Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 21STCV44657, Date: 2023-08-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 21STCV44657, Date: 2023-08-31 Tentative Ruling

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

The court rules on defendant Famers Insurance Exchange’s evidentiary objections, filed on June 9, 2023, as follows:

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order granting summary judgment in its favor and against plaintiff Joseph Caro (“Plaintiff”) on Plaintiff’s Complaint, or, in the alternative, granting summary adjudication in its favor on each cause of action alleged in the Complaint and the claim for punitive damages.

Because the court finds that its determination as to whether policy benefits were due under the insurance policy under the second cause of action for breach of contract is instructive as to the rulings on the remaining causes of action, the court has first discussed the second cause of action and addressed the remaining causes of action in numerical order.

1. Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract / Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract

“‘A cause of action for breach of contract requires proof of the following elements: (1) existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach.’” (Mills v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 402.) Further, “California law recognizes in every contract, including insurance policies, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [Citations.] In the insurance context the implied covenant requires the insurer to refrain from injuring its insured’s right to receive the benefits of the insurance agreement.” (Brehm v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1235.) “The duty imposed by law is not unreasonably to withhold payments due under the policy.” (Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1151.) “Thus, there are at least two separate requirements to establish breach of the implied covenant: (1) benefits due under the policy must have been withheld; and (2) the reason for withholding benefits must have been unreasonable or without proper cause.” (Ibid.)

The court notes that Plaintiff has titled this cause of action “Breach of Contract / Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract,” and therefore appears to be alleging two claims in one cause of action (i.e., (1) breach of contract, and (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

Although this cause of action appears to be uncertain, the court has concluded that Defendant has met its burden to show that each claim within the second cause of action for breach of contract / breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing has no merit because Defendant has shown that elements of the cause of action (that (1) Defendant breached the policy by denying claims for uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits, and (2) Defendant withheld benefits that Plaintiff was owed under the insurance policy) cannot be established.

As to the breach of contract claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant denied Plaintiff’s demands “for the full $250,000 policy UM/UIM benefits . . . .” (Compl., ¶ 31.)

First, the court finds that Defendant has presented sufficient evidence and argument to meet its burden of showing that Plaintiff is not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage.

Coverage under Insurance Code section 11580.2 “does not apply to any bodily injury until the limits of bodily injury liability polices applicable to all insured motor vehicles causing the injury have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements, and proof of the payment is submitted to the insurer providing the underinsured motorist coverage.” (Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (p)(3).) Thus, “in the context of underinsured motorist coverage, unlike uninsured motorist coverage, reaching a settlement or judgment exhausting the tortfeasor’s policy limits is a precondition to coverage under subdivision (p)(3).” (Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1056 [italics in original].)

Defendant has submitted evidence showing that (1) Plaintiff settled his claim against James Crockett (“Crockett”) for $10,000, but (2) Crockett had a $100,000 liability insurance policy limit. (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 16, 25; Def. Appendix of Evidence (“Def. Ex.”) 5 [letter from Plaintiff’s counsel to Defendant stating that Crockett’s insurance company tendered $10,000 to Plaintiff]; Def. Ex. 10, p. 1 [Declarations Page for Crockett’s insurance policy with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company providing for liability coverage for bodily injury limits in the amount of $100,000].)

Thus, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show that Plaintiff was not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage benefits because Plaintiff did not exhaust the full limits of Crockett’s policy. (Quintano, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1056 [“‘If the insured fails to follow the mandate of section 11580.2(p)(3) [requiring the insured to prosecute against the underinsured and exhaust the limits of bodily injury], there is no underinsured motorist coverage available’”] [italics in original].)

Second, the court finds that Defendant has presented sufficient evidence and argument to meet its burden of showing that Plaintiff is not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage, to which Plaintiff has alleged that he is entitled because it was later determined that Crockett was not at fault, and, rather, that uninsured driver Dimitar/Dimitri Zaykov (“Zaykov”) was at fault. (Compl., ¶ 11; UMF Nos. 6 [Zaykov was driving when the collision occurred], 28 [Plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits based on Zaykov’s liability].)

“No cause of action shall accrue to the insured under any policy or endorsement provision issued pursuant to this section unless one of the following actions have been taken within two years from the date of the accident: [¶] (A) Suit for bodily injury has been filed against the uninsured motorist, in a court of competent jurisdiction[,] [¶¶] [or] (C) The insured has formally instituted arbitration proceedings by notifying the insurer in writing sent by certified mail, return receipt requested.” (Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subds. (i)(1)(A), (i)(1)(C).) This “statute imposes an absolute obligation on the insured to comply with its mandates or else the insured forfeits his claim. ‘One of these three events must occur as a condition precedent to the accrual of a cause of action against the insurer.’” (Blankenship v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 87, 94.)

