Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 22STCV11124, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

Case Number: 22STCV11124    Hearing Date: April 17, 2025    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Dignity Health (erroneously sued as California Hospital – Dignity Health)

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Luz Reynozo

Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

The court rules on plaintiff Luz Reynozo’s evidentiary objections, filed on March 27, 2025, as follows:

The court overrules Objection No. 1.

The court sustains Objection No. 1, subd. (a) as to page 143, line 23 through page 144, line 5 of the deposition of plaintiff Luz Reynozo, attached as Exhibit B to the compendium of evidence filed by defendant Dignity Health.

The court overrules Objection No. 1, subd. (a) as to page 147, lines 6-13 of the deposition of plaintiff Luz Reynozo, attached as Exhibit B to the compendium of evidence filed by defendant Dignity Health.

The court rules on defendant Dignity Health’s evidentiary objections, filed on April 4, 2025, as follows:

The court sustains Objections Nos. 1 and 3.

The court overrules Objection No. 2.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)  “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Id. at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

DISCUSSION

Defendant Dignity Health (erroneously sued as California Hospital – Dignity Health) (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order granting summary judgment in its favor and against plaintiff Luz Reynozo (“Plaintiff”) on the remaining cause of action alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.[1]

1.     Second Cause of Action for Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code section 1102.5

“An employer . . . shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information . . . to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or for providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.”  (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).)  In support of this cause of action, Plaintiff has generally alleged that she reported patient abuse in the form of performing improper health care.  (FAC ¶ 18.)  Plaintiff has also alleged, in the factual allegations section of the Complaint, that Plaintiff specifically “made accusations to Hospital management against Ms. [Phinon] Huntley for patient abuse in the form of performing improper and unsafe medical procedures among other violations of safe patient care.”  (FAC ¶¶ 8, 5.)  Thus, the person about whom the subject disclosure was made is identified in Plaintiff’s Complaint to be Phinon Huntley (“Huntley”).  (Ibid.) 

First, the court finds that Defendant has not met its burden to show that the second cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 has no merit on the ground that Plaintiff admitted that she did not believe that the information disclosed regarding Huntley was unlawful because (1) the court has sustained Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection to the portion of the deposition transcript on which Defendant relies, and (2) even if the court were to consider this evidence, the court notes that Defendant did not ask Plaintiff if she believed that her complaints about Huntley disclosed a violation of law, and instead asked Plaintiff if she “kn[e]w whether [Huntley] did anything that was illegal, against the law[.]”  (Def. Compendium of Evidence, Ex. B, p. 143:25-144:5 [emphasis added].)  Further, although the court notes that Defendant has shown that Plaintiff testified that her complaints about Martha Salcedo disclosed violations of Defendant’s standards, Plaintiff did not base this cause of action on the allegation that she made reports about Martha Salcedo.  (FAC ¶¶ 8, 15 [alleging that Plaintiff made reports about Huntley]; Def. Compendium of Evidence, Ex. B, p. 147:6-13 [testifying that Martha Salcedo “was doing things against the Dignity Health standards”] in response to the question, “did you think that, in your view, that Martha was actually doing anything illegal, against the law?”].)

Second, the court finds that Defendant has not met its burden to show that the second cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 has no merit on the ground that it “has produced evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions, sufficient to satisfy its burden at trial” because Defendant has not used the correct standard for analyzing causes of action under Labor Code section 1102.5.  (Mot., p. 13:3-6.)

“Section 1102.6 provides the governing framework for the presentation and evaluation of whistleblower retaliation claims brought under section 1102.5.”  (Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718.)  Once a plaintiff meets their burden to show that retaliation for an employee’s protected activities was a contributing factor in a contested employment action, “the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the action in question for legitimate, independent reasons even had the plaintiff not engaged in protected activity.”  (Ibid.)

Although Defendant cites Labor Code section 1102.6 in its moving papers, Defendant appears to rely on the incorrect McDonnell Douglas framework in arguing that it “produced evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions,” instead of adequately addressing, and arguing that it has satisfied, the standard set forth in section 1102.6 (i.e., that the termination of Plaintiff “would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons” even if Plaintiff had not engaged in the alleged protected activity).  (Mot., pp. 9:13-23 [citing Labor Code section 1102.6], 12:21-2 [citing Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 378, in which the Court of Appeal recited the McDonnell Douglas standard in a FEHA case], 13:3-6 [arguing that Defendant had “a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions,” not that it would have taken the actions even if Plaintiff had not engaged in the alleged protected activity], 14:14-18 [arguing that an employer’s burden generally, and Defendant’s burden specifically, has been satisfied if it produces evidence that its belief that the plaintiff should be terminated for performance reasons was authentic and a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason has been produced], 14:19-20 [arguing that the performance issues identified were “sufficient to terminate plaintiff” and not that Defendant would have terminated Plaintiff even if she had not engaged in the subject activity].)  While the court recognizes that the evidence submitted by Defendant may be sufficient to meet the standard set forth under Labor Code section 1102.6, Defendant did not analyze its evidence under that standard.  (Scheer v. Regents of the University of California (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 904, 914 [“Because the moving papers failed to employ the applicable framework prescribed by Labor Code section 1102.6, the [moving parties] failed to meet their initial burden in moving to summarily adjudicate the” retaliation cause of action].)

