Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV03683, Date: 2024-04-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV03683    Hearing Date: April 24, 2024    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

 

 

veronica ceja ;

 

Plaintiff,

 

 

vs.

 

 

nissan north america, inc. , et al.;

 

Defendants.

Case No.:

21STCV03683

 

 

Hearing Date:

April 24, 2024

 

 

Time:

10:00 a.m.

 

 

 

[tentative] Order RE:

 

plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses

 

MOVING PARTY:                 Plaintiff Veronica Ceja

 

RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.

Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The court rules on defendant Nissan North America, Inc.’s evidentiary objections, filed on April 11, 2024, as follows:

Objections Nos. 1-9 and 15-22[1] are overruled.

Objection Nos. 10-14 are sustained.

The court rules on plaintiff Veronica Ceja’s evidentiary objections, filed on April 17, 2024, as follows:

            Objections Nos. 1-5 are overruled.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Veronica Ceja (“Plaintiff”) moves the court for an order awarding attorney’s fees in her favor and against defendant Nissan North America, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the amount of $101,669.64, consisting of $65,232.50 in attorney’s fees, a lodestar enhancement of 0.5 in the amount of $32,626.25, and $4,004.39 in costs.

First, the court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), provides:¿ “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”¿ 

Plaintiff has presented evidence, and Defendant does not dispute, that the parties settled this action on August 17, 2023, “when Plaintiff accepted and executed Defendant’s [Code of Civil Procedure section] 998 Offer to Compromise in the amount of $90,000, including a full statutory ‘buyback’ of the Subject Vehicle, plus incidental and consequential damages, with attorneys’ fees and costs to be decided by agreement or motion.”  (Daghighian Decl., ¶ 43.)  Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees from Defendant pursuant to Civil Code section 1794.

Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has established, as to the attorney’s fees incurred to commence and prosecute this action and to prepare the pending fee motion, a lodestar amount of $63,620.

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted).)¿ “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”¿ (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)¿ 

Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of Sepehr Daghighian, who has attested to qualifications, experience, and hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on this case.  (Daghighian Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7-12.)  The court finds that the hourly rates charged and requested by Plaintiff’s attorneys are reasonable in light of the qualifications and experience of counsel. 

The court has reviewed Defendant’s opposition papers and the spreadsheet requesting that the court reduce various billing entries.  (Opp., pp. 2:16-5:6; Yu Decl., Ex. A.)  The court finds that (1) of the 1 hour billed on May 13, 2021 to draft the case management statement and related documents, half of that hour was not reasonably expended, (2) of the 4 hours billed on September 28, 2021 to draft form interrogatories, special interrogatories, requests for admission, and demands for production, 2 of those hours were not reasonably expended, and (3) of the 3.1 hours billed on February 23, 2023 to prepare for and attend an informal discovery conference, 1.5 of those hours were not reasonably expended.  (Daghighian Decl., Ex. A., Invoices, pp. 1, 2, 9.)  The court therefore adjusts the lodestar to exclude 4 hours, totaling $1,612.50 in attorney’s fees ($137.50 (excluding 0.5 hours at Oppenheim’s $275 hourly rate) + $650 (excluding 2 hours at Schmitt’s $325 hourly rate) + $825 (excluding 1.5 hours at Hamblin’s $550 hourly rate)), that were not reasonably expended.  (Ibid.)  The court also finds that the hours expended in connection with preparing and supporting the pending motion for attorney’s fees were reasonable.  (Daghighian Decl., Ex. A, Invoice, p. 11 [setting forth attorney’s fees incurred in making fee demand, drafting motion for attorney’s fees, reviewing opposition, drafting reply, and attending hearing on motion].)

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has shown that her attorneys reasonably expended a total of 121.6 hours in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action and the preparation of the pending motion for attorney’s fees at the reasonable hourly rates charged by her respective attorneys for a lodestar figure of $63,620.  (Daghighian Decl., Ex. A, Invoice, pp. 1-10 [billing entries], 17 [summary of hours expended by each attorney].)

Third, the court finds that Plaintiff (1) is entitled to recover the legal expenses reasonably incurred in commencing and prosecuting this action, and (2) has supported her request for costs in the total amount of $4,004.39.  (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d); Daghighian Decl., Ex. A, Invoice, pp. 11-17 [invoices showing legal expenses].)

Finally, the court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to a lodestar multiplier of 0.5.

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.¿ [Citation omitted.]¿ The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.¿ In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.¿ The ‘“experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’”¿ (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)¿¿¿ 

Although the court recognizes that this matter was taken on a contingency basis and that the attorneys displayed skill in litigating this action, the court finds that there is no evidence that this lemon law matter involved novel or complex questions.  (Daghighian Decl., ¶¶ 5, 8-12.)

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has shown that she is entitled to recover $63,620 in attorney’s fees and $4,004.39 in costs from Defendant.  (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

ORDER

            The court grants plaintiff Veronica Ceja’s motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses as follows.

            The court orders that plaintiff Veronica Ceja shall recover a total of $67,624.39 from defendant Nissan North America, Inc., consisting of $63,620 in attorney’s fees and $4,004.39 in costs, pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d).

The court orders plaintiff Veronica Ceja to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

DATED:  April 24, 2024

 

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court



[1] The court notes that objections numbers 20-22 appear to have been misnumbered as objection numbers 3, 4, and 8.  (Def. Obj., pp. 12:2-13:1.)