Defendant presents evidence showing that (1) the subject car accident occurred on August 19, 2017; (2) Plaintiff filed suit against Crockett and Zaykov on February 14, 2018, alleging claims for motor vehicle and general negligence; (3) Plaintiff dismissed Zaykov without prejudice on November 29, 2018 and did not re-file a new complaint against Zaykov by August 19, 2019; (4) Plaintiff dismissed the personal injury action in full on February 4, 2020; and (5) on March 20, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel requested that the matter be referred to counsel for formal uninsured motorist proceedings promptly, in response to which Defendant referred the matter to defense counsel for uninsured motorist arbitration. (UMF Nos. 6, 9, 12, 15, 20; Holsombach Decl., ¶¶ 3, 9; Def. Ex. 2 [Pl. Complaint for negligence filed against, inter alia, Crockett and Zaykov on February 14, 2018] ; Def. Ex. 4 [Request for Dismissal of Zaykov without prejudice filed by Plaintiff on November 29, 2018]; Def. Ex. 8 [letter from Plaintiff’s counsel].)

Thus, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show that Plaintiff did not satisfy the “absolute obligation” set forth in Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i)(1) because (1) Plaintiff did not file a suit for bodily injury against Zaykov—the uninsured driver at fault—within two years from August 19, 2017 (i.e., the date of the accident) since Plaintiff’s request for dismissal placed Plaintiff “in a ‘legal position’ as if he had never brought” the action against Zaykov, and (2) Plaintiff did not demand arbitration within two years from August 19, 2017, and instead requested that the matter be referred “to Counsel for Formal Uninsured Motorist Proceedings” on March 20, 2020. (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 670, 676.)

The court therefore finds that Defendant has met its burden to produce evidence showing that it did not breach the terms of the insurance policy by denying Plaintiff’s demands for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage and, therefore, has shown that Plaintiff cannot establish the element of breach as to his breach of contract claim within the second cause of action.

As to the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to conduct a reasonable investigation, unreasonably delayed in providing coverage, failed to settle and pay Plaintiff’s claims, and conspired to deny Plaintiff benefits due under the insurance policy. (Compl., ¶¶ 33-34.)

As set forth above, one requirement of a claim for breach of the implied covenant is that benefits due under the policy must have been withheld. (Love, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1151.) Thus, “there can be no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if no benefits are due under the policy: ‘[T]he covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer . . . . Absent that contractual right [to policy benefits], the implied covenant has nothing upon which to act as a supplement, and “should not be endowed with an existence independent of its contractual underpinnings.” ’” (Brehm, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.)

Because Defendant has shown, for the reasons set forth above, that no policy benefits were due, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden to produce evidence showing Plaintiff cannot establish the element of withholding policy benefits due to Plaintiff as to his breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim within the second cause of action. (Love, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1151; Brehm, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.)

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the elements of (1) Defendant’s breach of contract based on the denial of uninsured or underinsured policy benefits, and (2) the withholding of policy benefits due and owing to Plaintiff.

First, the court notes that Plaintiff, in opposition, does not appear to argue that he is entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the subject insurance policy. Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant breached the subject insurance policy by denying him benefits under the underinsured motorist coverage provision.

Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant breached the subject insurance policy by denying him benefits under the uninsured motorist coverage provision.

Plaintiff does not dispute that “Plaintiff must comply with Insurance Code section 11580.2(i)(1) prior to [Defendant’s] need to comply with an [uninsured motorist] demand.” (Opp., p. 7:14-15.) However, Plaintiff argues that he did comply with this statute by filing suit against Zaykov in the prior personal injury action. The court disagrees.

As set forth above, one condition precedent for uninsured motorist benefits is the filing of a “[s]uit for bodily injury . . . against the uninsured motorist, in a court of competent jurisdiction[,]” within two years from the date of the accident. (Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (i)(1)(A).) The parties do not dispute that (1) Plaintiff filed suit against Zaykov for motor vehicle and general negligence in Orange County Superior Court on February 14, 2018, and (2) thereafter, on November 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal of Zaykov without prejudice, which the clerk entered on that date. (UMF Nos. 9, 11; Lingenfelter Decl., Ex. 1, Personal Injury Compl; Goldsman Decl., Ex. 5 [Request for Dismissal]; Def. Ex. 4 [Request for Dismissal, dismissal entered].)

