Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV27973, Date: 2022-08-05 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCV27973    Hearing Date: August 5, 2022    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Pearl Breland

RESPONDING PARTY:        Plaintiff Mattie Breland

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with the demurrer.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mattie Breland (“Plaintiff”) filed this quiet title action on July 29, 2021.  On September 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint against defendant Pearl Breland (“Defendant”) and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable interest in the properties described therein.  The First Amended Complaint asserts four causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2) adverse possession, (3) declaratory relief, and (4) unjust enrichment.

Defendant moves the court for an order sustaining her demurrer to each cause of action alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.

DEMURRER

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on the ground that it is uncertain because the First Amended Complaint is not ambiguous or unintelligible.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for quiet title because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff alleges that (1) Clayborn acquired Defendant’s one-half interest in the property during his marriage to Plaintiff after Defendant quitclaimed her interest to Clayborn (FAC ¶¶ 17, 19), making the property community property that (2) passes to Plaintiff as Clayborn’s surviving spouse (FAC ¶ 19), thereby sufficiently alleging Plaintiff’s individual interest in the property and standing.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Thornton v. Stevenson (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 708, 713 [it is sufficient for a plaintiff to allege, for a quiet title claim, that she is the owner and in possession, and that defendant claims an adverse interest without right].)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for adverse possession because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff alleges that (1) she possessed the property adverse to Defendant’s interest (FAC ¶ 36); (2) Defendant was on notice of Plaintiff’s hostile possession since at least the mid-1980s (FAC ¶¶ 17, 18, subd. (a), 36); and (3) Plaintiff continuously paid all property taxes.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 325.)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for declaratory relief because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff alleges an actual controversy relating to the legal rights of Plaintiff and Defendant as to the subject property with respect to her causes of action for quiet title and adverse possession.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10, subd. (e), 1060.)  The court notes that Defendant also demurs to this cause of action on the ground that Plaintiff’s claim for a reimbursement of costs is vague and ambiguous.  (Demurrer, 12:14-15.)  However, Plaintiff’s request for judicial declarations regarding the parties’ rights concerning the subject property may support the entire cause of action since “[a] demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action.”  (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682.) 

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for unjust enrichment on the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations because it does not “appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the complaint, the right of action is necessarily barred” since Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not assert any interest in the property until “late 2020 or early 2021” when Defendant commenced efforts to sell the property, which is when Plaintiff discovered the facts supporting her claim of unjust enrichment (i.e., that Plaintiff’s payments were made as to a property which Defendant may legally own).  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 881.)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for unjust enrichment on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was unjustly enriched by the mortgage and property tax payments made by Plaintiff and Clayborn.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) 

ORDER

            The court overrules defendant Pearl Breland’s demurrer to the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action alleged in the First Amended Complaint filed by plaintiff Mattie Breland.

            The court orders defendant Pearl Breland to file an answer to the First Amended Complaint within 20 days of the date of this order.

            The court orders plaintiff Mattie Breland to give notice of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  August 5, 2022

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court