Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 22STCV03412, Date: 2024-01-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV03412    Hearing Date: January 24, 2024    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant General Motors LLC

RESPONDING PARTIES:    Plaintiffs Claudia Ocegueda Velazquez a/k/a Claudia Ocegueda        and Jose Ocegueda

Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

The court rules on plaintiffs Claudia Ocegueda Velazquez a/k/a Claudia Ocegueda and Jose Ocegueda’s evidentiary objections, filed on January 10, 2024, as follows:

The court sustains Objections Nos. 1-3.

The court overrules Objections Nos. 4-6.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)  “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Id. at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

DISCUSSION

Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order granting summary judgment in its favor and against plaintiffs Claudia Ocegueda Velazquez a/k/a Claudia Ocegueda (“C. Ocegueda”) and Jose Ocegueda (“J. Ocegueda”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) on Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  Alternatively, Defendant moves for summary adjudication (1) as to each of Plaintiffs’ three causes of action, and (2) as to whether Plaintiffs may claim certain specified damages at trial.

1.     First Cause of Action for Violation of Song-Beverly Act—Breach of Express Warranty

“‘The [Song-Beverly Act] provides enhanced remedies to consumers who buy new consumer goods accompanied by a manufacturer’s express warranty.’”  (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 346.)  “‘Where . . . service or repair of the goods is necessary because they do not conform with the applicable express warranties, service and repair shall be commenced within a reasonable time by the manufacturer . . . .”  (Ibid.)  “‘A plaintiff pursuing an action under the [Song-Beverly] Act has the burden to prove that (1) the vehicle had a nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element).”  (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 152.)   

The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of showing that the first cause of action for breach of express warranty has no merit because Defendant has not shown (1) that plaintiff J. Ocegueda does not have standing to assert this cause of action, and (2) that the element of a new motor vehicle cannot be established. 

First, Defendant contends that plaintiff J. Ocegueda does not have standing to assert claims under the Song-Beverly Act against Defendant because he did not purchase the subject vehicle.  However, Defendant has not submitted admissible evidence in support of this assertion and therefore has not met its burden to show that J. Ocegueda does not have standing to allege this cause of action against Defendant.

Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs did not buy a “new motor vehicle” within the meaning of the Song-Beverly Act and therefore cannot maintain their cause of action for breach of express warranty.

The Song-Beverly Act provides remedies to consumers who buy new goods accompanied by a manufacturer’s express warranty.  (Santana, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.)  A new motor vehicle is statutorily defined to include “a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty . . . .”  (Civ. Code, § 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).)  “[C]ars sold with a balance remaining on the manufacturer’s new motor vehicle warranty are included within [the Song-Beverly Act’s] definition of a new motor vehicle.”  (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 123, 126 [“Our conclusion section 1793.22 includes cars sold with a balance remaining on the new motor vehicle warranty is consistent with the Act’s purpose as a remedial measure”].)  

Defendant has submitted the declaration of James Oaks, its Customer Resource Manager Technical for the Western Region Customer Care and Aftersales, in which Oaks states that Defendant “did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage concerning the [subject vehicle] when [plaintiff C. Ocegueda] bought” the subject vehicle.  (Oaks Decl., ¶ 8.)  However, this evidence does not show that the subject vehicle was not sold “with a balance remaining on [Defendant’s] new motor vehicle warranty[.]”  (Jensen, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.)  Moreover, Defendant’s moving papers appear to concede that the subject vehicle was sold with a balance remaining on Defendant’s original warranty.  (Mot., p. 10:26-27 [C. “Ocegueda received only the balance of coverage under the Warranty that [Defendant] issued in connection with the Terrain’s delivery to its original owner(s) back in October 2017”] [emphasis added].) 

The court notes that Defendant has relied on and cited Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, review granted July 13, 2022 (S274625) (“Rodriguez”) to support its contention that the subject vehicle is not a new motor vehicle.  The court acknowledges that the Rodriguez Court concluded that the term “other motor vehicles sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” in the Song-Beverly Act “refers to cars sold with a full warranty, not to previously sold cars accompanied by some balance of the original warranty.”  (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.)  However, the California Supreme Court has granted a petition for review of the Rodriguez opinion, and the court is therefore not bound by its holding.  (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.1115, subd. (e)(1) [pending review by the Supreme Court, “a published opinion of a Court of Appeal in the matter has no binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive value only”].)  The court elects to apply the holding in Jensen instead of Rodriguez.

Thus, the court finds that Defendant has not met its burden to submit evidence showing that the subject vehicle was not sold with a remaining balance on Defendant’s new motor vehicle warranty and therefore finds that Defendant has not met its burden to show that the subject vehicle is not a “new motor vehicle” within the meaning of the Song-Beverly Act.  (Civ. Code, § 1793.22, subd. (e)(2); Jensen, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 123, 126.)

The court therefore denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the first cause of action for breach of express warranty.

2.     Second Cause of Action for Violation of Song-Beverly Act—Breach of Implied Warranty

“[E]very sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s implied warranty that the goods are merchantable.”  (Civ. Code, §¿1792.)  “The warranty ‘ “arises by operation of law” ’ and therefore applies despite its omission from a purchase contract.”  (Brand v. Hyundai Motor America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1545.)  

