Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 22STCV00937, Date: 2024-08-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV00937 Hearing Date: August 15, 2024 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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22STCV00937 |
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August
15, 2024 |
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[tentative]
Order RE: plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees |
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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Marquis Mejia Hill
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Citiguard, Inc.
Motion for Attorney’s Fees
The court considered
the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff Marquis Mejia Hill (“Plaintiff”) moves the court for an
order awarding attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $108,315 in his favor
and against defendant Citiguard, Inc. (“Defendant”) pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1281.99.
On February 17, 2023, the court issued an order in this action (1)
granting Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings, and (2)
ordering Plaintiff and Defendant to submit the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s
Complaint to binding arbitration. (Feb.
17, 2023 Order, p. 10:10-14.)
Thereafter, on February 20, 2024, the parties lodged a “Stipulation and
Proposed Order re: Vacate Arbitration,” in which the parties stipulated that
all orders compelling this action to arbitration shall be vacated. (March 3, 2024 Stip. & Order, p.
2:18-19.) On March 3, 2024, the court
entered an order on the parties’ stipulation and vacated the court’s February
13, 2023 order compelling this matter to arbitration. (March 3, 2024 Stip. & Order, p.
3:12-16.) Plaintiff filed the pending
motion on May 2, 2024, contending that he is entitled to attorney’s fees and
costs from Defendant incurred as a result of Defendant’s material breach of the
parties’ arbitration agreement. The
court agrees.
“The court shall impose a monetary sanction against a drafting party
that materially breaches an arbitration agreement pursuant to subdivision (a)
of Section 1281.97 or subdivision (a) of Section 1281.98, by ordering the
drafting party to pay reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs,
incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.99, subd. (a).) Code of Civil Procedure “[s]ections 1281.97
and 1281.98 ‘largely parallel’ each other.
[Citation.] Whereas section
1281.97 concerns a failure to timely pay ‘the fees or costs to initiate’
an arbitration proceeding (§ 1281.97, subd. (a)(1), italics added), section
1281.98 concerns a failure to timely pay ‘the fees or costs required to continue’
an arbitration proceeding (§ 12891.98, subd. (a)(1), italics added).” (De Leon v. Juanita’s Foods (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 740, 750.)
First, the court finds that Plaintiff has shown that Defendant
materially breached the parties’ arbitration agreement, was in default of
arbitration, and waived its right to compel Plaintiff to proceed with that
arbitration as a result of its material breach thereof pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 1281.98.
Plaintiff has submitted an invoice, dated January 3, 2024, issued to
Defendant by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in the amount of
$40,250. (Roven Decl., Ex. 4, p. 1.) The AAA advised the parties that Defendant’s payment
was “due upon receipt, as of the date of the invoice.” (Roven Decl., Ex. 4A, p. 1.) On February 5, 2024, in response to questioning
from counsel for Plaintiff, the parties’ AAA case manager stated that Defendant
had not paid the invoice. (Roven Decl.,
Ex. 5, pp. 2 [Feb. 5, 2024 email from Jonathan Roven], 1 [Feb. 5, 2024 email
from AAA’s Daphne Crayne stating as follows: “It doesn’t appear that payment
has been applied”].) On that date, counsel
for Defendant (1) informed counsel for Plaintiff that Defendant was “not in any
financial position to pay the $40,000 invoice[,]” and (2) stated that, if
Plaintiff “insist[ed] on returning the matter to Superior Court, [Defendant]
will so stipulate so that no motion to vacate the Order to Compel Arbitration
is necessary or warranted.” (Id.
at p. 1 [Feb. 5, 2024 email from Daniel Josephson].)
Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has presented evidence showing
that Defendant did not pay the fees and costs required to continue the
arbitration proceedings within 30 days after the due date as required.
The court acknowledges, as Defendant raises in its opposition papers,
that Defendant stipulated to vacate the court’s order compelling the parties to
submit this action to arbitration.
