Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 21STCV43669, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV43669, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Joe Shuster (sued as Doe defendant 19) and Ted Bessen (sued as Doe defendant 20) (joined by defendant Sean Wolfington (sued as Doe defendant 21) on October 17, 2023)

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (sued as Doe defendant 17) and American Honda Finance Corporation (sued as Doe defendant 16)

The court considered the moving, joinder, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with each demurrer.

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation and the court’s June 7, 2023 order, plaintiffs Allie Rose Weinstein (“A. Weinstein”) and Jeremy Weinstein (“J. Weinstein”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed the operative Third Amended Complaint in this action, alleging eight causes of action for negligence against, inter alia, defendants Sean Wolfington (“Wolfington”), Joe Shuster (“Shuster”), Ted Bessen (“Bessen”), American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”), and American Honda Finance Corporation (“Honda Finance”).[1]

Two sets of responsive pleadings are now pending before the court. First, defendants Shuster and Bessen, joined by defendant Wolfington (collectively, “Dealer Defendants”) move the court for an order sustaining their demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action for negligence (count IV). Second, defendants Honda and Honda Finance (collectively, “Honda Defendants”) move the court for an order sustaining their demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action for negligence (count III).

The court overrules Dealer Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action for negligence (count IV) because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiffs have alleged the elements of duty and causation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 680, 687 [“The elements of any negligence cause of action are duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages”].)

First, the court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing that Dealer Defendants owed them a duty of care.

Pursuant to Civil Code section 1714, “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) This statute “articulates a general duty of care. But exceptions can be recognized when supported by compelling policy considerations.” (Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 993, 1021.)

The court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing that (1) Dealer Defendants owed a general duty of care to Plaintiffs pursuant to Civil Code section 1714, and (2) the factors set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 (“Rowland”) do not support limiting that duty. (TAC ¶ 116.)

The following Rowland factors are evaluated to determine whether policy considerations support “a departure from Civil Code section 1714’s default rule of duty[:] . . . ‘the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’” (Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1021.) “‘The most important factor to consider in determining whether to create an exception to the general duty to exercise ordinary care articulated by [Civil Code] section 1714 is whether the injury in question was foreseeable.’” (Id. at p. 1022.) In making this determination, the court focuses “not on particularities of the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, but on ‘whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed . . . .’” (Ibid.; Gilead Tenofovir Cases (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 911, 158 [same].)

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that (1) nonmoving defendant Francisco Barrera (“Barrera”) purchased the subject vehicle from Dealer Defendants; (2) Dealer Defendants knew that Barrera did not have a valid driver’s license at the time that he purchased the vehicle; (3) Dealer Defendants knew and understood that Barrera would be driving the vehicle despite not having a valid driver’s license; (4) Dealer Defendants knew or should have known that Barrera was incompetent or unfit to drive the subject vehicle; and (5) Dealer Defendants breached their duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation, use, maintenance, repair, ownership and entrustment of the subject vehicle. (TAC ¶¶ 9, 31, 114-119, 121.) The court finds that these allegations establish that it was foreseeable to Dealer Defendants, in selling the subject vehicle to Barrera with the knowledge that he was unlicensed and would continue to drive the vehicle while unlicensed, that (1) Barrera would operate the subject vehicle incompetently, including by driving the vehicle through a red light, and/or (2) Barrera was unfit to drive the subject vehicle, thereby causing harm to persons such as Plaintiffs. (TAC ¶¶ 115-116, 118-119, 120; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1022.)

The court further finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts showing that they have suffered injury, and that Dealer Defendants’ conduct is closely connected to Plaintiffs’ injuries because they sold Barrera the vehicle that he was incompetently driving when he struck plaintiff A. Weinstein. (TAC ¶¶ 114-119, 123-125; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1023-1024.) The court also finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts showing that Dealer Defendants could have taken steps to avert the foreseeable harm (i.e., by refusing to sell the vehicle to a driver they knew was unlicensed and was going to drive the vehicle) and therefore have alleged moral culpability on their part. (TAC ¶¶ 114-119; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1025 [courts have stated that, “if there were reasonable ameliorative steps the defendant could have taken, there can be moral blame attached to the defendants’ failure to take steps to avert the foreseeable harm”] [internal quotations omitted].) The court recognizes the policy of preventing future harm caused by unlicensed drivers that were able to purchase vehicles, while unlicensed, from dealerships that knew of their lack of licensure and their intent to drive without obtaining a license. (Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1021, 1026.) Finally, the court finds that (1) imposing liability on defendants for the harm caused by their selling vehicles to a person they know does not have a driver’s license and will drive the vehicle without a license would not impose an undue burden on Dealer Defendants or the community, and (2) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance supports imposing liability on Dealer Defendants because car dealerships are likely to have commercial liability insurance. (Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1021, 1027.)

Thus, the court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing that Dealer Defendants owed a legal duty of care to Plaintiffs.

Second, the court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing that Dealer Defendants proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.

“‘ “[T]he doctrine of proximate cause limits liability; i.e., in certain situations where the defendant’s conduct is an actual cause of the harm, the defendant will nevertheless be absolved because of the manner in which the injury occurred. . . . Rules of legal cause . . . operate to relieve the defendant whose conduct is a cause in fact of the injury, where it would be considered unjust to hold him or her legally responsible.” ’” (Novak v. Continental Tire North America (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 189, 196.) Policy considerations contemplated by the doctrine of proximate cause include (1) whether a defendant should be held liable for unforeseeable consequences, and (2) whether intervening forces caused a plaintiff harm. (Id. at pp. 196, 197.)

As set forth above, the court has concluded that Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing foreseeability. Moreover, the court finds that, even though Barrera is alleged to have been the driver that directly hit plaintiff A. Weinstein, the allegations do not show that his conduct constitutes an intervening force that would support absolving Dealer Defendants of liability. Barrera’s conduct (1) did not “bring[] about harm different in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor’s negligence;” (2) did not bring about consequences that were “extraordinary” or attenuated because, as set forth above, it was foreseeable that supplying an unlicensed driver with a vehicle could result in the driver’s failure to competently and safely operate a vehicle; and (3) did not occur independently of a situation caused by Dealer Defendants since they sold the vehicle to Barrera with knowledge that (i) he was unlicensed and (ii) would continue to drive the vehicle while unlicensed. (TAC ¶¶ 118, 120, 123; Novak, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 197 [setting forth elements that are weighed in determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause of harm to the plaintiff].)

Third, the court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for loss of consortium by plaintiff J. Weinstein against Dealer Defendants. (Tucker v. CBS Radio Stations, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1256 [loss of consortium claims, if derivative of negligence claims, fail or survive based on the underlying negligence claims].)

The court overrules Honda Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action for negligence (count III) on the ground of uncertainty because this cause of action is not ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f); Notice of Demurrer, p. 2:9.)

The court overrules Honda Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action for negligence (count III) because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiffs have alleged the elements of duty and proximate cause. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Peredia, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 687 [elements of cause of action for negligence].)

First, the court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing the element of duty because Plaintiffs have alleged facts showing that (1) Honda Defendants owed a general duty of care to Plaintiffs pursuant to Civil Code section 1714 (TAC ¶ 104), and (2) the Rowland factors do not support limiting that duty.

Plaintiffs have alleged that Honda Defendants owned the subject vehicle at the time that it was sold to Barrera, and permitted the sale of the vehicle to Barrera with the knowledge that he was unlicensed and would continue to drive the vehicle without obtaining a proper license. (TAC ¶¶ 32, 101-102.) The court finds that these facts show that it was foreseeable to Honda Defendants, in permitting the sale of the subject vehicle (which Plaintiffs have alleged was owned by Honda Defendants at the time of the sale) to Barrera, knowing that he was unlicensed and would continue to drive the vehicle while unlicensed, that Barrera (1) would operate the subject vehicle incompetently, including by driving the vehicle through a red light, and/or (2) was unfit to drive the subject vehicle, thereby causing foreseeable harm to persons such as Plaintiffs. (TAC ¶¶ 32, 101-102, 106, 107, 109-110; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1022.)

