Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV13408, Date: 2022-12-19 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

Case Number: 21STCV13408    Hearing Date: December 19, 2022    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTIES:              Defendants 450 Maple Condominium Owners Association, LB Property Management, Inc., Pamela Maxwell, Susan Yeung, and Victoria Lerman          

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Behrouz Yadegar

Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

The court overrules the evidentiary objection filed by plaintiff Behrouz Yadegar on December 5, 2022.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to Exhibit 1.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)

The court denies Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to Exhibit 2 as an improper subject for judicial notice.  (Evid. Code, § 452.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)  “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Id. at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

DISCUSSION

Defendants 450 Maple Condominium Owners Association, LB Property Management, Inc., Pamela Maxwell, Susan Yeung, and Victoria Lerman (“Defendants”) move the court for an order granting summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication as to each of the four causes of action asserted by plaintiff Behrouz Yadegar (“Plaintiff”).  

On October 31, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal of his second, third, and fourth causes of action without prejudice.  The court entered dismissal as requested on November 2, 2022. 

Plaintiff’s dismissal of his second, third, and fourth causes of action have rendered Defendants’ motion as to those causes of action moot.  The court therefore rules on Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s sole remaining cause of action for negligence.

1.     First Cause of Action for Negligence

“The elements of any negligence cause of action are duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages.”  (Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 680, 687.)

The court finds that Defendants have not met their burden of showing that the first cause of action for negligence has no merit because Defendants have not shown that (1) Plaintiff does not have standing to assert this cause of action, or (2) Plaintiff cannot establish the element of duty under a general negligence theory.

Defendants move for summary adjudication on the ground that, since Plaintiff is not a member of the 450 Maple Condominium Owners Association (the “Association”), Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a cause of action for negligence against Defendants under either (1) the Association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“CC&Rs”), or (2) the Davis-Stirling Act.

In support of their motion, Defendants submit a copy of the CC&Rs.  (Def. Volume of Exhibits (“Def. Ex.”) 1.)  The CC&Rs defines (1) a member to be “any Person who holds a recorded ownership interest in real property subject to these CC&Rs, which shall be either title ownership or an equitable interest under a contract to purchase the property, but excluding any Person having an interest in the property merely as security for the performance of an obligation[,]” and (2) a tenant to be “any Person to whom possession of a Unit has been given by a Member pursuant to an agreement, whether oral or written, and for consideration whether the consideration is monetary or otherwise.”  (Def. Ex. 1, CC&Rs, §§ 1.23, 1.38.)  The CC&Rs provide that, while the membership privileges provided by the CC&Rs are extended to tenants, “Tenants shall not be Members nor shall they have the right to vote.”  (Def. Ex. 1, CC&RS, § 2.4, subd. (c).)

Because Plaintiff has pleaded that he is a tenant, Defendants contend that he has no standing to assert a negligence claim against Defendants pursuant to the CC&Rs or the Davis-Stirling Act.  (Compl., ¶ 2.)  Specifically, Defendants argue that “[t]he duty pleaded is the duty of the Association to maintain the common area which arises out of the CC&Rs and the Davis-Stirling Act.  This is not a duty arising out of common law principles of negligence similar to the duties a landlord owes to his tenant.”  (Mot., p. 10:11-14.) 

However, the Complaint does not allege that the duty breached by Defendants was one imposed on them by the CC&Rs or the Davis-Stirling Act.  Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants (1) negligently operated, managed, maintained, and/or repaired the common areas, and (2) negligently attempted to repair, correct, or remediate the damage to the unit.  (Compl., ¶¶ 25-26.)  The Complaint does not cite (1) any provision of the CC&Rs imposing these duties on Defendants, or (2) any particular provision of the Davis-Stirling Act imposing these duties on Defendants.  The only reference to the Davis-Stirling Act in the Complaint is included to allege that defendant 450 Maple Condominium Owners Association was formed to manage a common interest development under the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (Compl., ¶ 3), which does not amount to an allegation that each of the causes of action arise under that statute.  Defendants point to no other evidence establishing that Plaintiff intends to pursue his negligence claim based on the CC&Rs or the Davis-Stirling Act. 

The court notes that Defendants rely on various cases to support their contention that Plaintiff has actually pleaded his negligence cause of action under the CC&Rs and/or the Davis-Stirling Act.  (Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024 (“Martin”); Farber v. Bay View Terrace Homeowners Assn. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1007 (“Farber”).)  The court finds the authorities cited by Defendants are inapposite.  First, the Martin plaintiffs alleged causes of action for negligence and negligence per se based on (1) the alleged duty owed to the plaintiffs as residents and members of the association, and (2) violations of the Davis-Stirling Act, respectively.  (Martin, supra 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029.)  On those allegations, the Martin Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were “premised on duties … owed … under the Bridgeport governing documents or the Davis-Stirling Act….”  (Id. at p. 1035.)  Second, the Farber Court concluded that the plaintiff sought to enforce obligations owed under the CC&Rs because the complaint sought a declaration concerning the parties’ rights and duties pursuant to the CC&Rs.  (Farber, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1011-1012.)  Here, as set forth above, Plaintiff does not (1) allege that the duty owed to Plaintiff was based on his status as a member of the Association pursuant to the CC&Rs, or (2) mention the CC&Rs or the Davis-Stirling Act (i) within the allegations describing the underlying facts, or (ii) in support of the first cause of action for negligence.

The court therefore finds that Defendants have not met their burden to show that Plaintiff lacks standing to allege the first cause of action for negligence against Defendants as a tenant, because Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for negligence is based on the theory that Defendants owed him a duty pursuant to the CC&Rs or Davis-Stirling Act.

Further, although Defendants assert that the duty alleged by Plaintiff is not one arising out of common law, Defendants present no evidence or argument showing that (1) the alleged duty arises from another source (i.e., the CC&Rs or Davis-Stirling Act), for the reasons set forth above, or (2) Plaintiff cannot establish this element under common law.  (Mot., p. 10:12-13.)  Defendants make no showing to demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, allege a claim for general negligence against Defendants.  The court therefore finds that Defendants have not met their burden of showing that (1) Plaintiff lacks standing to allege a claim for general negligence, or (2) Plaintiff cannot establish the element of duty under such a theory.

The court therefore denies Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication as to the first cause of action for negligence.

ORDER

            The court denies defendants 450 Maple Condominium Owners Association, LB Property Management, Inc., Pamela Maxwell, Susan Yeung, and Victoria Lerman’s motion for summary judgment.

            The court denies defendants 450 Maple Condominium Owners Association, LB Property Management, Inc., Pamela Maxwell, Susan Yeung, and Victoria Lerman’s motion for summary adjudication as to the first cause of action for negligence.

            The court denies defendants 450 Maple Condominium Owners Association, LB Property Management, Inc., Pamela Maxwell, Susan Yeung, and Victoria Lerman’s motion for summary adjudication as to the second, third, and fourth causes of action as moot.

            The court orders plaintiff Behrouz Yadegar to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  December 19, 2022

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court