The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of showing that the second cause of action for breach of the implied warranty has no merit because Defendant has not shown (1) that plaintiff J. Ocegueda does not have standing to assert this cause of action; (2) that the subject vehicle is not a new motor vehicle; and (3) that the subject vehicle did not suffer defects during the covered period set forth in Civil Code section 1795.5.

First, as set forth above, the court finds that Defendant has not submitted admissible evidence showing that plaintiff J. Ocegueda did not purchase the subject vehicle and therefore has not met its burden to show that J. Ocegueda does not have standing to allege this cause of action against Defendant.

Second, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cannot assert a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty against Defendant because (1) only distributors or sellers of used goods have implied warranty obligations in the sale of used goods, and (2) Defendant was not a distributor or seller of the subject vehicle.  (Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 399 [“only distributors or sellers of used goods—not manufacturers of new goods—have implied warranty obligations in the sale of used goods”] [emphasis in original]; Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 339 [“The Song-Beverly Act provides similar remedies in the context of the sale of used goods, except that the manufacturer is generally off the hook”].)  However, as set forth above, Defendant has not met its burden to show that the subject vehicle is not a new motor vehicle and therefore has not shown that it cannot be held liable to Plaintiffs in connection with their cause of action for breach of the implied warranty.

Third, Defendant contends that the subject vehicle did not have an issue during the implied warranty period set forth in Civil Code section 1795.5 because (1) Plaintiffs bought the subject vehicle in November 2019, but (2) Plaintiffs did not bring the subject vehicle in for repair until December 2020. 

“The duration of the implied warranty of merchantability and where present the implied warranty of fitness with respect to used consumer goods sold in this state, where the sale is accompanied by an express warranty, shall be coextensive in duration with an express warranty which accompanies the consumer goods, provided the duration of the express warranty is reasonable, but in no event shall such implied warranties have a duration of less than 30 days nor more than three months following the sale of used consumer goods to a retail buyer.”  (Civ. Code, § 1795.5, subd. (c).)

As a threshold matter, the court finds that Defendant has not shown that Civil Code section 1795.5 applies here because (1) section 1795.5 applies to the duration of implied warranties “with respect to used consumer goods sold in this state,” and (2) Defendant has not, as set forth above, shown that the subject vehicle is considered a used consumer good (rather than a new motor vehicle) within the meaning of this statute.  (Civ. Code, § 1795.5, subd. (c) [emphasis added].) 

Even if Defendant had met its burden to show that Civil Code section 1795.5 applied, the court finds that Defendant did not meet its burden to show that the implied warranties were not breached during the time period set forth in that statute.  The court acknowledges that Defendant has submitted evidence showing that the subject vehicle was presented for repairs on December 14, 2020.  (Oaks Decl., ¶ 8 [authenticating Exhibit C]; Oaks Decl., Ex. C, p. 2 [Transaction History for 12/14/2020].)  But this evidence does not show that there was no breach of the implied warranties during the statutory time period, and instead shows only that Plaintiffs did not present the vehicle for repair until December 14, 2020.  (Ibid.)  Further, Defendant has not presented evidence showing the date on which Plaintiffs purchased the subject vehicle because the court has sustained the evidentiary objections to the Retail Installment Sale Contract, such that, even if Defendant had shown that the subject vehicle was a used good within the meaning of Civil Code section 1795.5, Defendant did not present sufficient evidence showing that there were no defects with the subject vehicle within three months following the sale of the vehicle.  (Civ. Code, § 1795.5, subd. (c).)

The court therefore denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the second cause of action for breach of implied warranty.

3.     Third Cause of Action for Violation of Song-Beverly Act (Civ. Code, § 1793.2)

“Where those service and repair facilities are maintained in this state and service or repair of the goods is necessary because they do not conform with the applicable express warranties, service and repair shall be commenced within a reasonable time by the manufacturer or its representatives in this state. . . .  [T]he goods shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.”  (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (b).)

The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of showing that the third cause of action for violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2 has no merit because Defendant has not shown (1) that plaintiff J. Ocegueda does not have standing to assert this cause of action for the reasons set forth in connection with the court’s ruling on the first cause of action, and (2) the subject vehicle is not a new motor vehicle for the reasons set forth in connection with the court’s ruling on the first cause of action for breach of express warranty.

The court therefore denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the third cause of action for violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2.

4.     Claim for Damages

Defendant requests that the court “find that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs may not claim as ‘damages’ at any trial what [plaintiff C.] Ocegueda paid for the optional, non-GM service contract she bought.”  (Notice of Mot., p. 2:14-16.)  The court finds that this is an improper subject for summary adjudication.   

“A motion for summary adjudication may be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1) [emphasis added].)  A claim for damages within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c is limited to claims for punitive damages.  (Ibid. [stating that a party may move for summary adjudication if it contends “that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code”]; DeCastro West Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 410, 421 [“the reference to ‘a claim for damages’ must be qualified as referring to the previously defined claim for punitive damages”].)

Thus, because Defendant’s request for summary adjudication seeks to dispose of part of a claim for damages, it is improper.  The court therefore denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the issue of whether “Plaintiffs may not claim as ‘damages’ at any trial what [plaintiff C.] Ocegueda paid for the optional, non-GM service contract she bought.”  (Notice of Mot., p. 2:14-16.) 

ORDER

            The court denies defendant General Motors LLC’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.

            The court orders plaintiffs Claudia Ocegueda Velazquez a/k/a Claudia Ocegueda and Jose Ocegueda to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  January 14, 2024

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court