Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 20STCV42993, Date: 2023-05-16 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

Case Number: 20STCV42993    Hearing Date: May 16, 2023    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTIES:             Defendants Dwell Management, LLC and Simone Shah, individually and as trustee of the Simone Shah Trust

RESPONDING PARTIES:     Plaintiffs Jen Bosworth and Miles Horton      

Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court denies plaintiffs Jen Bosworth and Miles Horton’s requests for judicial notice because the matters to be judicially noticed are not relevant to a material issue presented by this motion.  (Malek Media Group LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 825 [“Any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue”].)

DISCUSSION

Defendants Dwell Management, LLC and Simon Shah, individually and as trustee of the Simone Shah Trust (“Defendants”) move the court for an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs in their favor, to be paid by plaintiffs Jen Bosworth and Miles Horton (“Plaintiffs”), in the total amount of $33,767.25, consisting of $30,030 in attorney’s fees and $3,737.25 in costs.

The court grants Defendants’ motion as follows.

First, the court notes that Plaintiffs raise the threshold issue of timeliness in their opposition, contending that Defendants failed to file this motion within 60 days of April 15, 2022 (i.e., the the date that judgment was entered).  The court finds that Defendants’ motion is timely.

“A notice of motion to claim attorney’s fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court—including attorney’s fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial court—must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case or under rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.”  (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1702, subd. (b)(1).)  Unless otherwise provided, “a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of: [¶] (A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; [¶] or (C) 180 days after entry of judgment.”  (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.104, subd. (a)(1).)

Here, Defendants filed with the court and served on Plaintiffs the Notice of Entry of Judgment on May 26, 2022.  Defendants filed the pending motion for attorney’s fees on July 25, 2022, on the 60th day after service of the Notice of Entry of Judgment.  The court therefore finds that Defendants’ motion is timely.  (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1702, subd. (b)(1).)  

Second, the court finds that Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party in this breach of warranty of habitability action.

In support of Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for breach of statutory warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs alleged that (1) their residence failed to meet certain standards of habitability as established by Civil Code section 1941.1; (2) Defendants’ failure to correct the substandard conditions constituted a violation of section 1941.1; and (3) Defendants’ collection of rent from Plaintiffs constituted a violation of Civil Code section 1942.2.  (Compl., ¶¶ 37, 40.)  The court finds that Plaintiff’s first, third, fifth, and sixth through ninth causes of action are similarly based on Defendants’ alleged failure to correct the substandard and uninhabitable conditions, such that they are intertwined with the statutory breach of warranty of habitability cause of action.  (Compl., ¶¶ 29, 46, 59, 63-64, 68-69, 74, 81.)  Pursuant to section 1942.4, “[t]he prevailing party shall be entitled to recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the suit in an amount fixed by the court.”  (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (b)(2).)

The court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Complaint on March 21, 2022, and entered judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs on April 15, 2022.  The court therefore finds that Defendants are the prevailing parties and entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs.  (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (b)(2).)  The court notes that, in their opposition, Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that Defendants are the prevailing parties and are entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under this statute.

Third, the court finds that Defendants have established that they are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the total amount of $32,717.25.

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted).)¿ “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”¿ (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)¿ 

Defendants submit the declaration of their counsel, Jason Davis, who attests to his qualifications and experience.  (Davis Decl., ¶¶ 2, 5.)  The court finds that counsel’s $350 hourly rate is reasonable based on counsel’s qualifications and experience.  (Davis Decl., ¶¶ 2, 5, 11.)

Defendants submit evidence showing that counsel billed (1) 75.80 hours in litigating this action, and (2) 7 hours to prepare this motion and Defendants’ memorandum of costs.  (Davis Decl., ¶¶ 9-10; Davis Decl., Ex. D [verified time entries of counsel].)  The court notes that, in their motion, Defendants state that counsel expects to bill an additional $1,050 (i.e., 3 hours at counsel’s hourly rate of $350) to review any opposition papers, draft a reply, and appear at the hearing on this motion.  (Mot., p. 4:12-14.)  However, Defendants have not provided the court with evidence establishing that Defendants anticipate incurring fees in this amount; instead, the supporting declaration states only that counsel expended 7 hours to prepare this motion.  (Davis Decl., ¶ 10.)  The court therefore finds that Defendants have not shown that their request for an additional $1,050 in attorney’s fees is reasonable or necessary.

Plaintiffs, in opposition, take issue with Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees incurred following the entry of judgment.  However, Defendants have properly requested fees and costs associated with filing this motion and have, as set forth above, sufficiently supported this request as to the 7 hours billed to prepare the moving papers.  (Davis Decl., ¶ 10.)  Moreover, although Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ counsel billed excessively, they have not challenged any specific entries as unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive.  The court finds that the 75.80 hours expended to defend this action and the 7 hours expended to prepare the pending motion for attorney’s fees are reasonable.

The court therefore finds that Defendants have established a lodestar figure of $28,980, consisting of (1) 75.80 hours billed to defend and litigate this action at counsel’s $350 hourly rate, and (2) 7 hours billed to prepare this motion at counsel’s $350 hourly rate.  (Davis Decl., ¶ 11; Davis Decl., Ex. D; PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)

The court further finds that Defendants have sufficiently supported their request for costs and expenses in the amount of $3,737.25.  (Davis Decl., ¶ 7; Davis Decl., Ex. C [verified Memorandum of Costs].)

The court therefore finds that Defendants are entitled to an award of (1) attorney’s fees in the amount of $28,980 and (2) costs in the amount of $3,737.25.  (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (b)(2).)

ORDER

The court grants defendants Dwell Management, LLC and Simone Shah’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs as follows.

The court orders that defendants Dwell Management, LLC and Simone Shah, individually and as trustee of the Simone Shah Trust, shall recover from plaintiffs Jen Bosworth and Miles Horton an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the total amount of $32,717.25 pursuant to Civil Code section 1942.4, subdivision (b)(2).

The court orders defendants Dwell Management, LLC and Simone Shah, individually and as trustee of the Simone Shah Trust to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  May 16, 2023

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court