Third, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the second cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (that Plaintiff disclosed information that could reasonably have been believed to be a violation of law) cannot be established.

Defendant has submitted the deposition transcript of Plaintiff, in which Plaintiff testified that she reported to Defendant “the subordination (sic) issues[,]” “the rude issues[,]” “the overpowering demeanor issues[,]” and “the yelling, the screaming, [and] the throwing” committed by Huntley.  (Def. Compendium of Evidence, Ex. B, p. 143:2-15, 143:18-22 [testifying “that’s—that’s—pretty much wraps it up.  She was subordinate (sic), she was rude, she was threatening, she was aggressive, overpowering” in response to the question “Any other complaints you had about Phinon [Huntley]?”].)  The court finds that Defendant has shown that Plaintiff did not engage in activity protected by Labor Code section 1102.5 because the information disclosed by Plaintiff regarding Huntley (1) describes conduct that relates to internal personnel matters between Plaintiff and Huntley, and (2) does not disclose conduct that could reasonably have been believed to be a violation of law.  (Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1384-1385, disapproved on other grounds in Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 718, n. 2 [finding that certain disclosures did not amount to whistleblowing as a matter of law because the disclosures “encompassed only the context of internal personnel matters involving a supervisor and her employee, rather than the disclosure of a legal violation”] [emphasis in original]; Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 922, 933 [finding that the disclosure that a coach had recommended a protein shake to a student was not protected activity because, even if the plaintiff subjectively believed that there was a violation of statute, “the record is devoid of anything that would support a conclusion that his belief was ‘reasonable’”].)

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of Plaintiff’s disclosing information that she had “reasonable cause to believe . . . disclose[d] a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation . . . .”  (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).)

Plaintiff did not submit evidence or present authority, analysis, and argument showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether she had reasonable cause to believe that the disclosure of information regarding Huntley’s behavior that she described in her deposition disclosed a violation of law.  Plaintiff did not, for example, present evidence showing that she made other reports about Huntley to Defendant, such that the court could determine that those reports disclosed information that Plaintiff could have had a reasonable belief disclosed a violation of law.

Further, although Plaintiff has disputed the truth of certain complaints made about her and the reason for her termination, her arguments on that point do not show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether the information reported to Defendant about Huntley’s yelling, screaming, and acting in a rude and insubordinate manner disclosed information that could reasonably have been believed to disclose a violation of law.  (Opp., pp. 3:10-4:16, 5:1-9, 7:20-24.)  The court also notes that Plaintiff has asserted, in her opposition papers, that she “was fired for blowing the whistle on an attempted coverup by Ms. Salcedo.”  (Opp., p. 7:27-28.)  However, Plaintiff did not plead this theory in her First Amended Complaint, and has instead based this cause of action on the allegations that she made reports of patient abuse and safety against Huntley.  (FAC ¶¶ 5, 8, 18; Berlanga v. University of San Francisco (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 75, 87 [“A plaintiff opposing summary judgment may not raise facts or legal theories not encompassed by his [or her] complaint to defeat a summary judgment motion”].)

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the second cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.  Because that is the sole remaining cause of action alleged in the First Amended Complaint, the court finds that all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)  The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDER

            The court grants defendant Dignity Health (erroneously sued as California Hospital – Dignity Health)’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff Luz Reynozo’s First Amended Complaint.

            The court orders defendant Dignity Health (erroneously sued as California Hospital – Dignity Health) to prepare, serve, and lodge a proposed judgment within 10 days of the date of this order.       

            The court orders that the Final Status Conference, set for May 29, 2025, is vacated.

            The court orders that trial, set for June 11, 2025, is vacated.

            The court sets for hearing an Order to Show Cause re entry of judgment (after granting summary judgment) on June 5, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 53.

The court orders defendant Dignity Health (erroneously sued as California Hospital – Dignity Health) to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  April 17, 2025

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court