Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 21STCV07940, Date: 2023-07-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV07940, Date: 2023-07-20 Tentative Ruling

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with each demurrer.

Plaintiffs Alejandra Garcia, Chance Brown, Stephen Thompson, Erick Herrera, Karissa Perez, Diana Salazar, Christopher Pearl, Brandon Gaviria, Amanda Flores, Osvaldo Perez, Mark Escalante, Kimberly Quitzon, Katherine Gerbasi, Brenden Smith, Danyelle Leah Sims, Kevin Jesus Ruiz, Elver Hernandez, Paris Washington, Jacqueline Wung, Eric Wilson, Aaron Walker Matis, Lacramioara Muntean, Kent Villa, Jasmin Rincon, Elizabeth Tooley, Ariana Willingham, Alicia Reyna, Aria Sonora Silva-Espinosa, Timothy Fulton, Samantha De Leon, Morgan Fangue, Leslye Alaniz, Katherine Gray, Katelynn Rhoads, Grace Evelyn Bowland, Enrico Maghelli, David Carmichael, and Alycia Lourim (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed the operative Fourth Amended Complaint in this action on October 6, 2023, alleging civil rights violations and claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendants City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, City of Santa Monica, and City of Beverly Hills (collectively, “Defendants”).

Now pending before the court are two demurrers filed by two defendants. First, defendant City of Santa Monica (“Santa Monica”) moves the court for an order sustaining its demurrer to the Fourth Amended Complaint in its entirety on the grounds of (1) defect or misjoinder of parties, and (2) uncertainty. Second, defendant County of Los Angeles (“County of LA”) moves the court for an order sustaining its demurrer to each cause of action alleged against it by plaintiffs Alejandra Garcia (“Garcia”) and Danyelle Leah Sims (“Sims”).

The court grants Santa Monica’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

The court grants County of LA’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 368, n. 1 [courts “may take judicial notice of the filing and contents of a government claim, but not the truth of the claim”].)

The court overrules Santa Monica’s demurrer to the Fourth Amended Complaint because the court finds that there is not a defect or misjoinder of parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (d).)

“All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: [¶] (1) They assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 378, subd. (a)(1).) This statute “‘should be liberally construed so as to permit joinder whenever possible in furtherance of [its] purpose.’” (Anaya v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 228, 232 [internal citation omitted].) Similarly, “[a]ll persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them: [¶] (1) Any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 379, subd. (a)(1).) It is not necessary that each plaintiff or each defendant be interested as to every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 378, subd. (b), 379, subd. (b).)

First, the court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing that they all suffered harm and sustained damages as a result of the coordinated conduct of all Defendants, including defendant Santa Monica. (4AC ¶¶ 5, 13-40.) The court, in liberally construing the joinder statute, finds that these allegations are sufficient to show that Plaintiffs have asserted rights to relief that arise out of the same “series of transactions or occurrences” that involve “question[s] of law or fact common to all these persons[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 378, subd. (a)(1).)

Second, the court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing that the conduct of Defendants was coordinated between them.

Plaintiffs have alleged that (1) Defendants “coordinated in creating a uniform police response to protests premised on the unfettered use of excessive force by law enforcement” (4AC ¶ 5); (2) Defendants “further coordinated their attack on Plaintiffs’ rights through the shared support of the National Guard, Los Angeles County departments related to transportation and public works, City of Los Angeles transportation and municipal resources, City of Santa Monica transportation and municipal resources, and City of Beverly Hills transportation and municipal resources” (4AC ¶ 11); (3) Defendants worked together to commit the wrongful conduct alleged “through intentional efforts including but not limited to the use of Los Angeles County Sheriff deputies, and Los Angeles, Santa Monica, and Beverly Hills police officers, as means of collective cross-jurisdictional curfew enforcement” (4AC ¶ 12); and (4) Defendants stationed their officers and deputies outside of their jurisdictional lines “to specifically develop a coordinated Government response in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights” (4AC ¶ 12). Plaintiffs have also alleged that Defendants, including Santa Monica, provided or received aid and resources from each other in coordinating their conduct. (4AC ¶¶ 194 [Santa Monica and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) personnel responded to the same block], 196, 198 [Santa Monica created a plan that included contacting LASD], 199 [LASD “provided at least one bus to the City of Santa Monica to assist with transportation”], 201 [Santa Monica relied on LASD for arrests and citations], 219 [Defendants provided to each other “buses, transportation, officer and sheriff deployment, and resources such as zip ties and less lethal munitions”].)

The court finds that these factual allegations show that Plaintiffs have asserted their rights to relief against Defendants, including Santa Monica, that arise out of the same “series of transactions or occurrences” and that will involve “question[s] of law or fact common” to the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 379, subd. (a)(1).)

