Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 20STLC01638, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 20STLC01638    Hearing Date: December 12, 2022    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Anytime Rent a Car, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendant/Cross-Complainant Reseda Saticoy Auto Body and Paint, Inc.

Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

The court considered the moving and opposition papers filed in connection with this motion.  No reply papers were filed.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

The court rules on defendant and cross-complainant Reseda Saticoy Auto Body and Paint, Inc.’s evidentiary objections, filed on November 28, 2022, as follows:

Objection No. 5 is sustained.

Objection No. 6 is sustained as to the phrase “in excess of the amount permitted by law.”

Objection No. 12 is sustained as to paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of the declaration of James S. Sifers.

Objection Nos. 1-4, and 7-11 are overruled.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) 

For the purposes of motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication, “[a] plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)  “Once the plaintiff . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff and cross-defendant Anytime Rent a Car, Inc. (“Anytime”) moves the court for an order (1) granting summary judgment in favor of Anytime and against defendant and cross-complainant Reseda Saticoy Auto Body and Paint, Inc. (“Reseda”) on Anytime’s Complaint, or, in the alternative, granting summary adjudication on each of the five causes of action asserted by Anytime and against Reseda in its Complaint, and (2) granting summary adjudication in favor of Anytime and against Reseda on the first and second causes of action asserted by Reseda and against Anytime in its Cross-Complaint.

1.     Anytime’s First Cause of Action for Breach of Statutory Duties

“Every person has a lien dependent upon possession for the compensation to which the person is legally entitled for making repairs or performing labor upon, and furnishing supplies or materials for, and for the storage, repair, or safekeeping of, and for the rental of parking space for, any vehicle of a type subject to registration under the Vehicle Code,” subject to certain statutory limitations.  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (a).)  The lien is “deemed to arise at the time a written statement of charges for completed work or services is presented to the registered owner or 15 days after the work or services are completed, whichever occurs first.”  (Ibid.)  Any person or entity whose lien “has been extinguished shall turn over possession of the vehicle, at the place where the work or services were performed, to the legal owner or the lessor upon demand of the legal owner or lessor, and upon tender by the legal owner or lessor…of only the amount for storage, safekeeping, or parking space rental for the vehicle to which the person is entitled….”  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (b)(2).) 

The court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that there is no defense to the first cause of action for breach of statutory duties because Plaintiff has not proved the elements of (1) the nonexistence of a lien pursuant to Civil Code section 3068; (2) Reseda’s breach of Civil Code section 3068, subdivision (b)(2); and (3) Reseda’s breach of Civil Code section 3068, subdivision (c).

First, the court finds that Anytime has not established that Reseda did not have a lien on the subject vehicle.  As set forth above, “[e]very person has a lien dependent upon possession for the compensation to which the person is legally entitled for making repairs or performing labor upon…, and for the storage, repair, or safekeeping of…any vehicle” subject to registration under the Vehicle Code, that arises at the earlier of (1) the time a written statement of charges for completed work or services is presented to the registered owner or (2) 15 days after the work or services are completed.  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (a).)  Although Anytime presents evidence establishing that Reseda was not authorized to perform any repairs to the subject vehicle, Anytime does not present evidence establishing that Reseda did not make repairs to the vehicle, or that Reseda did not perform any other work or services that were authorized.  (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 4; Tsymbalov Decl., ¶ 4.)  Instead, Anytime states only its belief that no repairs had been performed, and that it did not receive a written statement of charges for completed work or services.  (Tsymbalov Decl., ¶ 8.)  Although a lien under this statute may arise after a written statement of charges for completed work or services is presented to the registered owner, a lien may also arise automatically, 15 days after work or services are completed.  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (a).)  Thus, because Anytime has not submitted competent evidence establishing that Reseda did not perform work or repairs on the subject vehicle, Anytime has not met its burden of establishing that Reseda never obtained a lien pursuant to Civil Code section 3068.   

Second, the court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of establishing that Reseda breached its statutory obligations under Civil Code section 3068, subdivision (b)(2) by failing to release the vehicle to Anytime upon its attempt to tender to Reseda $1,025. 

“A person whose lien for work or services on a vehicle has been extinguished shall turn over possession of the vehicle…to the legal owner or lessor upon demand of the legal owner or lessor, and upon tender by the legal owner or lessor, by cashier’s check or in cash, of only the amount for storage, safekeeping, or parking space rental for the vehicle” in the amount specified in subdivision (c).  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (b)(2).)  