Plaintiff contends that the cases relied on by Defendant are distinguishable from Plaintiff’s dismissal of Zaykov, which was entered without prejudice. But (1) the case cited by Defendant expressly states that the plaintiff’s “dismissal without prejudice” of the action in federal court “terminated the action, and placed [plaintiff] in a ‘legal position’ as if he had never brought it[,]” and (2) Plaintiff does not cite to any cases establishing that a dismissal without prejudice does not have such legal effect. (Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 132 Cal.App.3d at p. 676 [italics in original].)

Moreover, as noted by Defendant in its moving papers, the limitations period set forth in Insurance Code section 11580.2 “is an adjunct to the right to recover damages for personal injuries,” and expresses the Legislature’s intent “to assimilate and attach the uninsured motorist liability of the insurer to the original tort liability of the motorist tortfeasor as closely as possible.” (Kortmeyer v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1292 [addressing previous Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i), which had a one-year limitations period] [internal quotations omitted].) Thus, this provision appears to contemplate that a plaintiff will seek to hold liable the uninsured motorist tortfeasor alongside the insurer. Thus, Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of Zaykov without prejudice would not satisfy that purpose.

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show a triable issue of material fact as to whether he complied with the condition precedent set forth in Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i)(1)(A), requiring the filing of a suit of bodily injury against the uninsured motorist within two years from the date of the accident.

The court notes that Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that he “formally served a [uninsured motorist] demand for proceedings and arbitration on or about March 20, 2020[,]” i.e., more than two years after the date of the accident. (Opp., p. 3:10-11 [italics added]; UMF No. 6 [“On August 19, 2017, plaintiff Caro was injured in a car accident”].) The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show a triable issue of material fact as to whether he complied with the condition precedent set forth in Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i)(1)(C), requiring the formal initiation of arbitration proceedings in a writing sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, within two years from the date of the accident.[1]

Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to whether he is entitled to uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage benefits, such that Plaintiff has not shown a triable issue of material fact as to (1) the element of Defendant’s breach of contract based on its denial of uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits as to the breach of contract claim, and (2) the withholding of “benefits due under the policy[,]” as to the breach of implied covenant claim. (Mills, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 402; Love, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1152 [italics added].)

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the second cause of action for breach of contract / breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract.

2. First Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

“California law recognizes in every contract, including insurance policies, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [Citations.] In the insurance context the implied covenant requires the insurer to refrain from injuring its insured’s right to receive the benefits of the insurance agreement.” (Brehm, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.) “The duty imposed by law is not unreasonably to withhold payments due under the policy.” (Love, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1151.) “Thus, there are at least two separate requirements to establish breach of the implied covenant: (1) benefits due under the policy must have been withheld; and (2) the reason for withholding benefits must have been unreasonable or without proper cause.” (Ibid.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the first cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (that benefits due under the policy were withheld from Plaintiff) cannot be established.

As set forth above, Defendant has submitted evidence showing that Plaintiff was not entitled to uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage due to his failure to meet the statutory requirements set forth in Insurance Code section 11580.2. Thus, the court finds that Defendant has shown that Plaintiff cannot establish that benefits due under the policy were withheld and, therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Love, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1151; Benavides v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250 [“It follows [that] an insured cannot maintain a claim for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing absent a covered loss. [Citations.] If the insurer’s investigation—adequate or not—results in a correct conclusion of no coverage, no tort liability arises for breach of the implied covenant”] [internal citations omitted].)

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element that Defendant withheld benefits due and owing to Plaintiff under the policy. As set forth above, Plaintiff has not met his burden to produce evidence showing that he was entitled to insurance benefits under the subject policy, and therefore has not shown a triable issue of material fact as to whether he can maintain a claim for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Love, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1151; Benavides, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250.)

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the first cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

“Promissory fraud is a subspecies of fraud, and an action may lie where a defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff to enter into a contract, by making promises he does not intend to keep . . . . ‘[P]romissory fraud requires proof of “(1) a promise made regarding a material fact without any intention of performing it; (2) the existence of the intent not to perform at the time the promise was made; (3) intent to deceive or induce the promise to enter into a transaction; (4) reasonable reliance by the promise; (5) nonperformance by the party making the promise; and (6) resulting damage to the promise[e].”’” (Missakian v. Amusement Industry, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 630, 653-654.) Plaintiff alleges that, at the time that Plaintiff entered into the policy contract with Defendant, Defendant did not intend to pay any claimant all sums due under the uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage provisions. (Compl., ¶ 38.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the third cause of action for promissory fraud has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (that Defendant made a promise that it did not intend to perform) cannot be established. Defendant submits the declaration of Candace Holsombach, the special claims representative for Defendant assigned to adjust Plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim, in which Holsombach states that Defendant “would have paid the presented claims for UM and/or UIM benefits if it felt that factual and legal grounds existed to pay such claims.” (Holsombach Decl., ¶¶ 1, 3, 18.) Thus, the court finds that this evidence shows that Defendant had the intention to perform the promises made to Plaintiff in the subject insurance policy.

