Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 20STCV31765, Date: 2025-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 20STCV31765, Date: 2025-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

Plaintiff Jasmine Nguyen (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on August 20, 2020, against defendants Richard Chhor, Peter Tri Nguyen, Tony Ta, a/k/a Tuong Duc Ta, Catherine Huang, Heng Phan, Theresa Vu, and Billy Phan. Thereafter, on December 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed two “Amendment to Complaint” forms, in which Plaintiff substituted (1) defendant Ellen K. Gold as the true name for fictitious name Doe 1 in the Complaint, and (2) defendant Linda Loi Vo as the true name for fictitious name Doe 2 in the Complaint.

The clerk entered the defaults of the following defendants on September 27, 2021: Catherine Huang (“Huang”), Theresa Vu (“Vu”), Ellen K. Gold (“Gold”), Linda Loi Vo (“Vo”), and Billy Phan (“B. Phan”) (collectively, “Defaulted Defendants”).[1]

Plaintiff now requests that the court enter default judgment in her favor and against Defaulted Defendants as follows: (1) against defendant Huang in the total amount of $317,864.44, consisting of (i) $185,000 in damages, and (ii) $132,865.55 in prejudgment interest; (2) against defendant Vu in the total amount of $54,981.94, consisting of (i) $32,000 in damages, and (ii) $22,981.96 in prejudgment interest; (3) against defendants Gold and Vo, jointly and severally, in the total amount of $1,775,072.59, consisting of (i) $1,105,426 in damages, and (ii) $669,646.59 in prejudgment interest; (4) against defendant B. Phan in the total amount of $123,724.83, consisting of (i) $72,008.98 in damages, and (ii) $51,715.85 in prejudgment interest; (5) against Defaulted Defendants, jointly and severally, costs in the amount of $12,625.71; and (6) against Defaulted Defendants, jointly and severally attorney’s fees in an amount to be decided on a noticed motion. (JUD-100, Attachment 7; CIV-100, ¶¶ 2, 7.)

The court, in its discretion, rules on the request for default judgment against Defaulted Defendants and leaves the action to proceed against the non-defaulted defendants, because a several judgment is proper and because the five-year deadline by which to bring this action to trial expires as to Defaulted Defendants on August 20, 2025.[2] (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 579, 583.310.)

The Complaint alleges against defendant Huang the eighth cause of action for conspiracy, which is based on the following allegations: (1) defendant Huang is a girlfriend of non-defaulted defendant Richard Chhor (“Chhor”), (2) “All 3 Defendants and each of them conspired with each other to harm Plaintiff[,]” (3) “Defendants discussed with one another, thus knew about and together carried out the intended act, namely transferring the money to Defendant Catherine Huang, without equivalent value in exchange,” without Plaintiff’s consent, and (4) Defendants together consummated the transfer. (Compl., ¶¶ 129-134.) Plaintiff has also alleged, in the general allegations section of the Complaint, that defendants Chhor and Peter Tri Nguyen (“Nguyen”) conspired with Huang to defraud Plaintiff by paying money to her. (Compl., ¶ 41.)

Although the court notes that Plaintiff has defined the term “Defendants” to refer only to defendants Chhor and Nguyen, the court finds that the allegations in support of this cause of action against Huang, considered in light of their context, allege that Huang conspired with Chhor and Nguyen to transfer money to Huang wrongfully “under the guise of service rendered[,]” which is sufficient to allege civil conspiracy based on the conversion of funds against Huang. (Compl., ¶¶ 16 [defining “Defendants”], 132-133; Navarrete v. Meyer (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1291 [“The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act or acts done in furtherance of the common design”] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