Third, the court notes that Santa Monica has argued that the court’s September 7, 2023 order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for relief from filing government claims “ratifies that Plaintiffs do not have a right to relief against all defendants in this action, as all Plaintiffs did not file government tort claims with each defendant in this action.” (Demurrer, pp. 8:22-24, 10:16-17 [internal emphasis omitted].) However, that ruling was made in the context of Plaintiffs’ request for relief from filing further government claims and did not address whether they alleged facts sufficient to show that there was a proper joinder of parties. (Santa Monica RJN Ex. A.)

The court overrules Santa Monica’s demurrer to the Fourth Amended Complaint in its entirety because it is not ambiguous or unintelligible and therefore is not uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)

The court overrules defendant County of LA’s demurrer to the Fourth Amended Complaint, as filed by plaintiff Garcia, because County of LA has not shown that all of plaintiff Garcia’s claims against it are based on facts not alleged in her government claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

“The required contents of a government claim are set forth in section 910 of the Government Claims Act. Among other mandatory contents, section 910 specifies that a claim ‘shall’ include ‘[t]he date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted,’ ‘[a] general description of the . . . injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim,’ and ‘[t]he name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known.’ [Citations.] The failure to timely file a proper government claim is fatal to the maintenance of a civil action against a public entity.” (Hernandez v. City of Stockton (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1230-1231.)

The court has taken judicial notice of the “Claims for Damages [¶] to Person or Property” that plaintiff Garcia submitted to defendant County of LA. (RJN Ex. A.) In her government claim, Garcia stated (1) the date and time of the incident to be June 5, 2020, at 6:00 a.m., (2) that, while protesting in downtown Los Angeles, Garcia was (i) “kettled” by County of LA’s Sheriff’s Department’s officers, (ii) pinned to the ground and zip-tied, (iii) punched in her genital area three times by two separate deputies during unnecessary searches of her person, and (iv) that she, despite having been detained for several hours, was not given access to food, water, or a bathroom. (RJN Ex. A, ¶¶ 6 [date and time of incident], 8, 10 [describing incident].) In addition to the facts set forth on the prepared form, Garcia’s claim attached “Attachment A,” which provided further facts, including, inter alia, that on or about May 30, 2020 and lasting through, without limitation, June 4, 2020, the County of LA enforced an illegal curfew, performed kettling tactics, unlawfully detained protesters, bound the claimants (here, Garcia) in tightly secured zip-ties behind their backs, and placed the claimants on buses to transport them to either police stations or to the Los Angeles National Cemetery as an act of harassment and intimidation. (RJN Ex. A, Attachment, pp. 1-2.)

In the Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have alleged (1) as to Garcia specifically, that (i) defendants County of LA and City of Beverly Hills caused her damage “on or about, without limitation, June 12, 2020, and June 26, 2020” and that she suffered harm and sustained damages arising from the same series of transactions involving Defendants’ conduct “beginning on or about May 30, 2020, and lasting through June 2020” (4AC ¶¶ 13, 99), and (ii) she was subjected to excessive force by City of Beverly Hills’s police officers on June 12, 2020 (4AC ¶ 97) and June 26, 2020 (4AC ¶ 98), and (2) as to all Plaintiffs, that they were forced to the ground, bound with zip-ties that were intentionally tightened behind their backs, and denied food, water, and access to bathrooms (4AC ¶¶ 72, 76).

The court acknowledges that, as set forth above, the allegations specific to Garcia principally concern the conduct of defendant City of Beverly Hills. (4AC ¶¶ 13, 97-99.) The court further notes that these facts were not set forth in Garcia’s claim to County of LA. (RJN Ex. A.) However, the Fourth Amended Complaint also alleges that (1) Defendants – including County of LA – coordinated with each other to create a uniform response to the subject protests, including by engaging in acts “violative of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights” through the kettling of demonstrators and the denial of Plaintiffs’ access to bathrooms, water and food (4AC ¶¶ 5, 71); (2) “Plaintiffs” – i.e., all plaintiffs, including Garcia (4AC pp. 2:22-11 [defining Plaintiffs]) – were forced to the ground, bound with zip-ties, and placed on buses commandeered by, inter alia, County of LA’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority and LASD (4AC ¶ 73), some of which were used to transport Plaintiffs to the Los Angeles National Cemetery as an intimidation tactic (4AC ¶ 74); (3) all Plaintiffs were denied food, water, and access to bathrooms over the course of their detention (4AC ¶ 76); and (4) Garcia suffered harm from the same actions involving Defendants (i.e., including County of LA) from May 30, 2020 through June 2020 (4AC ¶ 99). These facts, which apply to all Plaintiffs and all Defendants and therefore apply to plaintiff Garcia and defendant County of LA, were included in Garcia’s government claim. (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 8 [alleging that Garcia was kettled, grabbed, and beaten], Attachment A [alleging that County of LA implemented an illegal curfew and engaged in wrongful conduct on or about May 30, 2020 and lasting through, without limitation, June 4, 2020].)

Thus, the court finds that (1) Garcia’s government claim “fairly describe[d] what [defendant County of LA] is alleged to have done[,]” and (2) defendant County of LA has not shown that all of Garcia’s claims against it are based on facts “not ‘fairly reflected’” in the claim, such that the court should sustain the demurrer to the Fourth Amended Complaint, in its entirety, as alleged against County of LA by plaintiff Garcia. (Hernandez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1231, 1226.)

The court overrules County of LA’s demurrer to the Fourth Amended Complaint, as filed against County of LA by plaintiff Garcia, because it is not ambiguous or unintelligible and therefore is not uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f); 4AC ¶¶ 70-78.)

The court overrules County of LA’s demurrer to the Fourth Amended Complaint, as filed against County of LA by plaintiff Sims, because it is not ambiguous or unintelligible and therefore is not uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f); 4AC ¶¶ 26, 160 [alleging that Sims was subjected to physical violence, threat of violence, and was unlawfully detained by County of LA for approximately five hours without access to bathrooms or water].)

The court overrules County of LA’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action for negligence and the seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because they state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since County of LA has not met its burden to show that Plaintiffs have not properly pleaded a statutory basis for these causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

“Under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), there is no common law tort liability for public entities in California; instead, such liability must be based on statute.” (Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 897; Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a) [“Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person”].) While the Government Claims Act “provides that a public employee generally is liable for an injury caused by his or her act or omission ‘to the same extent as a private person’ [citation] and that, when the act or omission of the public employee occurs in the scope of employment the public entity will be vicariously liable for the injury [citation], the [Government Claims] Act provides no provision similarly providing that a public entity generally is liable for its own conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person or entity. Rather, the [Government Claims] Act provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute . . . .’” (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127 [emphasis in original].)

Here, Plaintiffs have expressly alleged that (1) Defendants (including defendant County of LA) “weaponized their authority and violated their mandatory and statutory duty[,]” and therefore (2) the public entity defendants “are liable [for the] injuries they proximately caused to” Plaintiffs “[p]ursuant to, without limitation, Government Code §§ 815.2 and 815.6[.]” (4AC ¶¶ 79, 298 [incorporating all allegations in support of sixth cause of action], 308 [incorporating all allegations in support of seventh cause of action].)

First, as to the sixth cause of action for negligence, County of LA did not, in its moving papers, present argument establishing that the identified statutes do not constitute a proper statutory basis for liability under the Government Claims Act. For example, Government Code section 815.2 provides that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) However, County of LA did not set forth argument showing that they may not be held liable for the allegedly negligent acts of their officers and deputies.[1] (4AC ¶¶ 63, 71, 302.)

Second, as to the seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, County of LA did not meet its burden to cite authority establishing that section 815.2 cannot support that cause of action. Although County of LA has argued that a public entity is immune from liability for this tort, citing Hansen v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537 (“Hansen”) and Wright v. State of California (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 659 (“Wright”), the court disagrees.

In Hansen, the Court concluded, in that action, that the public entity was “immune from liability on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress” under sections 815.2 and 821.6 because, “[p]ursuant to these sections, public employees, acting within the scope of their employment, and the public entity, are immune from tort liability for any acts done by the employees in preparation for formal judicial or administrative proceedings, including investigation of alleged wrongdoing, and for any acts done to institute and prosecute such formal proceedings.” (Hansen, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1547.) There, because the wrongful acts alleged by the plaintiff “were part of [the public entity’s] internal investigation, which was a precursor to a formal judicial or administrative proceeding, both the employees and [the public entity] [were found to be] immune.” (Ibid.) Thus, Hansen does not stand for the general proposition that any public entity is automatically immune from liability on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Government Code section 815.2.

The Wright Court’s ruling similarly concerned immunity of a public entity. There, the Court (1) noted that “there are two immunity provisions of the California Tort Claims Act specifically related to a public entity’s immunity for a prisoner’s medical care[,]” and (2) held that the public entities were immune from liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence claims alleged by the plaintiff, a state prison inmate. (Wright, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 672 [emphasis added], 663 [“Wright is a state prison inmate”].) Thus, the Wright Court’s ruling finding immunity appears to have been based on the application of two immunity provisions related to a public entity’s immunity for a prisoner’s medical care, and therefore does not establish that public entities like County of LA are automatically immune from liability on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Government Code section 815.2. (Ibid.)

The court overrules defendant City of Santa Monica’s demurrer to the Fourth Amended Complaint.

The court overrules defendant County of Los Angeles’s demurrer to the Fourth Amended Complaint.

The court orders defendants City of Santa Monica and County of Los Angeles to file an answer to the Fourth Amended Complaint within 10 days of the date of this order.

[1] To the extent that County of LA contends that it is immune under section 815.2, subdivision (b), County of LA did not present sufficient argument establishing such immunity. (Reply, p. 3:11-12 [summarily quoting section 815.2, subdivision (b)].)

alejandra garcia , et al.; Plaintiffs, vs. city of los angeles , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	21STCV07940

	Hearing Date:	April 19, 2024

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[tentative] Order RE: (1) defendant’s demurrer to fourth amended complaint (2) defendant’s demurrer to fourth amended complaint