As a threshold matter, this provision requires a person to turn over possession of a vehicle to a legal owner upon the legal owner’s demand only if the lien has been extinguished.  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (b)(2).)  Anytime contends that, even if a lien did arise as to the vehicle, it was extinguished when Anytime, on October 18, 2019, sent a letter to Reseda stating that Anytime was the legal owner of the vehicle, and demanding that Reseda (1) make the vehicle available for inspection, and (2) provide Anytime with a written copy of the work order or invoice reflecting any services or repairs performed to the vehicle.

Any lien that arises under Civil Code section 3068 because work or services have been performed on a vehicle with the consent of the registered owner shall be extinguished if (1) the lienholder, “after written demand made by either personal service or certified mail with return receipt requested” by the legal owner to inspect the vehicle, fails to permit that inspection within a period of time not sooner than 24 hours nor later than 72 hours after receipt of the written demand, during the lienholder’s normal business hours, or (2) the lienholder, “after written demand made by either personal service or certified mail with return receipt requested” by the legal owner to receive a written copy of the work order or invoice reflecting the services or repairs performed on the vehicle and the authorization from the owner requesting the lienholder to perform the services or repairs, fails to provide that copy within 10 days after receipt of the written demand.  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subds. (b)(3), (b)(4).)

Anytime submits a copy of its October 18, 2019 letter to Reseda, which included (1) a demand that Reseda “immediately make the Vehicle available for inspection” by Anytime’s authorized agent, and (2) a demand that Reseda provide Anytime “with a written copy of the work order or invoice reflecting the services or repairs performed on the Vehicle,” and any documents establishing authorization to do so.  (Anytime Compendium of Evidence (“Anytime COE”) Ex. 2.)  Reseda did not respond to the letter.  (Sifers Decl., ¶ 4.) 

There is no Proof of Service establishing a particular method of service as to this letter.  However, Anytime presents evidence establishing that this letter was sent by overnight mail.  (Anytime COE Ex. 2, p. 1 [“VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL”]; Sifers Decl., ¶ 3.)  However, Civil Code section 3068 requires any written demand to be “made by either personal service or certified mail with return receipt requested….”  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subds. (b)(3), (b)(4).)  The court thus finds that Anytime has not met its burden of producing evidence that the October 18, 2019 letter was served by either personal service or certified mail with return receipt requested, such that Anytime’s written demands and Reseda’s failure to comply therewith cannot be considered to extinguish any lien held by Reseda.  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subds. (b)(3), (b)(4).)  The court notes that Anytime appears to concede this defect, but contends that Reseda did receive this letter.  (Mot., 6:7-8 [“Reseda cannot deny the fact that it received Anytime’s demand”].)  Even if the court were presented with evidence establishing this fact, the statute expressly provides for two authorized methods of service and does not depend on whether the recipient received actual notice of the demands. 

Because Anytime did not meet its burden of showing that the lien was extinguished pursuant to Civil Code section 3068, subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4), the court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of establishing that Reseda violated subdivision (b)(2) by failing to “turn over possession of the vehicle,” because that obligation arises only after a lien has been extinguished.  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (b)(2) [“A person whose lien for work or services on a vehicle has been extinguished shall turn over possession of the vehicle…” (emphasis added)].) 

Further, even if Anytime had met its burden of showing that the lien had been extinguished, the evidence submitted by Anytime establishes that it did not comply with the methods of tender prescribed by statute.  Once a lien has been extinguished, a person shall turn over possession of the vehicle upon demand of the legal owner and “upon tender by the legal owner or lessor, by cashier’s check or in cash” of the amount specified by statute.  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (a)(2) [emphasis added].)  Anytime submits (1) the declaration of its owner, Vitaliy Tsymbalov, who states that he delivered “a check for $1,025 to Reseda,” and (2) a photo of the check.  (Tsymbalov Decl., ¶ 7; Anytime COE Ex. 5.)  The evidence establishes that Anytime did not attempt to tender this amount to Reseda in a manner required by statute—by cashier’s check or cash—and instead attempted to tender this amount by regular check.  The court therefore finds that, even if Anytime had met its burden of establishing that the lien had been extinguished, Anytime did not present evidence establishing that it complied with its own obligations set forth in Civil Code section 3068, subdivision (b)(2), such that Reseda would not have been required to turn over the vehicle.  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (b)(2) [A person shall turn over possession of the vehicle “upon tender by the legal owner…by cashier’s check or in cash” (emphasis added)].)

