Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 20STCV44438, Date: 2023-12-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV44438    Hearing Date: December 11, 2023    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                Plaintiff Aladdin Nabulsi

RESPONDING PARTIES:    Defendants Isam Nabulsi, Adnan Nabulsi, Walid Nabulsi, individually and as trustee of the Walid M. Nabulsi Revocable Living Trust dated April 12, 2013, Mazen Nabulsi, and Azzam Nabulsi

(1)   Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

MOVING PARTIES:             Defendants Isam Nabulsi, Adnan Nabulsi, Walid Nabulsi, individually and as trustee of the Walid M. Nabulsi Revocable Living Trust dated April 12, 2013, Mazen Nabulsi, and Azzam Nabulsi

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Aladdin Nabulsi

(2)   Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with each motion.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

Plaintiff Aladdin Nabulsi (“Plaintiff”) moves the court for an order (1) awarding $352,250 in reasonable attorney’s fees incurred for the common benefit of partition, and           (2) apportioning those costs of partition among the parties in proportion to their interests in the subject property, i.e., apportioning those costs among Plaintiff and defendants Isam Nabulsi, Adnan Nabulsi, Walid Nabulsi, Mazen Nabulsi, and Azzam Nabulsi (“Defendants”).

“[T]he court shall apportion the costs of partition among the parties in proportion to their interests or make such other apportionment as may be equitable.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.040.)  “The costs of partition include: [¶] (a) Reasonable attorney’s fees incurred or paid by a party for the common benefit.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.010, subd. (a)(1).)  “[T]he ‘common benefit’ in a partition action is the proper distribution of the ‘ “respective shares and interests in said property by the ultimate judgment of the court.” ’”  (Orien v. Lutz (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 957, 967.) 

The court finds that (1) Plaintiff has shown that his requested attorney’s fees of $352,250 were incurred for the “common benefit[,]” and (2) Plaintiff has established a lodestar in that amount.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.010, subd. (a)(1).) 

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted).)¿ “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”¿ (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)¿ 

Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of Sean Riley (“Riley”), who has attested to the qualifications, experience, and hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on this action.  (Riley Decl., ¶¶ 15-16, 21.)  Riley has also explained that (1) during the pendency of this action, Glaser Weil provided periodic discounts to Plaintiff, thereby decreasing the effective hourly rates of the attorneys, such that (2) “the blended hourly rate for the Litigation Team is $522” per hour.  (Riley Decl., ¶ 22.)  The court finds that the hourly rates charged and requested by Plaintiff’s attorneys, including the periodic discounts which effectively decreased those hourly rates, are reasonable given counsel’s qualifications and experience.  (Riley Decl., ¶¶ 15-16, 21-22.)

The court has reviewed (1) the chart set forth in Riley’s declaration, which states that Plaintiff’s attorneys billed the following hours, in summary form: (i) 90 hours in connection with researching for, preparing, and filing the Complaint, (ii) 125 hours in connection with preparing discovery to propound on Defendants and filing discovery motions with the court, (iii) 205 hours in connection with researching for, preparing, and filing motions for the appointment of a receiver, (iv) 185 hours in connection with preparing the motion for summary judgment, and    (v) 70 hours in connection with facilitating the partition by sale, including the participation in the referee process; (2) the monthly invoices sent to Plaintiff beginning in November 2020 through April 2023, which the court has calculated to represent attorney’s fees incurred in the amount of $357,847.29, which exceeds the amount requested by Plaintiff in his motion; and (3) the particular entries challenged by Defendants in their opposition.  (Riley Decl., ¶ 23; Riley Decl., Ex. 28, PDF pp. 594, 604, 608, 612, 616, 621, 625, 631, 635, 638, 643, 646, 651, 656, 660, 665, 688, 692, 697, 702, 706, 710, 714, 720, 725; Opp., pp. 5:20-6:24.) The court finds that the entries challenged by Defendants (1) show that the attorney’s fees requested and charged by counsel were reasonably incurred, and (2) do not represent improper and undiscernible block billing.

The court therefore finds that (1) Plaintiff has established a lodestar of $352,250,[1] and  (2) Plaintiff has shown that the $352,250 in attorney’s fees were incurred by Plaintiff for the common benefit.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.010, subd. (a).) 

