Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 20STCV05624, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

Case Number: 20STCV05624    Hearing Date: April 30, 2025    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTIES:              Plaintiffs Catalina Harb and Solei Harb                    

RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendant Hyundai Motor America

Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court denies plaintiffs Catalina Harb and Solei Harb’s requests for judicial notice because (1) the federal court rulings on other motions for attorney’s fees are not relevant to the court’s disposition of the pending motion for attorney’s fees in this action, and (2) the trial court rulings on other motions for attorney’s fees (i) are not relevant to the court’s disposition of the pending motion for attorney’s fees in this action, and (ii) have no binding or precedential value on the court.  (Malek Media Group LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 825; Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761 [“a written trial court ruling has no precedential value”].)

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

            The court rules on plaintiffs Catalina Harb and Solei Harb’s evidentiary objections, filed on April 9, 2025, as follows:

            The court overrules Objections Nos. 1-4, 6-7, and 16-18.

            The court sustains Objections Nos. 5 and 8-15.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs Catalina Harb and Solei Harb (“Plaintiffs”) move the court for an order awarding in favor of Plaintiffs and against defendant Hyundai Motor America (“Defendant”)   (1) attorney’s fees in the amount of $113,541.50, (2) $39,739.53 in a 1.35 lodestar multiplier on the attorney’s fees, (3) $8,787.925 in costs and expenses, and (4) an additional $5,000 to review any opposition papers filed in connection with this motion, draft a reply, and attend the hearing on this motion.

First, the court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that they are entitled to recover from Defendant attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), provides:¿ “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”¿¿¿ 

Plaintiffs have shown that, on July 5, 2024, they accepted Defendant’s “Second Code of Civil Procedure Section 998 Offer to Compromise” (the “Second 998 Offer”), pursuant to which the parties agreed that (1) Defendant will pay to Plaintiffs $24,000 and Plaintiffs will dismiss this action with prejudice, and (2) Defendant will stipulate that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party for purposes of any motion for attorney’s fees, expenses and costs, and/or memorandum of costs.  (Baker Decl., Ex. 7, Second 998 Offer, ¶¶ 1, 5, and p. 3 [acceptance page].)  The court therefore finds that Plaintiffs may recover from Defendant attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses that were reasonably incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action.  (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) 

Second, the court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs from Defendant until May 6, 2020, which is the date on which Defendant made an offer to allow an award to be entered in accordance with its terms pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1); Aliviado Decl., Ex. B.)

“If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover their postoffer costs . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1).)  An offer to compromise under this statute “must be sufficiently specific to allow the recipient to evaluate the worth of the offer and make a reasoned decision whether to accept the offer.”  (Covert v. FCA USA, LLC (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 821, 833 [internal quotation marks omitted].)  “Once the offeror shows the section 998 offer is valid, the burden shifts to the offeree to show the offer was not made in good faith.”  (Ibid.)  “[A]n offer is only made in good faith if the offer carri[ies] with it some reasonable prospect of acceptance.”  (Id. at p. 834 [internal quotation marks omitted].)  Determining whether the offer has a reasonable prospect of acceptance “is a function of two considerations[:]” (1) whether the offer is within the range of reasonably possible results at trial, considering all of the information the offeror knew or should have known, and (2) whether the offeror knew that the offeree had sufficient information, based on what the offeree knew or reasonably should have known, to assess whether the offer was a reasonable one.  (Ibid.)

            Defendant has presented evidence that it served Plaintiffs with its first Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer on May 6, 2020 (the “First 998 Offer”), pursuant to which Defendant offered to settle this action for the amount of $27,500.  (Aliviado Decl., Ex. B, First 998 Offer, ¶¶ 1, 5.)  The court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show that the First 998 Offer was valid because the First 998 Offer (1) included a statement of the offer (i.e., that Defendant would pay $27,500 to Plaintiffs), (2) contained the terms and conditions of the judgment or award (i.e., that Defendant would pay that amount to Plaintiffs within 30 days of acceptance and that Plaintiffs would dismiss the action with prejudice), and (3) included a provision that allowed Plaintiffs to accept its terms by signing a statement that the First 998 Offer was accepted by signing the acceptance statement attached thereto.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (b); Aliviado Decl., Ex. B, First 998 Offer.)  The court further finds that Defendant has shown that Plaintiffs failed to obtain a more favorable judgment or award since Plaintiffs later settled this action for $24,000, i.e., $3,500 less than the amount offered to them by Defendant in the First 998 Offer.  (Aliviado Decl., Ex. C, Second 998 Offer; Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2025) 17 Cal.5th 592, 722 [“In section 998(b), the Legislature contemplated that a ‘judgment’ might result from a settlement agreement between the parties.  There is no reason to think the term ‘judgment’ carries a different meaning in section 998(c)(1)”].)

