of tender of delivery.

[2] The court finds that the reasoning set forth in Dhital is persuasive. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.1115, subd. (e)(1) [“Pending review and filing of the Supreme Court’s opinion, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court under (3), a published opinion of a Court of Appeal in the matter has no binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive value only”].)

adela sanchez , et al.; Plaintiffs, vs. kia motors america, inc. , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	19STCV46989

	Hearing Date:	December 5, 2024

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[Tentative] Order RE: defendant’s motion for summary adjudication