Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV27654, Date: 2025-03-04 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

Case Number: 21STCV27654    Hearing Date: March 4, 2025    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                 Plaintiff Luis Chan    

RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendant General Motors LLC

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court denies plaintiff Luis Chan’s request for judicial notice, filed on August 19, 2024, because (1) the rulings on motions for attorney’s fees in federal court are irrelevant to the court’s determination as to the amount of attorney’s fees incurred in this action, and (2) rulings from other trial courts do not have binding or precedential value on this court and are therefore irrelevant.  (Malek Media Group LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 815 [“Any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue”]; Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761 [“a written trial court ruling has no precedential value”].)

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The court overrules plaintiff Luis Chan’s evidentiary objections filed on February 24, 2025.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Luis Chan (“Plaintiff”) moves the court for an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs in his favor, and against defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”), in the total amount of $45,681.33, consisting of (1) $29,976.75 in attorney’s fees, (2) $10,497.86 for a lodestar multiplier of 1.35, (3) $1,712.72 in costs and expenses, and (4) $3,500 in attorney’s fees to review any opposition to this motion, draft a reply, and attend the hearing on this motion.

First, the court finds that Plaintiff has shown that he is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs from Defendant pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act and the parties’ settlement agreement.

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), states that “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”¿¿¿¿ 

            On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s “CCP §998 Offer of Compromise,” in which Defendant agreed to pay to Plaintiff $88,000 to settle this action.  (Baker Decl., ¶ 46 and Ex. 3, Offer of Compromise, ¶ 1.)  Defendant further agreed that (1) it would “agree that Plaintiff[ is] the prevailing party” on a motion for attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs under Civil Code section 1794, and (2) Defendant would pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $20,000 or, alternatively, Plaintiff could elect to determine the amount of attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs reasonably incurred by noticed motion.  (Id., ¶¶ 2-3.) 

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff may recover from Defendant attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses that were reasonably incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action.¿ (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)¿

Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has established, as to the attorney’s fees incurred to commence and prosecute this action and to prepare the pending fee motion, a lodestar amount of $25,462.75.

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted); Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691 [“To determine a reasonable attorney fee award, the trial court applies the lodestar method”].)¿ “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”¿ (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)¿¿¿¿ 

Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of attorney Payam Shahian, in which counsel attests to the qualifications, skill, and experience of the legal staff that performed work in this action.  (Shahian Decl., ¶¶ 46-77.)  The court finds, based on Shahian’s declaration, that the reasonable hourly rates for the legal staff are as follows: (1) $425 for attorney Aronowitz; (2) $595 for attorney Baker; (3) $125 for law clerk Canton; (4) $595 for attorney Carroll; (5) $595 for attorney Carvalho; (6) $595 for attorney Choderker; (7) $425 for attorney Hamaguchi; (8) $500 for senior attorney Haw; (9) $425 for attorney Law; (10) $595 for attorney McCallister; (11) $350 for attorney Ringstad; (12) $400 for attorney Sanaia; (13) $450 for attorney Scott;  (14) $400 for attorney Stoliker; (15) $375 for attorney Tirmizi; and (16) $610 for attorney Vaziri.  (Ibid.)

The court has reviewed the billing records of the legal staff that performed work on behalf of Plaintiff in this action and Defendant’s objections to certain of those entries in its opposition papers.  Based on the court’s review of those materials, the court finds that the following hours were not reasonably expended to commence and prosecute this action: 

·       Of the 3.20 hours billed by attorney Hamaguchi on July 22, 2021 to draft the complaint and supporting documents, 0.70 of those hours were not reasonably expended.

·       Of the 4.0 hours billed by attorney Aronowitz to draft Plaintiff’s discovery requests on November 29, 2022, 2.0 of those hours were not reasonably expended.

·       Of the 2.70 hours billed by attorney Vaziri to review and finalize Plaintiff’s discovery requests on December 21, 2022, 0.70 of those hours were not reasonably expended.

·       Of the total 3.50 hours billed by attorney Carroll on February 7 and 8, 2023 to draft and confer with opposing counsel regarding their Joint Stipulation to Continue Trial, 1.50 of those hours was not reasonably expended.

·       Of the 8.50 hours billed by attorney Tirmizi to draft and finalize Plaintiff’s motion to compel further discovery responses on May 16, 2023, 2.50 of those hours were not reasonably expended.

·       Of the 6.80 hours billed by attorney Baker to draft the pending motion for attorney’s fees on August 16, 2024, 2.80 of those hours were not reasonably expended.

(Shahian Decl., Ex. 20, pp. 1-2.)

The court further notes that, although Plaintiff has requested “over $3,500 in attorney fees in connection with reviewing Defendant’s Opposition” to this motion, Plaintiff did not set forth the anticipated hours to be billed, and by which attorney (and therefore their reasonable hourly rate).  (Shahian Decl., ¶ 80.)  The court notes that attorney Baker has signed Plaintiff’s reply.  (Reply, p. 18:20.)  The court finds that a reasonable amount of time to prepare a reply and attend the hearing on this motion is 2.5 hours at attorney Baker’s $595 hourly rate.

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has established a lodestar of $25,462.75, calculated as follows: (1) 2.0 hours at attorney Aronowitz’s $425 hourly rate ($850); (2) 6.5 hours at attorney Baker’s $595 hourly rate ($3,867.50); (3) 4.25 hours at law clerk Canton’s $125 hourly rate ($531.25); (4) 5.7 hours at attorney Carroll’s $595 hourly rate ($3,391.50); (5) 1.70 hours at attorney Choderker’s $595 hourly rate ($1,011.50); (6) 1.10 hours at attorney Carvalho’s $595 hourly rate ($654.50); (7) 2.5 hours at attorney Hamaguchi’s $425 hourly rate ($1,062.50); (8) 0.50 hours at attorney Haw’s $500 hourly rate ($250); (9) 1.50 hours at attorney Law’s $425 hourly rate ($637.50); (10) 5 hours at attorney McCallister’s $595 hourly rate ($2,975); (11) 2.30 hours at attorney Ringstad’s $350 hourly rate ($805); (12) 2.30 hours at attorney Sanaia’s $400 hourly rate ($920); (13) 3.40 hours at attorney Scott’s $450 hourly rate ($1,530); (14) 6.40 hours at attorney Stoiler’s $400 hourly rate ($2,560); (15) 8.5 hours at attorney Tirmizi’s $375 hourly rate ($3,187.50); and (16) 2 hours at attorney Vaziri’s $610 hourly rate $1,220).

            Third, the court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that the court should award a lodestar multiplier of 1.35 ($10,497.86).

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.¿ [Citation omitted.]¿ The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.¿ In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.¿ The ‘“experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’”¿ (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)¿¿¿¿¿¿ 

Although the court recognizes that this matter was taken on a contingency basis and that Plaintiff’s attorneys displayed skill in prosecuting this action, the court finds that there is no evidence that this lemon law matter involved complex or novel issues that would justify the imposition of a multiplier.  (Shahian Decl., ¶ 83 [“Our firm took Plaintiff’s case on a contingent basis”].)  The court therefore denies Plaintiff’s request for a lodestar multiplier.

Fourth, the court denies Plaintiff’s request for costs in connection with this motion, without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing a Memorandum of Costs and complying with the procedure to recover costs set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.

ORDER

            The court grants in part plaintiff Luis Chan’s motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses as follows.

            The court orders that plaintiff Luis Chan shall recover a total of $25,462.75 in attorney’s fees from defendant General Motors LLC pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d).

            The court denies, without prejudice, plaintiff Luis Chan’s request for an award of costs from defendant General Motors LLC.

            The court orders plaintiff Luis Chan to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  March 4, 2025

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court