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element that Defendant made a promise that it did not intend to perform. Plaintiff did not address this cause of action in his opposition, and therefore has not presented any argument in support of the validity of this cause of action. However, the court notes that Plaintiff has disputed, in the separate statement, Defendant’s assertion that it would have paid the benefits if it felt such payment was supported by fact and law, stating that he has shown that Defendant never intended to pay the uninsured motorist claims “at any point in the process, starting with [Defendant’s] failure to recognize the claim as a UM demand in the first place, failure to even attend an arbitration with Plaintiff on this demand, and ultimate failure to pay any money at all to Plaintiff while aimed at simply denying Plaintiff’s claim.” (Pl. Response to Def. Material Fact No. 42.)

In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to the following exhibits: (1) letter correspondence to Defendant dated December 10, 2019, in which Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Plaintiff appeared to possess an uninsured motorist claim due to Zaykov’s negligent driving; (2) Zaykov’s declaration dated March 10, 2020, in which Zaykov states that (i) on August 19, 2017, he was driving with Plaintiff as a passenger; (ii) as he approached the intersection of Graham Street, he observed that the light had turned red; and (iii) although Plaintiff screamed to break, it was too late; (3) the March 20, 2020 demand for uninsured motorist proceedings sent to Defendant; (4) the April 3, 2020 letter sent by Defendant in response thereto, acknowledging receipt of Plaintiff’s demand for arbitration; (5) his December 2, 2020 statutory demand for $250,000; (6) a letter from Plaintiff’s counsel dated August 25, 2021, stating that counsel had not heard back from Defendant or its new counsel; and (7) a letter from Defendant’s counsel dated September 16, 2021, stating, inter alia, that Defendant was investigating coverage under a reservation under rights. (Perez Decl., Ex. 6; Goldsman Decl., Exs. 7-12.)

The court finds that this evidence does not show the existence of a triable issue of material fact that Defendant did not intend to perform the promise it made in the subject insurance policy. While it might show that Defendant declined to provide coverage benefits to Plaintiff, it does not show that (1) Defendant was contractually obligated to provide those benefits, or (2) Defendant did not intend to provide coverage benefits that were due to Plaintiff under the policy. Moreover, promissory fraud “‘entails more than proof of an unkept promise or mere failure of performance.’” (Missakian, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 653.)

Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant intended to perform its obligations under the insurance policy.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the third cause of action for promissory fraud.

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “[O]n a motion for summary adjudication with respect to a punitive damages claim, the higher evidentiary standard applies. If the plaintiff is going to prevail on a punitive damages claim, he or she can only do so by establishing malice, oppression or fraud by clear and convincing evidence.” (Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1121.) “Under the clear and convincing evidence standard, the evidence must be ‘ “ ‘ “so clear as to leave no substantial doubt” ’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘ “sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Although the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is a stringent one, ‘it does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to “prove” a case for punitive damages at summary judgment [or summary adjudication].’” (Butte Fire Cases, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1158 [internal citations omitted].) However, the court must take this higher standard of proof into account in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. (Ibid.)

Because the court has granted summary adjudication on all of the causes of action alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the court finds that all of the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Because the court’s ruling granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment makes Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages moot, the court does not address the motion for summary adjudication on that claim.

The court grants defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff Joseph Caro’s Complaint.

The court orders defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange to prepare, serve, and lodge a proposed judgment no later than 10 days from the date of this order.

The court sets an Order to Show Cause re entry of judgment for hearing on December 7, 2023, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 53.

The court orders that the Final Status Conference, scheduled for May 3, 2024, is vacated.

The court orders defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange to give notice of this ruling.

[1] To the extent that Plaintiff contends that the December 10, 2019 letter informing Defendant that Plaintiff “appear[ed] to possess an Uninsured Motorist Claim because of the Negligent Driving of one Dimitar Zaykov” satisfies this requirement, the court disagrees, because the letter (1) does not formally demand arbitration, and (2) was sent two years after the date of the August 19, 2017 accident. (Goldsman Decl., Ex. 6 [Dec. 10, 2019 letter].)

joseph caro ; Plaintiff, vs. farmers insurance , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	21STCV44657

	Hearing Date:	August 31, 2023

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[Tentative] Order RE: defendant’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication