Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV33335, Date: 2023-03-28 Tentative Ruling
Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.
Case Number: 21STCV33335 Hearing Date: March 28, 2023 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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Case
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21STCV33335 |
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Hearing
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March
28, 2023 |
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11:00
a.m. |
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[Tentative]
Order RE: plaintiffs’ request for court judgment by
default |
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MOVING PARTIES:
Plaintiffs Aaron G. Villa and
Armando Navarro
RESPONDING PARTY: n/a
Request for Court Judgment by Default
Plaintiffs Aaron G. Villa and Armando Navarro (“Plaintiffs”) filed
this action on September 9, 2021, against defendants Stanley Huser and Extra
Mile Staffing, alleging three causes of action for (1) conversion, (2)
cancellation of instrument, and (3) declaratory relief.
Defendant Stanley Huser was dismissed with prejudice on February 23,
2022.
Default was entered against defendant Extra Mile Staffing, an unknown
business entity (“Defendant”) on January 13, 2022.
Plaintiffs now request that the court enter judgment by default in the
amount of $500,000. Plaintiffs also
request, in their Statement of the Case and the declaration of plaintiff
Armando Navarro, that the court (1) cancel the Certificate of Dissolution as to
Extra Mile Staffing, and (2) reinstate Extra Mile Staffing.
The court denies Plaintiffs’ request for court judgment by default.
“‘Substantively, “[t]he judgment by default is said to
‘confess’ the material facts alleged by the plaintiff, i.e., the defendant’s
failure to answer has the same effect as an express admission of the matters
well pleaded in the complaint.”’” (Kim
v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 281 [emphasis in original].) However, “if the well-pleaded allegations of
the complaint do not state any proper cause of action, the default judgment in
the plaintiff’s favor cannot stand.” (Id.
at p. 282.)
First, the court finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts
sufficient to state a cause of action for conversion because the Complaint does
not allege facts establishing their standing to assert this cause of
action.
In connection with this cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that (1)
Extra Mile Staffing (“Extra Mile”), for which they are both shareholders,
generated goodwill and a good reputation over a three-year period; (2)
Defendant sought “to capitalize on Extra Mile’s good will and convert that value
for their own use and benefit[;]” (3) Plaintiffs did not allow Defendant to
misappropriate Extra Mile’s goodwill and reputation; and (4) as a result of
Defendant’s actions, Plaintiffs have been damaged. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-2, 14-15, 17-18.)
On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiffs have alleged a cause of
action based on harm to Extra Mile, and not to Plaintiffs. This is improper. “California law does not give a party
personal standing to assert rights or interests belonging solely to
others.” (Yvanova v. New Century
Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 936.)
Thus, “[e]very action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) Here, Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts establishing
that they have been personally damaged as a result of the acts of Defendant in (1)
filing a Certificate of Dissolution as to Extra Mile, or (2) converting Extra
Mile’s goodwill and reputation.
The court notes that, as shareholders, Plaintiffs may have the ability
to bring a derivative lawsuit on behalf of Extra Mile. “[A] derivative suit is one in which the
shareholder seeks ‘redress of the wrong to the corporation. [Citations.]’” (Bader v. Anderson (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 775, 793.) Thus, “the cause
of action in a shareholder derivative suit belongs to and remains with the
corporation. Such a lawsuit is
derivative, i.e., brought in the ‘corporate right,’ to recompense the corporation
for injuries done to it.” (McDermott,
Will & Emery v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)
However, Plaintiffs have not alleged this action as a shareholder
derivative suit and instead seek to recover damages on behalf of themselves for
harm done to Extra Mile. (Compl.,
¶¶ 17-18 [“Plaintiff[s] ha[ve] been damaged in the sum of not less
than $500,00” as a result of the misappropriation of Extra Mile’s goodwill and
reputation].) Plaintiffs are not
entitled to such relief. First, as set
forth above, Plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 387.) Second, Plaintiffs have not filed this action
as a shareholder derivative suit in order “to recompense [Extra Mile] for
injuries done to it.” (McDermott,
Will & Emery, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 382.) Thus, the court cannot enter court judgment by
default on this cause of action because it is not a well-pleaded cause of
action. (Kim, supra, 201
Cal.App.4th at p. 282.)
The court therefore denies Plaintiffs’ request for court judgment in
the amount of $500,000 in damages on the first cause of action for conversion.
Second, the court finds that Plaintiffs have not stated facts
sufficient to constitute a proper cause of action as to the second and third
causes of action because they have not established standing. Plaintiffs’ second and third causes of action
seek, respectively, (1) judicial declarations that (i) Plaintiffs are the sole
owners of Extra Mile, (ii) Defendant has no interest in Extra Mile, (iii)
Defendant illegally and fraudulently filed the March 4, 2021 Certificate of
Dissolution, and (iv) the March 4, 2021 Certificate of Dissolution is void and
unenforceable, and (2) cancellation of the March 4, 2021 Certificate of
Dissolution. (Compl., ¶¶ 20, 24;
Compl., Prayer, p. 7:13-25.)
As to the requests for judicial declarations, the court finds that
Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts or provided evidence establishing that they
are entitled to that relief. First, Extra
Mile, as a corporation, does not have “owners.”
(Compl., ¶ 7 [alleging that Extra Mile was “incorporated”].) Second, although Plaintiffs have alleged that
they are shareholders of Extra Mile, they have not pleaded facts or provided
evidence showing that they are the sole shareholders and would be entitled to a
declaration that they are the sole shareholders of Extra Mile.
As to the requests that the court declare unenforceable and set aside
the March 4, 2021 Certificate of Dissolution, the court finds that Plaintiffs
have not provided authority for the court to issue that relief. First, as set forth above, although
Plaintiffs have pleaded that they are each a shareholder of Extra Mile, they
have not alleged facts or provided evidence establishing that they are the only
shareholders or that they are authorized to set aside the Certificate of
Dissolution under law based on their status as shareholders. Plaintiffs have not cited, in their Complaint
or the documents filed in support of their request for judgment, any authority
establishing that the court may grant this relief upon Plaintiffs’ request. Second, although the court notes that there
are statutes that permit reinstatement of a business entity in some
circumstances, Plaintiffs have not pleaded any such statute in their Complaint. For example, Government Code section 12261
provides that “[t]he Secretary of State shall reinstate to active status on its
records, a business entity for which a court finds” that either (A) “[t]he
factual representations by a shareholder, member, partner or other person that
are contained in the termination document are materially false[,]” or (B)
“[t]he submission of the termination document to the Secretary of State for
filing is fraudulent.” (Gov. Code,
§ 12261, subd. (a).) However,
Plaintiffs did not seek that relief or plead this statute as a basis for relief
in their Complaint. The court therefore
may not enter judgment pursuant to this statute. (Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 527, 550 [judgment is void if the trial court has entered a
judgment for a type of relief not requested in the complaint].)
The court therefore denies plaintiffs Aaron G. Villa and Armando
Navarro’s request for court judgment by default against defendant Extra Mile
Staffing an unknown business entity.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court