The court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that the First 998 Offer was not made in good faith.  (Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 918, 924 [“A 998 offer is valid only if it is made in ‘good faith’”], 926 [“Although the party making a 998 offer generally has the burden of showing that her offer is valid [citations], it is the 998 offeree who bears the burden of showing that an otherwise valid 998 offer was not made in good faith”].)  Although Plaintiffs have argued that the First 998 Offer was made before the parties conducted discovery and that plaintiffs in lemon law cases may require certain discovery before evaluating a settlement offer, Plaintiffs did not submit evidence or present argument and analysis to show what evidence Plaintiffs here—rather than lemon law plaintiffs generally—needed to obtain before they could assess whether the First 998 Offer was reasonable, including because (1) Plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known the total amount that they were to pay under the subject lease (i.e., $9,156.15 ($11,156.15 less $2,000 rebate)), and (2) the First 998 Offer exceeded that amount.  (Mot., p. 4:8-11; Reply, pp. 1:3-3:7; Aliviado Decl., Ex. D, Lease Agreement, p. 1; Crayton v. FCA US LLC (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 194, 203-204 [manufacturer shall make restitution in amount equal to actual price paid or payable by the buyer, which incudes all amounts a plaintiff becomes legally obligated to pay when agreeing to lease a vehicle].)  The court further finds that the timing of the First 998 Offer, alone, does not show that Defendant knew that Plaintiffs did not have sufficient information to evaluate the reasonableness of the First 998 Offer.  (Covert, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 833; Licudine, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 925.)

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that the First 998 Offer was not made in good faith.  (Covert, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 833; Licudine, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 926.)

Third, the court finds, as to the attorney’s fees incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with (1) the commencement and prosecution of this action until May 6, 2020 and (2) the preparation of this fee motion, that Plaintiffs have established a lodestar amount of $9,250.

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted); Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691 [“To determine a reasonable attorney fee award, the trial court applies the lodestar method”].)¿ “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”¿ (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)¿¿¿¿ 

As to the attorney’s fees incurred to commence and prosecute this action until May 6, 2020, the court finds (1) that, upon consideration of the declaration of Payam Shahian describing the education, skill, and qualifications of counsel, the reasonable hourly rate for (i) attorney Mark Gibson is $450, and (ii) attorney Matthew Pardo is $350,[1] (2) that attorney Gibson reasonably expended 5 hours to draft the Complaint and discovery requests, and (3) that attorney Pardo reasonably expended 3 hours to draft case documents and correspond with opposing counsel and Plaintiffs.  (Shahian Decl., ¶ 9, subds. (i) [qualifications of Mark Gibson], (q) [qualifications of Matthew Pardo]; Shahian Decl., Ex. 23, p. 1 [billing records].)  The court further finds that Plaintiffs have shown that attorney Baker reasonably expended, at the reasonable hourly rate of $595, a total of 10 hours to prepare the pending fee motion, review Defendant’s opposition papers, draft the reply papers, and to appear at the hearing on this motion.  (Shahian Decl., ¶ 9, subd. (b) [qualifications of Baker]; Shahian Decl., Ex. 23, p. 7.)

Thus, the court finds that Plaintiffs have established a lodestar amount of $9,250 ((5 hours x Gibson’s $450 hourly rate) + (3 hours x Pardo’s $350 hourly rate) + (10 hours x Baker’s $595 hourly rate)).

            Fourth, although the court recognizes that this matter was taken on a contingency basis, the court finds that there is no evidence that this lemon law matter involved complex or novel issues that would justify the imposition of a multiplier, and therefore denies Plaintiffs’ request for a 1.35 multiplier.  (Shahian Decl., ¶ 14.)

            Fifth, the court finds that (1) Plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs until the date of May 6, 2020 (i.e., the date on which Defendant served the First 998 Offer), and (2) Plaintiffs have shown that they incurred costs to commence and prosecute this action until that date in the total amount of $555.50.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1); Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d); Shahian Decl., Ex. 23, p. 7.)

ORDER

            The court grants in part plaintiffs Catalina Harb and Solei Harb’s motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses as follows.

            Pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), the court orders that plaintiffs Catalina Harb and Solei Harb shall recover a total of $9,805.50 from defendant Hyundai Motor America, consisting of $9,250 in attorney’s fees and $555.50 in costs and expenses.

            The court orders defendant Hyundai Motor America to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  April 30, 2025

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court