Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV12217, Date: 2023-05-15 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

Case Number: 21STCV12217    Hearing Date: May 15, 2023    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                Plaintiff Cory Martin

RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendant Ford Motor Company

Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Court Costs, and Litigation Expenses

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The court rules on defendant Ford Motor Company’s objections to the declaration of Isaac Kohen as follows:

Objection No. 1 is sustained.

Objection Nos. 2-11 are overruled.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Cory Martin (“Plaintiff”) filed this lemon law action against defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”) on April 1, 2021.  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement of Entire Case with the court on October 13, 2022, stating that the parties settled this action.

The parties entered into the “Release and Settlement Agreement” in December 2021, and agreed (1) to settle this action, and (2) that Defendant “shall pay Plaintiff[’s] attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d) in an amount determined by the Court, by way of a single noticed motion, to have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in the commencement and prosecution of this action, unless the parties agree on the amount of fees, costs and expenses to be paid absent such a motion.”  (Kohen Decl., Ex. 3, Release and Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5.)  The parties further expressly agreed “that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of the motion.”  (Ibid.)

“A buyer who prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Act may . . . recover reasonable attorney fees.”  (Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691.)  Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), states the following:  “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of the costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

Plaintiff now moves the court, pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement and Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), for an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the total amount of $34,679.10, consisting of (1) $30,400 in attorney’s fees for work performed by Plaintiff’s two attorneys, (2) $1,239.10 in costs and expenses, and (3) a lodestar multiplier of $3,040.

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted).)¿ “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”¿ (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) 

Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of attorney Isaac Kohen (“Kohen”), who attests to the qualifications and experience of counsel.  (Kohen Decl., ¶¶ 14-18.)  The court finds that the hourly rates charged and requested by Plaintiff’s attorneys (consisting of a $275 hourly rate for work billed by Tamara Imber (“Imber”), and a $525 hourly rate for work billed by Kohen) are reasonable based on counsel’s qualifications and experience.  The court denies Defendant’s request that the court reduce Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates to reflect an hourly rate of $400 for work performed by Kohen and $265 for work performed by Imber.  (Opp., p. 8:22-23.)

Plaintiff has submitted evidence showing that counsel billed 66 hours in litigating this action.  (Kohen Decl., ¶¶ 35-38; Kohen Decl., Ex. 1.)  In opposition, Defendant challenges several entries for (1) block billing, (2) billing for tasks that are administrative in nature (e.g., calendaring and rescheduling motions for hearing and calling the court clerk), (3) value billing, and (4) billing for time not actually incurred.  (Dizon Decl., Ex. A.) 

The court finds that the estimated 1 hour to draft a memorandum of costs is unnecessary since (1) Plaintiff has already requested an award of costs and expenses in the amount of $1,239.10 in this motion; (2) Plaintiff has not filed a memorandum of costs with the court since filing this motion; and (3) Plaintiff has not explained why it is necessary to file a memorandum of costs with the court in light of Plaintiff’s request for costs and expenses with this motion.  The court finds that the remaining entries challenged by Defendant do not reflect unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive billing.

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has established a lodestar figure of $29,875, consisting of 48 hours billed at Kohen’s hourly rate of $525 and 17 hours billed at Imber’s hourly rate of $275.  (Kohen Decl., Ex. 1; PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)

Plaintiff requests the court adjust the lodestar figure by a multiplier of 1.1.

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.  [Citation omitted.]  The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.  In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.  The ‘“experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)   

The court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to a lodestar enhancement.  Although counsel took this matter on a contingency basis, and counsel displayed skill in litigating this action on behalf of Plaintiff, there is no evidence that this lemon law matter involved novel or difficult questions warranting an enhancement.  (Kohen Decl., ¶¶ 24-26.)

The court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently supported the request for costs and expenses in the amount of $1,239.10.  (Kohen Decl., Ex. 2 [summary of costs and expenses].)

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of (1) attorney’s fees in the amount of $29,875, and (2) costs in the amount of $1,239.10.

ORDER

The court grants plaintiff Cory Martin’s motion for attorney’s fees, court costs, and litigation expenses as follows.

The court orders that plaintiff Cory Martin shall recover from defendant Ford Motor Company a total award of $31,114.10, payable to “Law Offices of Isaac Kohen,” pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d).

The court orders plaintiff Cory Martin to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  May 15, 2023

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court