The court (1) grants Plaintiff’s request for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $352,250, and (2) grants Plaintiff’s request to apportion the award of attorney’s fees in this amount among Plaintiff and Defendants in proportion to their one-sixth interests in the subject property.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 874.010, 874.040; March 20, 2023 Interlocutory Judgment, p. 2, ¶ 2 [the court orders that “Plaintiff and Defendants each respectively owns, as joint tenants, a one-sixth (1/6th) interest in the property”].)

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

Defendants move the court for an order awarding attorney’s fees in their favor, to be paid by Plaintiff, in the amount of $26,362.  Alternatively, Defendants request that the court order that all parties shall be responsible for paying their own attorney’s fees and costs.

“[T]he court shall apportion the costs of partition among the parties in proportion to their interests or make such other apportionment as may be equitable.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.040.)  “The costs of partition include: [¶] (a) Reasonable attorney’s fees incurred or paid by a party for the common benefit.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.010, subd. (a)(1).)  “[T]he ‘common benefit’ in a partition action is the proper distribution of the ‘ “respective shares and interests in said property by the ultimate judgment of the court.” ’”  (Orien, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 967.)  “This sometimes will require that ‘ “controversies” ’ be ‘ “litigated” ’ to correctly determine those shares and interests [citation], but this ultimately can be for the common benefit as well.”  (Ibid.)

As a threshold matter, the court notes that, as argued by Defendants, “[t]he fact that a party resists the partition does not change” that an opposing party’s attorney’s fees may be considered to have been incurred for the “common benefit.”  (Orien, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 967.)  However, the court further notes that “fees incurred ‘advocat[ing] a position of limited merit’ are not for the common benefit[,]” and the court may exercise its discretion to order that such costs “be borne by the party ‘pressing’ such ‘spurious matters.’”  (Id. at p. 968.)

Here, the court finds that some of the attorney’s fees requested by Defendants appear to have been incurred for the common benefit.  For example, the attorney’s fees incurred to review and analyze the Complaint, prepare, propound and review discovery, stipulate to a continuance of trial, and appear at case management conferences and other court hearings appear to have been (1) appropriate, and (2) permissibly incurred in litigating the action.  (Miller Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 1, 3, 6, 10, 12; Orien, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 967.)  But the court finds that other attorney’s fees requested were not incurred for the common benefit because they created an unnecessary procedural hurdle.  For example, Defendants request an award of attorney’s fees in connection with opposing Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, but their opposition to Plaintiff’s motion conceded that the property should be sold.  (Miller Decl., Ex. 2, p. 12; Def. Opp. to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2:10.)   Thus, their opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment created an unnecessary procedural hurdle, such that the attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the opposition was not for the common benefit.  (Orien, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 968.)

The court, upon consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties in connection with this motion and the conduct of the parties during litigation, finds that (1) Defendants have not met their burden to show that the entire requested award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $26,362 was incurred for the common benefit, and (2) as to the attorney’s fees that were incurred for the common benefit, as described above, the court finds that it is appropriate, and exercises its discretion, to order that Defendants bear their own attorney’s fees given their conduct in creating unnecessary procedural hurdles throughout the course of this litigation.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 874.010, 874.040; Orien, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 968 [a court may exercise its equitable discretion under section 874.040 “and require a party to bear its own fees”].)

The court denies Defendants’ alternative request that the court order that all parties shall be responsible for paying their own attorney’s fees.

ORDER

            The court grants plaintiff Aladdin Nabulsi’s motion for attorney’s fees.

            The court orders that (1) plaintiff Aladdin Nabulsi shall be awarded a total amount of $352,250 in attorney’s fees, which shall be apportioned among plaintiff Aladdin Nabulsi and defendants Isam Nabulsi, Adnan Nabulsi, Walid Nabulsi, Mazen Nabulsi, and Azzam Nabulsi in proportion to their one-sixth interests in the subject property, and (2) defendants Isam Nabulsi, Adnan Nabulsi, Walid Nabulsi, Mazen Nabulsi, and Azzam Nabulsi shall therefore each pay to plaintiff Aladdin Nabulsi attorney’s fees in the amount of $58,708.33 (i.e., 1/6th of the $352,250 award).

            The court denies defendants Isam Nabulsi, Adnan Nabulsi, Walid Nabulsi, Mazen Nabulsi, and Azzam Nabulsi’s motion for attorney’s fees.

            The court orders plaintiff Aladdin Nabulsi to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  December 11, 2023

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court