Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV26547, Date: 2023-05-08 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCV26547    Hearing Date: May 8, 2023    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendant Mulgrew Aircraft Components Inc.         

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff David Maijala

Motion to Quash Subpoenas for Business Records to Cadence Aerospace

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

DISCUSSION

Defendant Mulgrew Aircraft Components Inc. (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order (1) quashing the Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records issued to Cadence Aerospace (“Cadence”) by plaintiff David Maijala (“Plaintiff”) on June 23, 2022 (the “Deposition Subpoena”), and (2) award attorney’s fees to Plaintiff in the amount of $3,060.  Defendant moves for this relief on the grounds that the Deposition Subpoena (1) is irrelevant and overbroad, (2) demands the production of trade secrets, and (3) seeks documents protected by the right of privacy.

The Deposition Subpoena requests Cadence to produce documents “pertaining to ‘forming, straightening, and check & straighten’ activities performed for [Defendant] per specification STP51-302.  This includes but is not limited to [Defendant] purchase orders, Cadence travelers, routers, documents showing the production activities performed, inspection reports, work instructions/procedures, Cadence certificates of conformance, and emails pertaining to Lockheed Martin Inc. parts.”  (Schaedel Decl., Ex. B, Deposition Subpoena, Attachment 3.)  

First, the court finds that the information sought in the Deposition Subpoena is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action and is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence since it seeks the production of documents that may show whether Plaintiff’s alleged complaints and reporting of violations are supported by evidence.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Compl., ¶¶ 48-50.)  However, the court finds that the Deposition Subpoena is overbroad because there is no temporal limitation.  (Schaedel Decl., Ex. B, Deposition Subpoena, Attachment 3.)  The court therefore orders that the scope of the Deposition Subpoena is limited to the period of May 1, 2016, through October 10, 2019 (i.e., Plaintiff’s date of termination).  (Compl., ¶ ¶ 11 [alleging that Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated on October 10, 2019].)

Second, the court finds that Defendant has not met its burden to show that the Deposition Subpoena demands the production of trade secrets.

“‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: [¶] (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and [¶] (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”  (Civ. Code, § 3426.1, subd. (d).)  “[T]he owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.”  (Evid. Code, § 1060.) 

The party claiming the privilege of trade secret protection has the burden of establishing its existence.  (People v. Superior Court (Dominguez) (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 223, 242; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393.)  The owner of a trade secret must submit an affidavit in support of a motion for a protective order based on the privilege that is “based upon personal knowledge listing the affiant’s qualifications to give an opinion concerning the trade secret at issue, identifying, without revealing, the alleged trade secret and articles which disclose the secret, and presenting evidence that the secret qualifies as a trade secret under either subdivision (d) of Section 3426.1 of the Civil Code or paragraph 9 of subdivision (a) of Section 499c of the Penal Code.”  (Evid. Code, § 1061, subd. (b)(1); Stadish v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1145 [concluding “that the procedures called for in [Evidence Code] section 1061 have a utility in a civil action in protecting the trade secret privilege provided for in section 1060 and should be followed”].)

The court finds that the affidavit of Mohammad Houshiar is insufficient to establish that the documents sought by the Deposition Subpoena include trade secrets belonging to Defendant.  Houshiar’s declaration (1) does not provide a sufficient factual foundation establishing that the information sought is information that “[d]erives independent economic value . . . from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use” and instead states, in a conclusory fashion, that the information “contains sensitive and confidential information, the release of which could be utilized by others in the industry to harm” Defendant, and (2) does not provide any facts showing that the information “[i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”  (Civ. Code, § 3426.1, subd. (d); Houshiar Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)

Third, the court finds that Defendant’s privacy concerns are outweighed by the probative value of the information requested.

The California Supreme Court has established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy.  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.)  First, “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.”  (Ibid.)  Then, “[t]he party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.”  (Ibid.)  “A court must then balance these competing considerations.”  (Ibid.)

The court finds that Defendant has established a legally protected privacy interest in its business information, including its manual, procedures, and other related documents.  (Houshiar Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)  The court further finds that Plaintiff has produced evidence and argument showing that disclosure is relevant to his claims and therefore necessary for Plaintiff to litigate his action.  (Maijala Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, 10-11.)  The court therefore finds that Defendant’s privacy concerns are outweighed by Plaintiff’s need to obtain this information in discovery.  However, the court finds that, to address Defendant’s privacy concerns, the documents shall be produced pursuant to a protective order as set forth below.

The court denies Defendant’s request for an award of attorney’s fees because the court finds that the Deposition Subpoena was not oppressive.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).) 

The court denies Plaintiff’s request for an award of sanctions because the court finds that the motion was not made in bad faith or without substantial justification.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

ORDER

The court grants in part and denies in part defendant Mulgrew Aircraft Components, Inc.’s motion to quash subpoenas for business records to Cadence Aerospace as follows.

The court denies defendant Mulgrew Aircraft Components, Inc.’s request to quash the Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records issued to Cadence Aerospace by plaintiff David Maijala.

The court orders that the Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records is modified to require Cadence Aerospace to produce documents responsive to the Deposition Subpoena (1) limited to the period of time between May 1, 2016, through October 10, 2019, and (2) pursuant to a protective order issued by the court that plaintiff David Maijala and his attorneys shall not disclose any of the documents or information which plaintiff David Maijala may obtain by this order to anyone who is not a party, an attorney for a party, or an expert or expert consultant retained by a party to this action, and those records shall not be used by plaintiff David Maijala or his attorneys for any purpose other than to prosecute this lawsuit, without the written agreement of the parties or further order of the court.¿¿

The parties and their counsel may prepare a more detailed proposed stipulation for protective order and lodge it with the court, if they believe one is necessary or appropriate.¿ 

The court denies all requests for sanctions and awards for attorney’s fees.

The court orders plaintiff David Maijala to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  May 8, 2023

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court