The court finds that Plaintiff has proven that she suffered damages as a result of Huang’s wrongful conduct in the amount of $185,000 based on the evidence that (1) Plaintiff raised over $3,000,000 to invest in five supermarkets, including City of Industry Supermarket, LLC and Little Saigon Supermarket, LLC, and (2) Huang wrongfully received from (i) City of Industry Supermarket, LLC a total of $69,000, and (ii) Little Saigon Supermarket, LLC a total of $116,000. (Pl. Decl., ¶¶ 4-6; Pl. Compendium of Ex., Vol. II, Ex. 44, pp. 88 [Check No. 5600 dated April 15, 2017 showing $30,000 transfer to Huang], 474 [Check No. 1002 dated April 10, 2019 showing $8,000 transfer to Huang], 594 [Check No. 10016 dated November 30, 2014 showing $6,000 transfer to Huang], 622 [Check No. 1008 dated May 13, 2015 showing $25,000 transfer to Huang]; Pl. Compendium of Ex., Vol. I, Ex. 42-Bank of America-3, pp. 183 [Check No. 1091 dated May 31, 2016 showing $66,000 transfer to Huang], 192 [Check No. 1014 dated November 2015 showing $20,000 transfer to Catherine Huang and Check No. 1015 dated November 21, 2015 showing $22,000 transfer to Huang], 217 [Check No. 1246 dated September 27, 2016 showing $8,000 transfer to Huang].)

The court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that the court should award prejudgment interest in the amount of $132,865.55 from the date of April 15, 2018 on the total amount of $185,000 because Plaintiff did not incur all of those damages as of the date of April 15, 2018 since defendant Huang did not receive the wrongfully transferred $8,000 until April 10, 2019. (Pl. Compendium of Ex., Vol. II, Ex. 44, p. 468 [April 10, 2019 Check No. 1002 in amount of $8,000].)

The court awards prejudgment interest in the total amount of $90,137.61 as follows: (1) $12,188.05 in interest on the amount of $177,000 ($185,000 less the $8,000 in damages incurred on April 10, 2019) from the period of April 15, 2018 to April 9, 2019 (359 days) at the rate of 7 percent per annum, and (2) $77,949.56 in interest on the amount of $185,000 from the date of April 10, 2019 through April 15, 2025 (2,197 days) at the rate of 7 percent per annum. (Civ. Code, § 3287, subd. (a).)

The court will therefore enter default judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against defendant Huang in the total amount of $275,137.61, consisting of $185,000 in damages and $90,137.61 in prejudgment interest.

The Complaint alleges against defendant Vu the eighth cause of action for conspiracy, which is based on the allegations that (1) Vu is a mutual friend of Plaintiff, Chhor, and Nguyen, (2) Vu introduced defendants Chhor and Nguyen to Plaintiff, and (3) Vu, Chhor, and Nguyen conspired with each other to harm Plaintiff, including by discussing and carrying out the act of transferring money to defendant Vu without equivalent value in exchange and without Plaintiff’s consent or ratification. (Compl., ¶¶ 146-150.) The court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for conspiracy against defendant Vu. (Navarrete, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291 [elements of civil conspiracy].)

The court finds that Plaintiff has proven that she suffered damages as a result of Vu’s wrongful conduct in the total amount of $33,000, consisting of the $28,000 transferred to Vu on May 31, 2016 and the $5,000 transferred to Vu on April 25, 2017. (Pl. Compendium of Exhibits, Vol. I, Ex. 42-Bank of America-3, p. 183 [Check No. 1090 dated May 31, 2016 to Vu from Little Saigon Supermarket, LLC for $28,000]; Pl. Compendium of Exhibits, Vol. II, Ex. 44, p. 91 [Check No. 5598 dated April 25, 2017 to Vu from City of Industry Supermarket, LLC for $5,000].) The court notes that, although Plaintiff has calculated the damages to be $32,000, $28,000 + $5,000 is $33,000. (Pl. Decl., ¶ 6, subd. (a)(i).)

The court modifies the amount of prejudgment interest to be $16,109.94 as to the correct amount of $33,000 from the date of May 31, 2018 through May 15, 2025 (2,541 days) at the rate of 7 percent per annum. (Civ. Code, § 3287, subd. (a).)

The court will therefore enter default judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against defendant Vu in the total amount of $49,109.94, consisting of $33,000 in damages and $16,109.94 in prejudgment interest.