Third, the court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of establishing that (1) the limitation on the amount of storage fees to be collected, as set forth in Civil Code section 3068, subdivision (c)(1), applies, such that (2) Reseda violated Civil Code section 3068, subdivision (c), by demanding from Anytime an amount in excess of $1,025 for the storage, safekeeping, or rental of parking spaces for the vehicle.

A lienholder is not permitted to charge a legal owner or lessor “any amount for release of the vehicle” that is “in excess of one thousand twenty-five dollars ($1,025) for any storage, safekeeping, or rental of parking space or, if an application for an authorization to conduct a lien sale has been filed…within 30 days after the commencement of the storage or safekeeping, in excess of one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250) for any storage or safekeeping…unless prior to commencing any work, services, storage, safekeeping, or rental of parking space, the person claiming the lien gives actual notice in writing either by personal service or by registered letter addressed to the legal owner…, and the written consent of the legal owner is obtained before any work, services, storage, safekeeping, or rental of parking space are performed.”  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (c)(1).)

Anytime has not presented evidence establishing that the limitation on storage fees applies here.  As set forth above, a lienholder may not charge a legal owner an amount in excess of $1,025 or $1,250 for storage or safekeeping fees, unless the person claiming the lien gives actual notice, in writing or by registered letter, to the legal owner, and obtains the legal owner’s consent.  (Civ. Code, § 3068, subd. (c)(1).)  Although Anytime presents evidence establishing that the purchaser did not authorize the performance of repairs, Anytime does not present evidence establishing that Reseda did not, before any storage or safekeeping services were performed, (1) give Anytime actual notice in writing, and (2) obtain Anytime’s consent as the legal owner, as set forth in Civil Code section 3068, subdivision (c)(1).  (Tsymbalov Decl., ¶ 4 [purchaser did not authorize repairs], ¶ 3 [Anytime is the legal owner of the vehicle].)

Thus, the court finds that, because Anytime has not presented evidence establishing that its consent was not obtained, Anytime has not met its burden of establishing that the limitation on storage fees that may be demanded from Reseda set forth in subdivision (c)(1) applies.  Since Anytime has not met its burden of establishing that this limitation applies, the court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of establishing that any demand by Reseda that requests storage fees in an amount greater than $1,025 is a violation of this provision.

The court therefore denies Anytime’s motion for summary adjudication as to its first cause of action for breach of statutory duties.

2.     Anytime’s Second Cause of Action for Conversion

“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another.  The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.”  (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240 [internal quotations omitted].)

The court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that there is no defense to the second cause of action for conversion because Anytime has not proved the element of Reseda’s conversion of the vehicle by its withholding the vehicle from Anytime.

Anytime contends that Reseda converted its property—the vehicle—by failing to return it to Anytime despite Anytime’s (1) demand to release the vehicle, and (2) tender of the maximum payment required by Civil Code section 3068.  (Mot., p. 8:20-23.)  The court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that Reseda’s withholding of the vehicle constitutes a wrongful act, since Anytime has not met its burden of showing that Reseda has violated Civil Code section 3068, or that Reseda was obligated to turn over possession of the vehicle by this statute for the reasons set forth in connection with the discussion on the first cause of action.

The court therefore denies Anytime’s motion for summary adjudication as to its second cause of action for conversion. 

3.     Anytime’s Third Cause of Action for Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200

California’s unfair competition law “proscribes ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising,’ and any act prohibited by California’s false advertising law.”  (Lee v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 793, 799; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.). “‘By proscribing “any unlawful” business act or practice [citation], the [unfair competition law] “ ‘borrows’ ” rules set out in other laws and makes violations of those rules independently actionable.’  [Citation.]  A ‘violation of another law is a predicate for stating a cause of action under the [unfair competition law’s] unlawful prong.’”  (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 610 [internal citation omitted].)

The court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that there is no defense to the third cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 because Anytime has not proved the element of Reseda’s violation of an underlying law.  (Graham, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 610.)  Anytime’s third cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 is based on its preceding first and second causes of action.  (Compl., ¶ 30 [Defendant’s conduct in converting Plaintiff’s vehicle and unlawfully withholding the vehicle constitute unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business acts or practices].)  Anytime confirms in its motion that this cause of action is based on Reseda’s alleged breach of its statutory duties to Anytime pursuant to Civil Code section 3068.  (Mot., p. 9:25-26.)

Because the court has determined that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that Reseda violated its statutory obligations under Civil Code section 3068 and has denied summary adjudication as to Anytime’s first and second causes of action, the court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of proving the existence of a predicate violation of law.

The court therefore denies Anytime’s motion for summary adjudication as to its third cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200.

