Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case 21STCV08365 2023-04-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV08365, Date: 2023-04-12 Tentative Ruling

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this demurrer.

The court grants individual defendant Keiko Hasegawa’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

Plaintiff Haryati T.S. Sentoso (“Plaintiff”) filed the operative First Amended Complaint in this action on October 25, 2022, against defendants Keiko Hasegawa, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Mulyadi Tirto Susielo Sentoso, and Philip Sentoso, as personal representative of the Estate of Mulyadi Tirto Susielo Sentoso. Plaintiff alleges three causes of action for (1) breach of written contract, (2) common counts, and (3) imposition of constructive trust.

Defendant Keiko Hasegawa, in her individual capacity (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order sustaining her demurrer to the third cause of action for constructive trust.[1]

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for imposition of constructive trust because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

First, the court finds that Defendant has not met her burden to show that the Probate Court’s Spousal Property Order bars, as a matter of law and on the face of the First Amended Complaint and judicially noticed matters, the imposition of a constructive trust over the $1,084,736.61 that belonged to the community and which Plaintiff alleges may be recovered in connection with her claims against the community estate of Mulyadi Sentoso and Defendant.

Probate Code section 13500 et seq. is a summary procedure “intended to permit a surviving spouse to obtain a judicial determination of property to which that spouse is entitled and to obtain a judicial confirmation of that property to that spouse without other proceedings.” (Estate of Bonanno (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 7, 18.) Under Probate Code section 13650, a “surviving spouse may file a spousal property petition with the probate court to confirm the surviving spouse’s interest in property that belongs to the surviving spouse and that passes to the surviving spouse without probate procedures.” (Ibid.; Prob. Code, §13650, subd. (a) [“A surviving spouse . . . may file a petition in the superior court of the county in which the estate of the deceased spouse may be administered requesting an order that administration of all or part of the estate is not necessary for the reason that all or part of the estate is property passing to the surviving spouse”].) “If the court finds that all of the estate of the deceased spouse is property passing to the surviving spouse, the court shall issue an order describing the property, determining that the property is passing to the surviving spouse, and determining that no administration is necessary.” (Prob. Code, § 13656, subd. (a).)

The First Amended Complaint and judicially noticed matters establish that (1) the Estate of Mulyadi Sentoso is currently being administered in probate court; (2) on April 22, 2021, Defendant filed a Spousal Property Petition pursuant to Probate Code section 13650 as to, inter alia, the $1,084,736.61 balance of the proceeds of the sale of the real property located at 660 Berkshire Avenue, La Canada Flintridge, California, which Plaintiff alleges is part of the community that is liable to Plaintiff; and (3) on June 11, 2021, the court issued the Spousal Property Order, finding that the $1,084,736.61 proceeds belong to Defendant. (FAC ¶¶ 3, 34; RJN Ex. A, Attachment 7b, ¶¶ 4-5; RJN Ex. D, pp. 1, ¶ 7, pp. 2, Attachment 7a, ¶ 1.)

The court acknowledges that Defendant asserts that an order under Probate Code section 13656 “(1) determining that property is property passing to the surviving spouse or (2) confirming the ownership of the surviving spouse of property belonging to the surviving spouse under Section 100 or 101 shall be conclusive on all persons, whether or not they are in being.” (Prob. Code, § 13657.) However, Defendant has not explained how a Spousal Property Order insulates the community estate from liability in this action. (Fam. Code, § 910, subd. (a) [“the community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage”].)

Under the Probate Code, “a surviving spouse who receives a decedent’s property without administration becomes personally liable for decedent’s debts chargeable against such property, within limits.” (Estate of Bonanno, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) “[W]hen a deceased spouse’s property is not subject to any administration but passes directly to the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse’s liability for debts incurred by the deceased spouse is governed by Probate Code sections 13550 et seq.” (Dawes v. Rich (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 24, 31.) Section 13550 provides that, “upon the death of a married person, the surviving spouse is personally liable for the debts of the deceased spouse chargeable against the property described in Section 13551 to the extent provided in Section 13551.” (Prob. Code, § 13550.) “Probate Code section 13551 in turn provides that the liability created by Probate Code section 13550 shall not exceed the fair market value of the community property and the decedent’s separate property which passed to the survivor without administration.” (Dawes, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 31.)

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the community estate of Mulyadi Sentoso and Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for the debt of Mulyadi Sentoso, because the debt was incurred before or during Mulyadi Sentoso and Defendant’s marital estate. (FAC ¶¶ 34, 28, 21.) Although the Spousal Property Order confirmed Defendant’s 50 percent property right in the sale proceeds under Probate Code sections 100 and 101 (i.e., the Probate Code sections governing community property and quasi-community property, respectively), Defendant has not shown that this order insulates her from personal liability for Mulyadi Sentoso’s debts that are “chargeable against such property,” i.e., for Plaintiff’s causes of action that are chargeable against the community property of Defendant and Mulyadi Sentoso. (Estate of Bonanno, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.)

The court finds that, based on the face of the First Amended Complaint, judicially noticed matters, and the arguments presented by the parties, the Spousal Property Order does not bar the imposition of a constructive trust and therefore finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

Second, Defendant argues that the court should sustain the demurrer to the third cause of action on the ground that the imposition of a constructive trust is a remedy and not a cause of action. (Shoker v. Superior Court of Alameda County (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 271, 278 [“A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that compels a wrongdoer—one who has property or proceeds to which he is not justly entitled—to transfer same to its rightful owner”].) However, the court has concluded, for the reasons set forth above, that Plaintiff has alleged facts entitling her to obtain this remedy as to the subject community property and therefore finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

The court overrules individual defendant Keiko Hasegawa’s demurrer to plaintiff Haryati Sentoso’s third cause of action for imposition of constructive trust.

[1] The court notes that Defendant states, in her notice of motion, that “the only claim asserted against [Defendant] as an individual is for a constructive trust….” (Notice, p. 2:6-7.). However, the First Amended Complaint alleges all three causes of action against Defendant in her individual capacity. (FAC pp. 2:20-21 [first cause of action asserted “Against all Defendants”], 5:11-13 [second cause of action asserted “Against All Defendants”].) The court rules on the demurrer only as to the third cause of action since that is the only cause of action challenged by this demurrer.

haryati t.s. sentoso ; Plaintiff, vs. keiko hasegawa , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	21STCV08365

	Hearing Date:	April 12, 2023

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[Tentative] Order RE: defendant’s demurrer to first amended complaint