Further, as set forth in connection with the court’s ruling on Dealer Defendants’ demurrer, the court finds that Plaintiffs alleged facts showing that suffered injury. (TAC ¶¶ 109-110; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1023.) The court also finds that Honda Defendants’ conduct is closely connected to Plaintiffs’ injuries since they permitted the sale of their property, i.e., the subject vehicle that Barrera was driving when he struck plaintiff A. Weinstein, with the knowledge that Barrera was unlicensed and planned to continue driving the vehicle without obtaining a license. (TAC ¶¶ 101, 107.) As with the Dealer Defendants, the court (1) finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts showing that Honda Defendants could have taken steps to avert the foreseeable harm by refusing to sell their property to a driver that they knew was unlicensed and planned to drive the vehicle without obtaining a license, and therefore have alleged moral culpability on the part of Honda Defendants, and (2) recognizes the policy of preventing future harm caused by unlicensed drivers that were able to purchase vehicles, while unlicensed, from owners that knew of their lack of licensure and their intent to drive the purchased vehicle without obtaining a license. (TAC ¶¶ 101 [alleging that Honda Defendants owned the vehicle at the time of sale]; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1025 [courts have stated that, “if there were reasonable ameliorative steps the defendant could have taken, there can be moral blame attached to the defendants’ failure to take steps to avert the foreseeable harm”] [internal quotations omitted], 1026.) Finally, the court finds that (1) imposing liability on defendants for the harm caused by their permitting the sale of vehicles to a person they know does not have a driver’s license and will drive the vehicle without a license would not impose an undue burden on Honda Defendants or the community, and (2) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance supports imposing liability on Honda Defendants because vehicle-financing companies are likely to have commercial liability insurance. (Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1021, 1027.)

Second, the court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing the element of proximate cause.

The court (1) has concluded, as set forth above, that the injury to Plaintiffs was a foreseeable consequence of Honda Defendants’ actions, and (2) finds that Barrera’s conduct does not constitute a superseding cause of harm to Plaintiffs that would absolve Honda Defendants of liability because (i) the consequences of Barrera’s actions were not “extraordinary” since, as set forth above, it was foreseeable that permitting the sale of their property to an unlicensed individual that planned to continue driving while unlicensed would cause the type of harm suffered by Plaintiffs, and (ii) Barrera’s conduct was not independent of Honda Defendants’ conduct since Honda Defendants provided Barrera with the subject vehicle. (Novak, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 196 [foreseeability is a policy consideration subsumed within proximate cause], 197 [elements used to determine if a superseding cause of harm may absolve the defendant of liability].)

Third, the court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for loss of consortium by plaintiff J. Weinstein against Honda Defendants. (Tucker, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1256 [loss of consortium claims, if derivative of negligence claims, fail or survive based on the underlying negligence claims].)

The court overrules defendants Joe Shuster and Ted Bessen’s demurrer to plaintiffs Allie Rose Weinstein and Jeremy Weinstein’s Third Amended Complaint.

The court overrules defendant Sean Wolfington’s joinder to demurrer to plaintiffs Allie Rose Weinstein and Jeremy Weinstein’s Third Amended Complaint.

The court overrules defendants American Honda Motor Co., Inc. and American Honda Finance Corporation’s demurrer to plaintiffs Allie Rose Weinstein and Jeremy Weinstein’s Third Amended Complaint.

The court orders defendants Joe Shuster, Ted Bessen, Sean Wolfington, American Honda Motor Co., Inc., and American Honda Finance Corporation to file an answer to plaintiffs Allie Rose Weinstein and Jeremy Weinstein’s Third Amended Complaint within 20 days of the date of this order.

The court orders plaintiffs Allie Rose Weinstein and Jeremy Weinstein to give notice of this ruling.

[1]On February 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed various Amendments to Complaint, identifying (1) the true name of defendant Doe 16 to be American Honda Finance Corporation, (2) the true name of defendant Doe 17 to be American Honda Motor Co., Inc., (3) the true name of defendant Doe 19 to be Joe Shuster, (4) the true name of defendant Doe 20 to be Ted Bessen, and (5) the true name of defendant Doe 21 to be Sean Wolfington.

allie rose weinstein , et al.; Plaintiffs, vs. francisco barrera , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	21STCV43669

	Hearing Date:	February 23, 2024

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[Tentative] Order RE: (1) defendants’ demurrer to third amended complaint (2) defendants’ demurrer to third amended complaint