Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV21826, Date: 2022-08-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV21826    Hearing Date: August 30, 2022    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Public Storage, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Vida Hallman

(1)   Demurrer to Complaint

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Public Storage, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Vida Hallman

(2)   Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike.  

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Vida Hallman (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant Public Storage, Inc. (“Defendant”) on June 11, 2021, alleging three causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) general negligence, and (3) intentional tort (intentional infliction of emotional distress). 

Defendant moves the court for an order (1) sustaining its demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligence and third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (2) granting its motion to strike Plaintiff’s request and supporting allegations for punitive damages. 

DEMURRER

As a threshold matter, the court notes that Plaintiff argues, in opposition, that Defendant failed to meet and confer prior to the deadline by which responsive pleadings were to be filed.  Specifically, Plaintiff states that (1) counsel granted Defendant a 15-day extension to file a responsive pleading, making the deadline to file its demurrer March 16, 2022, but that (2) defense counsel did not attempt to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel until April 13, 2022.  (Dantzler Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.)  Thus, Plaintiff contends that Defendant was not entitled to obtain an automatic extension by its March 17, 2022 filing of the “Declaration of Paul A. Gamez for Automatic Extension to Respond to Complaint Pursuant to C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2),” thereby rendering Defendant’s April 18, 2022 demurrer untimely.  In reply, Defendant explains that its prior counsel has since terminated his employment with counsel’s firm, and that “it is presently unknown why [prior counsel] did not reach out to [Plaintiff’s attorney] until April 13, 2022, to meet and confer.”  (Reply, 2:23-28.) 

The court exercises its discretion to consider Defendant’s demurrer.  (Jackson v. Doe (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for general negligence on the ground of uncertainty because the allegations as to this cause of action are not ambiguous or unintelligible.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for general negligence because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)  As noted by Defendant, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant had two duties: (1) to train its employees on policy, procedure, and the terms of its contracts by permitting patrons to bid on their items before sale, and (2) to allow patrons the opportunity to retrieve their personal and private documents before sale.  (Compl., PLD-PI-001(2).)  Defendant argues that the first duty is unaccompanied by an allegation that Defendant did not train its employees, but appears to implicitly concede that there is an allegation that Defendant breached its second duty by failing to allow Plaintiff “the opportunity to obtain private and personal documents prior to selling her items.”  (Ibid.; Demurrer, 8:10-11 [“it appears breach of only one duty exists, and not two”].)  Although Defendant contends that Plaintiff has pleaded insufficient facts to allege a negligence cause of action based on the first duty alleged by Plaintiff, “[a] demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action.”  (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682.)  Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations that (1) Defendant owed a duty to allow patrons the opportunity to retrieve personal and private documents prior to a bidding sale, and (2) Defendant breached that duty by refusing to allow Plaintiff to obtain personal and private documents prior to selling her items are sufficient to support this cause of action.  (Compl., PLD-PI-001(2).)  The court therefore overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for general negligence.

The court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for intentional tort (intentional infliction of emotional distress) because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff fails to allege (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendant with the intent of causing, or the reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress, and (2) Plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)

MOTION TO STRIKE

First, the court notes that Plaintiff takes issue with the meet and confer process and timeliness of this motion for the same reasons described in connection with the demurrer.  The court exercises its discretion to consider Defendant’s motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436 [“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper” strike false, improper, or irrelevant material].)

Defendant moves the court for an order striking (1) Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, and (2) the allegation in Plaintiff’s third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress that “The outrageous act of fraud resulted in [Plaintiff’s] extreme severe emotional distress.”  (Compl., ¶ 14, subd. (a)(2); Compl., PLD-PI-001(3).)

The court grants Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages because (1) Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that Defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, and (2) Plaintiff has failed to allege advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or an act of oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (b).)

The court denies as moot Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s allegation that “The outrageous act of fraud resulted in [Plaintiff’s] extreme severe emotional distress” because that allegation appears in the third cause of action for intentional tort (intentional infliction of emotional distress), which has been removed from the Complaint since the court has sustained Defendant’s demurrer to this cause of action.

ORDER

            The court overrules defendant Public Storage, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiff Vida Hallman’s second cause of action for general negligence.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).)

            The court sustains defendant Public Storage, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiff Vida Hallman’s third cause of action for intentional tort (intentional infliction of emotional distress).  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

            The court grants defendant Public Storage, Inc.’s motion to strike plaintiff Vida Hallman’s prayer for punitive damages.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (b).)

The court denies as moot defendant Public Storage, Inc.’s motion to strike plaintiff Vida Hallman’s allegation that “The outrageous act of fraud resulted in [Plaintiff’s] extreme severe emotional distress” made in support of the sustained cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

The court grants plaintiff Vida Hallman 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint to amend the third cause of action for intentional tort (intentional infliction of emotional distress).

            The court orders defendant Public Storage, Inc. to give notice of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  August 30, 2022

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court