Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV03683, Date: 2024-04-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV03683 Hearing Date: April 24, 2024 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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21STCV03683 |
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April
24, 2024 |
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[tentative]
Order RE: plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees,
costs, and expenses |
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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Veronica Ceja
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.
Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses
The court
considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with
this motion.
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
The court rules on defendant
Nissan North America, Inc.’s evidentiary objections, filed on April 11, 2024,
as follows:
Objections Nos. 1-9 and 15-22[1] are overruled.
Objection Nos. 10-14 are
sustained.
The court rules on plaintiff Veronica
Ceja’s evidentiary objections, filed on April 17, 2024, as follows:
Objections
Nos. 1-5 are overruled.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff Veronica Ceja (“Plaintiff”) moves the court for an order
awarding attorney’s fees in her favor and against defendant Nissan North
America, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the amount of $101,669.64, consisting of $65,232.50
in attorney’s fees, a lodestar enhancement of 0.5 in the amount of $32,626.25,
and $4,004.39 in costs.
First, the court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover
attorney’s fees pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.
Civil
Code section 1794, subdivision (d), provides:¿ “If the buyer prevails in an
action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover
as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and
expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined
by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with
the commencement and prosecution of such action.”¿
Plaintiff has presented evidence, and Defendant does not dispute, that
the parties settled this action on August 17, 2023, “when Plaintiff accepted
and executed Defendant’s [Code of Civil Procedure section] 998 Offer to
Compromise in the amount of $90,000, including a full statutory ‘buyback’ of
the Subject Vehicle, plus incidental and consequential damages, with attorneys’
fees and costs to be decided by agreement or motion.” (Daghighian Decl., ¶ 43.) Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff is
entitled to recover attorney’s fees from Defendant pursuant to Civil Code
section 1794.
Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has established, as to the
attorney’s fees incurred to commence and prosecute this action and to prepare
the pending fee motion, a lodestar amount of $63,620.
“[T]he
fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e.,
the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly
rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community
for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on
consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the
fair market value for the legal services provided.”¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted).)¿ “[T]he verified
time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to
credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”¿ (Horsford
v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359,
396.)¿
Plaintiff
has submitted the declaration of Sepehr Daghighian, who has attested to
qualifications, experience, and hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on
this case. (Daghighian Decl., ¶¶ 5,
7-12.) The court finds that the hourly
rates charged and requested by Plaintiff’s attorneys are reasonable in light of
the qualifications and experience of counsel.
The court
has reviewed Defendant’s opposition papers and the spreadsheet requesting that
the court reduce various billing entries.
(Opp., pp. 2:16-5:6; Yu Decl., Ex. A.)
The court finds that (1) of the 1 hour billed on May 13, 2021 to draft
the case management statement and related documents, half of that hour was not
reasonably expended, (2) of the 4 hours billed on September 28, 2021 to draft
form interrogatories, special interrogatories, requests for admission, and
demands for production, 2 of those hours were not reasonably expended, and (3)
of the 3.1 hours billed on February 23, 2023 to prepare for and attend an
informal discovery conference, 1.5 of those hours were not reasonably expended. (Daghighian Decl., Ex. A., Invoices, pp. 1, 2, 9.) The court therefore adjusts the lodestar to
exclude 4 hours, totaling $1,612.50 in attorney’s fees ($137.50 (excluding 0.5
hours at Oppenheim’s $275 hourly rate) + $650 (excluding 2 hours at Schmitt’s
$325 hourly rate) + $825 (excluding 1.5 hours at Hamblin’s $550 hourly rate)),
that were not reasonably expended. (Ibid.) The court also finds that the hours expended
in connection with preparing and supporting the pending motion for attorney’s
fees were reasonable. (Daghighian Decl.,
Ex. A, Invoice, p. 11 [setting forth attorney’s fees incurred in making fee
demand, drafting motion for attorney’s fees, reviewing opposition, drafting
reply, and attending hearing on motion].)
The court
therefore finds that Plaintiff has shown that her attorneys reasonably expended
a total of 121.6 hours in connection with the commencement and prosecution of
this action and the preparation of the pending motion for attorney’s fees at
the reasonable hourly rates charged by her respective attorneys for a lodestar
figure of $63,620. (Daghighian Decl.,
Ex. A, Invoice, pp. 1-10 [billing entries], 17 [summary of hours expended by
each attorney].)
Third, the
court finds that Plaintiff (1) is entitled to recover the legal expenses
reasonably incurred in commencing and prosecuting this action, and (2) has
supported her request for costs in the total amount of $4,004.39. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d);
Daghighian Decl., Ex. A, Invoice, pp. 11-17 [invoices showing legal expenses].)
Finally,
the court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to a lodestar multiplier of 0.5.
“[T]he
lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it
may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein,
(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill
displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent
nature of the fee award.¿ [Citation omitted.]¿ The purpose of such adjustment
is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.¿ In effect,
the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a
contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation
of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such
services.¿ The ‘“experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of
professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of
course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court
is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’”¿ (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)¿¿¿
Although
the court recognizes that this matter was taken on a contingency basis and that
the attorneys displayed skill in litigating this action, the court finds that
there is no evidence that this lemon law matter involved novel or complex
questions. (Daghighian Decl., ¶¶ 5,
8-12.)
The court
therefore finds that Plaintiff has shown that she is entitled to recover
$63,620 in attorney’s fees and $4,004.39 in costs from Defendant. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)
ORDER
The court grants plaintiff Veronica
Ceja’s motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses as follows.
The court orders that plaintiff
Veronica Ceja shall recover a total of $67,624.39 from defendant Nissan North
America, Inc., consisting of $63,620 in attorney’s fees and $4,004.39 in costs,
pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d).
The court orders plaintiff Veronica Ceja to give notice of this
ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
The court notes that objections numbers 20-22 appear to have been misnumbered
as objection numbers 3, 4, and 8. (Def.
Obj., pp. 12:2-13:1.)