(March 3, 2024 Stip. & Order; Josephson Decl., ¶ 12.) However, Defendant has not presented evidence
or argument showing that (1) the parties, in executing the stipulation,
rescinded the arbitration agreement, or (2) Defendant did not materially breach
the parties’ arbitration agreement within the meaning of section 1281.98 by
failing to pay the fees required to continue the arbitration proceeding within
30 days after the due date. Defendant
has not, for example, presented evidence establishing that it did pay the
$40,250 invoice within 30 days of the date of the January 3, 2024 invoice.
The court therefore finds that Defendant materially breached the
parties’ arbitration agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees and costs incurred as a result of its material breach. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.99, subd. (a).)
Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has shown that he has incurred
$4,080 in attorney’s fees and costs as a result of Defendant’s material breach
of the arbitration agreement and therefore grants Plaintiff’s motion for
attorney’s fees and costs in that amount.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.99, subd. (a).)
“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the
‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the
reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing
in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted,
based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee
at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”¿ (PLCM Group v.
Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted); Reck
v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691 [“To determine a reasonable
attorney fee award, the trial court applies the lodestar method”].)
The court has reviewed the time entries on the billing statements submitted
by Plaintiff. (Roven Decl., Ex. 1, Roven
Timesheet; Pl. Appendix of Ex., Ex. 2, Crippen Timesheet; Pl. Appendix of Ex.,
Ex. 3, Annelyse Gomez Timesheet.) The
court acknowledges that Plaintiff has shown that his attorneys have expended 83.7
hours in litigating this action. (Ibid.;
Opp., p. 4:9-10, 4:25-27; Reply, pp. 5:4-13 [conceding that there was a
clerical error in calculating Crippen’s hours], 6:5-8 [conceding that there was
a clerical error in calculating Gomez’s hours].) However, Plaintiff has not cited authority
showing that Defendant is required to pay all of the attorney’s fees that he
has incurred since commencing this action.
Instead, Plaintiff is entitled to receive from Defendant “reasonable
expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, incurred by the employee or
consumer as a result of the material breach.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.99, subd. (a)
[emphasis added].)
Based on the billing statements submitted by Plaintiff, the court
finds that Plaintiff’s attorneys expended a total of 6.70 hours of work
incurred as a result of Defendant’s breach of the arbitration agreement,
consisting of (1) 0.40 hours expended by attorney Roven to draft the
stipulation to vacate the order compelling arbitration, and (2) 6.30 hours expended
by attorney Roven to prepare this motion.[1] (Roven Decl., Ex. 1, Roven Timesheet, p. 2.) The other entries set forth the work
performed by counsel to, inter alia, prepare pleadings, conduct and
review discovery, and engage in other case-related correspondence. (Roven Decl., Ex. 1, Roven Timesheet; Pl.
Appendix of Ex., Ex. 2, Crippen Timesheet; Pl. Appendix of Ex., Ex. 3, Annelyse
Gomez Timesheet.) Plaintiff did not
show, nor do the billing statements reflect, that those hours were expended “as
a result of” Defendant’s breach of the arbitration agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.99, subd. (a).) The court further finds that a reasonable
hourly rate for attorney Roven is $600 in light of Roven’s qualifications,
skill, and experience. (Roven Decl., ¶¶
2-20.)
The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has shown that he incurred $4,020
in attorney’s fees (6.70 hours x attorney Roven’s $600 hourly rate) and $60 in
costs as a result of Defendant’s material breach of the arbitration agreement under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1298.98.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.99, subd. (a); Roven Decl., Ex. 1, Roven
Timesheet, p. 2; Roven Decl., ¶ 36 [“I anticipate spending $60 to file this
motion”].) The court denies Plaintiff’s
request for a multiplier.
ORDER
The court grants in part plaintiff
Marquis Mejia Hill’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.
The court orders defendant
Citiguard, Inc. to pay to plaintiff Marquis Mejia Hill attorney’s fees and
costs in the amount of $4,080 within 30 days of the date of this order.
The court orders plaintiff Marquis
Mejia Hill to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
The court notes that there is another entry dated February 5, 2024, showing
0.20 hours of work. (Roven Decl., Ex. 1,
p. 2.) However, the billing statement
does not include a full description of the work performed, such that the court
cannot make a determination that those hours were expended as a result of
Defendant’s breach of the arbitration agreement. (Ibid. [stating “Draft correspondence
to client re Respondent position on”].)