The Complaint alleges against defendants Gold and Vo, who are identified in the Complaint as Doe defendants 1 and 2, respectively, the following causes of action: (1) the first cause of action for breach of contract; (2) the second cause of action for fraud; (3) the third cause of action for fraud: constructive fraud; (4) the fourth cause of action for negligent representation; (5) the fifth cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty; (6) the sixth cause of action for conversion; (7) seventh cause of action for conspiracy; (8) the eighth cause of action for conspiracy; (9) the ninth cause of action for money had and received; (10) the 10th cause of action for quiet title; and (11) the 11th cause of action for accounting.

For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the Complaint does not plead sufficient facts in support of Plaintiff’s causes of action against defendants Gold and Vo.[3]

“‘Substantively, “[t]he judgment by default is said to ‘confess’ the material facts alleged by the plaintiff, i.e., the defendant’s failure to answer has the same effect as an express admission of the matters well pleaded in the complaint.’” (Kim v. Westmore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 281 [internal citation omitted] [emphasis in original].) “The ‘well-pleaded allegations’ of a complaint refer to ‘ “ ‘all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid. [internal citations omitted].) “And if the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint do not state any proper cause of action, the default judgment in the plaintiff’s favor cannot stand.” (Id. at p. 282.)

First, the court finds that the first cause of action for breach of contract, as alleged against defendants Gold and Vo, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because Plaintiff did not adequately allege that Plaintiff, Vo, and Gold entered into the subject oral agreement. (Aton Center, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1230 [elements of breach of oral contract]; Compl., p. 11:12-14 [alleging first cause of action against Chhor, Nguyen, and Does 1-100] and ¶¶ 9 [“All causes of action arise out of and/or [are] related to the contract entered into between Plaintiff Jasmine Nguyen and Defendants Richard Chhor and Peter Tri Nguyen”], 62 [identifying partners to project to be Chhor, Nguyen, and Plaintiff].)

Second, the court finds that the second cause of action for fraud does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo because Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that (1) Gold and Vo misrepresented facts to Plaintiff, (2) with knowledge of their falsity and (3) with the intent to induce Plaintiff’s reliance, (4) Plaintiff actually and justifiably relied on the statements made by Gold and Vo, and (5) Plaintiff suffered damages as a result thereof. (Compl., p. 13:11-13 [alleging second cause of action against Chhor, Nguyen, and Does 1-100]; Aton Center, Inc., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1245 [elements of intentional misrepresentation].)

The court acknowledges that Plaintiff has alleged that “Defendants represented to Plaintiff” certain facts set forth in the Complaint. (Compl., ¶ 76.) But (1) the term “Defendants” has been specially defined to mean only defendants Chhor and Nguyen, and (2) the allegations in support of this cause of action make clear that the subject misrepresentations are those made by defendants Chhor and Nguyen. (Compl., ¶¶ 16 [“Defendants Richard Chhor and Peter Tri Nguyen, at times collectively referred to as ‘Defendants’ . . . .”], 76 [“In particular, on or about October 22, 2015, each defendant, Richard Chhor and Peter Tri Nguyen, took turn to represent to Plaintiff the following material facts . . . .”].) Moreover, the court finds that the general, conclusory allegations that Doe defendants (i.e., including Gold and Vo) are responsible for the conduct alleged or were the agents, representatives, or alter egos of the other defendants do not support this cause of action. (Compl., ¶¶ 10-12.) The court also notes that Plaintiff does not appear to contend that Gold and Vo were Chhor and Nguyen’s agents, employees, representatives, or alter egos. (Pl. Case Summary.)

Third, the court finds that the third cause of action for fraud: constructive fraud does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo because Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that (1) there existed a confidential or fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff, Gold, and Vo, and (2) Gold and Vo breached their duties in that confidential or fiduciary relationship that induced justifiable reliance by Plaintiff to her prejudice and that resulted in damages. (Compl., p. 14:16-19 [alleging third cause of action against Chhor, Nguyen, Tony Ta a/k/a Tuong Duc Ta, and Does 1-100]; Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1131 [defining constructive fraud].)

Fourth, the court finds that the fourth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo because Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing (1) that Gold and Vo made misrepresentations of past or existing material facts, (2) without reasonable ground for believing them to be true, (3) with the intent to induce Plaintiff’s reliance on those facts, (4) Plaintiff justifiably relied on those misrepresentations, and (5) Plaintiff suffered resulting damages. (Compl., p. 16:4-6 [alleging fourth cause of action against defendants Chhor, Nguyen, and Does 1-100]; Aton Center, Inc., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1245-1246 [elements of negligent misrepresentation].)

Fifth, the court finds that the fifth cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo because Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that there existed a fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff, Gold, and Vo, and instead has alleged only that “Defendants,” i.e., defendants Chhor and Nguyen, were partners/investors in the joint venture and therefore owed Plaintiff a fiduciary duty. (Compl., p. 17:3-5 [alleging fifth cause of action against Chhor, Nguyen, and Does 1-100] and ¶¶ 16, 102; McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 911 [elements of cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty].)

Sixth, the court finds that the sixth cause of action for conversion does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo. (Compl., p. 17:26-28 [alleging sixth cause of action against Chhor, Nguyen, and Does 1-100].)

Plaintiffs have alleged that “Defendants” interfered with Plaintiff’s property by knowingly taking the possession of the property, including by (1) transferring the equipment belonging to the City of Industry Supermarket after Defendants fraudulently transferred that supermarket to Tony Ta, (2) removing items from Little Saigon Supermarket without Plaintiff’s consent, and (3) transferring money from sales “to pay to individuals named as defendants in the case herein” “in the guise of ‘services rendered’ and the like.” (Compl., ¶¶ 109-110.) Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the “disposition of [Plaintiff’s] property in a manner that is inconsistent with [Plaintiff’s] property rights” by defendants Chhor and Nguyen (who are defined to be “Defendants”). (Regent Alliance Ltd. v. Rabizadeh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1777, 1181 [elements of conversion].) However, Plaintiff did not allege that defendants Gold and Vo disposed of Plaintiff’s property.

Seventh, the court finds that the seventh cause of action for conspiracy does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo. (Compl., p. 18:21-23 [alleging seventh cause of action against Chhor, Nguyen, and Does 1-100.) The conspiracy alleged in support of this cause of action is based on the alleged acts and omissions of Chhor and Nguyen, and do not include any allegations that can be reasonably construed to extend to Gold and Vo. Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that “Both Defendants [i.e., referencing Chhor and Nguyen only] approached Plaintiff together[,]” and at those meetings, “Defendant Richard Chhor and Peter Tri Nguyen each” made statements of fact to Plaintiff, such that “Defendants therefore were aware of the scheme being set up by themselves to defraud Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶ 118 [emphasis added].)

Eighth, the court finds that the eighth cause of action for conspiracy does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo. (Compl., p. 19:20-23 [alleging eighth cause of action against Chhor, Nguyen, Tony Ta, Huang, Heng Phan, Vu, Phan, and Does 1-100].)

Plaintiff has alleged five counts of conspiracy in support of this cause of action. The first count (labeled 8A) is specifically alleged against Chhor, Nguyen, Tony Ta, and Does 1-100. (Compl., p. 19:24.) In support of this claim, Plaintiff has alleged that (1) Defendants and each of them conspired with each other to harm Plaintiff, and (2) Defendants’ scheme was to transfer the City of Industry Supermarket to defendant Ta, which they carried out together to defraud Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶¶ 123-126.)

As set forth above, Plaintiff has defined the term “Defendants,” as used in the allegations set forth above, to mean defendants Chhor and Nguyen. (Compl., ¶ 16.) Contextually and fairly construed, it does not appear that Plaintiff has alleged any facts establishing that defendants Gold and Vo participated in the alleged conspiracy to transfer to defendant Tony Ta the City of Industry Supermarket. The other allegations in the Complaint, which are incorporated by reference, support the interpretation that defendants Chhor and Nguyen are the individuals alleged to have transferred City of Industry Supermarket to defendant Tony Ta. (See, e.g., ¶¶ 42 [“Defendants fraudulently transferred Plaintiff’s property by executing a quit claim deed, transferring Plaintiff’s title and legal interest in the City of Industry supermarket to defendant Tony Ta without Plaintiff’s knowledge and/or consent or subsequent ratification by Plaintiff”],

83 and 85 [“Defendants/Debtors Richard Chhor and Peter Tri Nguyen did not receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer [of City of Industry Supermarket]”], 88 [“Plaintiff suffers harm as a direct result of Defendant Tri Ta’s failure to pay market value to Plaintiff and Defendants/Debtors Richard Chhor and Peter Tri Nguyen”], 109 [“Defendants transferred the equipment belonged to the business of the City of Industry Supermarket after Defendants had fraudulently transferred said supermarket to Tony Ta”].)

The second count (labeled 8B) is specifically alleged against Chhor, Nguyen, Huang, and Does 1-100. (Compl., p. 20:13-14.) However, that claim of conspiracy, fairly construed, is based on the conduct attributable to Chhor, Nguyen, and Huang only—not Does 1-100, i.e., Gold and Vo. (Compl., ¶ 131 [“All 3 Defendants and each of them conspired with each other to harm Plaintiff”] [emphasis added].) Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged that Gold and Vo participated in a conspiracy to wrongfully transfer funds to defendant Huang.

The third count (labeled 8C) is specifically alleged against Chhor, Nguyen, Heng Phan, and Does 1-100. (Compl., p. 21:4-5.) However, that claim of conspiracy, fairly construed, is based on the conduct attributable to Chhor, Nguyen, and Heng Phan. (Compl., ¶¶ 138 [alleging that Heng Phan is the mother of Chhor], 139 [“All 3 Defendants and each of them conspired with each other to harm Plaintiff”] [emphasis added].) Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged that Gold and Vo participated in a conspiracy to wrongfully transfer funds to Heng Phan.

The fourth count (labeled 8D) is specifically alleged against Chhor, Nguyen, Vu, and Does 1-100. (Compl., p. 21:23-24.) However, that claim of conspiracy, fairly construed, is based on the conduct attributable to Chhor, Nguyen, and Vu. (Compl., ¶¶ 146-147 [alleging that Vu is a mutual friend of Chhor and Nguyen and that “All 3 Defendants and each of them conspired with each other to harm Plaintiff”] [emphasis added].) Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged that Gold and Vo participated in a conspiracy to wrongfully transfer money to Vu.

The fifth count (labeled 8E) is specifically alleged against Chhor, Nguyen, Phan, and Does 1-100. (Compl., p. 22:14-15.) However, that claim of conspiracy, fairly construed, is based on the conduct attributable to Chhor, Nguyen, and B. Phan. (Compl., ¶¶ 154-155 [alleging that B. Phan is an uncle of Chhor and was in charge of purchasing at Little Saigon Supermarket], 156 [“All 3 Defendants and each of them conspired with each other to harm Plaintiff”] [emphasis added].) Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged that Gold and Vo participated in a conspiracy to obtain goods that were free of charge or charged at reduced prices, increase the receipts, and retain the remaining money.

Ninth, the court finds that the ninth cause of action for money had and received does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo. (Compl., p. 23:9-11 [alleging ninth cause of action against Chhor, Nguyen, and Does 1-100].) Although this action is alleged against the Doe defendants and is therefore alleged against defendants Gold and Vo, this cause of action appears to seek recovery of damages based on the money lost as a result of defendants Chhor and Nguyen’s conduct in failing to fulfill their obligations under the terms of the parties’ agreement. (Compl., ¶¶ 162 [alleging that “Plaintiff met her legal obligations” and invested approximately $3,500,000 into the business venture at the request of Chhor and Nguyen], 163 [alleging that “Defendants nonetheless didn’t provide their end of the bargain. As a direct result, Plaintiff lost said approximate amount which Defendants had and received”].)

Tenth, the court finds that the 10th cause of action for quiet title does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo because (1) the Complaint is not verified as required, and (2) Plaintiff did not allege facts establishing defendants Gold and Vo’s adverse claims to the subject title. (Compl., p. 23:22-24 [alleging 10th cause of action against Chhor, Nguyen, and Does 1-100]; Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020, subd. (c).) Further, even if Plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to constitute a quiet title cause of action, it does not appear that Plaintiff is seeking a remedy in connection with this cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo, which would require an evidentiary hearing and could not be entered by default judgment on the papers. (Code Civ. Proc., § 764.010 [“The court shall not enter judgment by default but shall in all cases require evidence of plaintiff’s title and hear such evidence as may be offered respecting the claims of any of the defendants, other than claims the validity of which is admitted by the plaintiff in the complaint”]; Paterra v. Hansen (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 507, 533 [finding the reasoning in other cases “persuasive that section 764.010 imposes an absolute ban on a judgment by default in a quiet title action, and an ‘open-court’ evidentiary hearing is required”].)

Finally, the court finds that the 11th cause of action for accounting does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo because Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that (1) a relationship exists between Plaintiff and Gold, and Plaintiff and Vo, that requires an accounting, and (2) some balance is due to Plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting. (Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 869 [elements of cause of action for accounting].)

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that the well pleaded allegations of the Complaint do not state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action against defendants Gold and Vo. (Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 281, 282.) The court therefore denies Plaintiff’s request for default judgment against those defendants.

The Complaint alleges against defendant B. Phan the eighth cause of action for conspiracy based on the allegations that (1) defendant B. Phan was in charge of purchasing, among other duties, at Little Saigon Supermarket; (2) “All 3 Defendants and each of them conspired with each other to harm Plaintiff[;]” and (3) B. Phan, along with Chhor and Nguyen, carried out the intended wrongful act “by purchasing or acquiring expired goods, [which] were either free of charge or charged at a substantially reduced prices, but those defendants [i.e., Chhor, Nguyen, and B. Phan] in turn trumped up the receipt and pocketed the difference among themselves.” (Compl., ¶¶ 155-158.) The court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for conspiracy against defendant B. Phan. (Navarrete, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291 [elements of civil conspiracy].)

The court, however, finds that Plaintiff has not proven the amount of damages requested. Plaintiff asserts, in her declaration, that B. Phan “pocketed about $72,008.98.” (Pl. Decl., ¶ 6, subd. (iv).) This assertion is conclusory and insufficient to prove damages in that amount. (Ibid.) The court notes that Plaintiff has also attached as Exhibit 138 “Invoices to Billy Heng also known as Billy Phan . . . .” (Ibid. & Pl. Compendium of Exhibits, Ex. 138.) Exhibit 138 consists of (1) transaction receipts regarding an unknown account in the amounts of $20,000, $15,000, and $8,036, and (2) two invoices to Little Saigon Supermarket, LLC from Sunnyvale Seafood in the amounts of $20,902 and $52,106.90.[4] (Pl. Compendium of Exhibits, Ex. 138, pp. 1-3 [transaction receipts], 6-12 [invoices].)

Plaintiff did not explain how she calculated $72,008.90 in damages based on this evidence. For example, Plaintiff did not present evidence to show that (1) the items in the invoices were actually received free of charge and B. Phan retained all of the amounts stated, or (2) the items in the invoices were received for amounts less than stated and that B. Phan retained the remainder thereof. (See Compl., ¶ 157 [alleging that B. Phan, with Chhor and Nguyen, purchased goods that were either free or charged at substantially reduced prices and pocketed the difference].) Plaintiff also did not explain the significance of the transaction receipts.

Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden to prove damages in the amount of $72,008.90, to be recovered from B. Phan in connection with the eighth cause of action for conspiracy. (Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 272 [“it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove up his damages, with actual evidence”] [emphasis in original].) The court therefore denies Plaintiff’s request for default judgment against defendant B. Phan.

Plaintiff requests an award of costs in favor of Plaintiff and against Defaulted Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $12,625.71. (CIV-100, ¶ 7; JUD-100, Attachment 7, ¶ 5.) Plaintiff also requests attorney’s fees from Defaulted Defendants in an amount to be determined by noticed motion.

First, the court denies Plaintiff’s request for costs and attorney’s fees against defendants Gold, Vu, and B. Phan because the court has concluded that Plaintiff has not proven that she is entitled to default judgment in her favor and against those defendants for the reasons set forth above.

Second, the court grants Plaintiff’s request for costs in the total amount of $2,580.71 jointly and severally against defendants Huang and Vu ($910.29 in clerks’ filing fees + $1,514.00 in process server’s fees + $156.42 in e-filing costs). (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subds. (a)(1), (a)(4).)

Third, the court denies Plaintiff’s request for $10,000 for deposition and interpreter costs against defendants Huang and Vu, jointly and severally, because Plaintiff has not shown that those costs were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation against defendants Huang and Vu, whose defaults were entered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subds. (c)(2).) Plaintiff did not, for example, submit a declaration explaining how those costs were incurred and were reasonably necessary to the litigation against Defaulted Defendants.

Fourth, the court will not issue an award of attorney’s fees and will strike from the proposed Judgment the language that “Plaintiff Jasmine Nguyen shall recover from Catherine Huang, Theresa Vu, Ellen K. Gold, Linda Loi Vo and Billy Phan, jointly and severally, attorney’s fees in the amount to be determined on Plaintiff’s submission of a motion for attorney’s fees” because (1) Plaintiff did not identify a statute or agreement of the parties providing for attorney’s fees as required, and (2) “a party seeking entry of a default judgment must apply for all of the relief sought—including attorney fees—when application is made for entry of default.” (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1800, subd. (a)(9); Garcia v. Politis (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1479 [emphasis added].)

The court grants in part plaintiff Jasmine Nguyen’s request for default judgment as follows.

The court will enter default judgment as follows: (1) in favor of plaintiff Jasmine Nguyen and against defendant Catherine Huang in the total amount of $275,137.61, consisting of $185,000 in damages and $90,137.61 in prejudgment interest; (2) in favor of plaintiff Jasmine Nguyen and against defendant Theresa Vu in the total amount of $49,109.94, consisting of $33,000 in damages and $16,109.94 in prejudgment interest; and (3) in favor of plaintiff Jasmine Nguyen and against defendants Catherine Huang and Theresa Vu, jointly and severally, for costs in the amount of $2,580.71.

The court orders that this action is dismissed as to defendants Ellen K. Gold, Linda Loi Vo, and Billy Phan.

The court will modify, sign, and file the proposed Judgment (made on Judicial Council form JUD-100) consistent with this order.

[1] Defendants Peter Tri Nguyen, Tony Ta, Heng Phan, and Richard Chhor filed answers to the Complaint. Trial is scheduled to begin on September 3, 2025.

[2] On April 25, 2025, Plaintiff and counsel for the non-defaulted defendants orally stipulated to extend the time within which the action must be brought to trial until and including February 20, 2026. (April 25, 2025 Minute Order and Nunc Pro Tunc Order, p. 1.) This stipulation did not include or extend to Defaulted Defendants.

The court notes that, on May 5, 2025, counsel for Defaulted Defendants submitted a declaration stating that Defaulted Defendants “agree to join the stipulation of the initial defendants and the plaintiff to extend the time by which the action shall be brought to trial until February 20, 2026 . . . .” (Swarovski Decl., ¶ 3.) However, this declaration does not extend the time by which Plaintiff must have default judgment entered against Defaulted Defendants because it is not (1) a written stipulation with all other parties, or (2) an oral agreement made in open court with all other parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.330.)

[3] The court notes that Plaintiff did not (1) make any specific allegations relating to the Doe defendants, or (2) file a First Amended Complaint to allege specific facts as to defendants Gold and Vo after identifying them as Doe defendants 1 and 2.

[4] Page four of this exhibit is unintelligible but appears to be another transaction receipt.

jasmine nguyen ; Plaintiff, vs. richard chhor , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	20STCV31765

	Hearing Date:	May 19, 2025

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	Order RE: plaintiff’s request for court judgment by default