4.     Anytime’s Fourth Cause of Action for Claim and Delivery

“Claim and delivery is a remedy by which a party with a superior right to a specific item of personal property (created, most commonly, by a contractual lien) may recover possession of that specific property before judgment.”  (Waffer Internat. Corp. v. Khorsandi (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1271.)

The court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that there is no defense to the fourth cause of action for claim and delivery because Anytime has not proved the element of its superior right to the vehicle over Reseda entitling Anytime to the right to possess the vehicle. As with the previous causes of action, Anytime contends that Reseda wrongfully possesses the vehicle based on its alleged violations of Civil Code section 3068.  (Mot., p. 10:20-11:2.)  The court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that Reseda is in wrongful possession of the vehicle for the reasons set forth in connection with the first and second causes of action.

The court therefore denies Anytime’s motion for summary adjudication as to its fourth cause of action for claim and delivery.

5.     Anytime’s Fifth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief

Any person interested under a written instrument or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his rights or duties with respect to another, may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action for a declaration of rights and duties, and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)

The court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that there is no defense to the fifth cause of action for declaratory relief because Anytime has not proved that it is entitled to the declaration sought.  Anytime seeks a judicial declaration that Anytime “has a right to the Vehicle….”  (Compl., ¶ 44.)  The court interprets this cause of action to be based on a finding that Reseda wrongfully possesses the vehicle for the reasons set forth above (i.e., its alleged violations of Civil Code section 3068).  The court finds that, since Anytime has not met its burden of establishing that Reseda is in wrongful possession of the vehicle, Anytime has not met its burden of establishing that Anytime is entitled to a declaration of its legal rights and duties as requested in the Complaint.

The court therefore denies Anytime’s motion for summary adjudication as to its fifth cause of action for declaratory relief.

6.     Reseda’s First Cause of Action for Common Counts—Services Rendered

“The only essential allegations of a common count are ‘(1) the statement of indebtedness in a certain sum, (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc., and (3) nonpayment.’”  (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460.)

The court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that Reseda’s first cause of action for common counts—services rendered has no merit because Anytime has not shown that the element of indebtedness cannot be established. 

Anytime argues that (1) Reseda did not perform its statutory obligations by its unreasonable withholding of the vehicle, and (2) Reseda was not authorized to perform any services on the vehicle, such that Anytime does not owe any amount to Reseda.  The court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that Reseda cannot establish Anytime’s indebtedness to Reseda because (1) Anytime has not established, for the reasons set forth above, that Reseda violated any of its statutory obligations as to its withholding of the vehicle, and (2) although Anytime presents evidence establishing that repairs were not authorized by the purchaser, Anytime does not present evidence establishing that Reseda was not authorized to perform towing and storing services, for which Reseda seeks to recover.  (Tsymbalov Decl., ¶ 4 [purchaser instructed Reseda not to perform repairs]; Cross-Compl., ¶ 12 [Anytime’s indebtedness includes funds incurred in towing charges and storage fees].) 

The court therefore denies Anytime’s motion for summary adjudication as to Reseda’s first cause of action for common counts—services rendered.

7.     Reseda’s Second Cause of Action for Common Counts—Indebtedness and Lien Sale of Vehicle

“The only essential allegations of a common count are ‘(1) the statement of indebtedness in a certain sum, (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc., and (3) nonpayment.’”  (Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 460.)

The court finds that Anytime has not met its burden of showing that the second cause of action for common counts—indebtedness and lien sale of vehicle has no merit because Anytime has not shown that the element of indebtedness cannot be established.  As set forth above, Anytime has not shown that (1) Reseda did not fulfill its statutory obligations, or (2) Anytime did not authorize or request storage services for Reseda, for which Reseda now seeks to recover.

The court therefore denies Anytime’s motion for summary adjudication as to Reseda’s second cause of action for common counts—indebtedness and lien sale of vehicle.

ORDER

The court denies plaintiff and cross-defendant Anytime Rent a Car, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment on (1) the Complaint filed by Anytime Rent a Car, Inc., and (2) the Cross-Complaint filed by defendant and cross-complainant Reseda Saticoy Auto Body and Paint, Inc.

The court denies plaintiff and cross-defendant Anytime Rent a Car, Inc.’s motion for summary adjudication as to (1) each of the causes of action alleged in the Complaint filed by Anytime Rent a Car, Inc., and (2) each of the causes of action alleged in the Cross-Complaint filed by defendant and cross-complainant Reseda Saticoy Auto Body and Paint, Inc.

The court orders defendant and cross-complainant Reseda Saticoy Auto Body and Paint, Inc. to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  December 12, 2022

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court