Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 22STCV11336, Date: 2023-10-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV11336 Hearing Date: October 11, 2023 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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22STCV11336 |
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October
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[Tentative]
Order RE: plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration |
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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Roberto Valencia
Martinez
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Ford Motor Company
Motion for Reconsideration
The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in
connection with this motion.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The court denies plaintiff Roberto Valencia Martinez’s request for
judicial notice, filed on October 4, 2023, because the matters to be judicially
noticed are not relevant to a material issue presented by this motion. (Malek Media Group LLC v. AXQG Cor. (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 817, 825.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff Roberto Valencia Martinez (“Plaintiff”) requests that the
court (1) reconsider its December 16, 2022 order granting the motion to compel
arbitration filed by defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”), and (2) vacate
the December 16, 2022 order and issue a new order denying Defendant’s motion.
“If
a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that
warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own
motion and enter a different order.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (c).) “An appellate decision published during an
action’s pendency may be a change of law under section 1008, subdivision (c),
and requires a trial court to reconsider its earlier ruling if the decision
materially changed the law.” (State
of California v. Superior Court (Flynn) (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 94, 100.) “Even without a change of law, a trial court
has the inherent power to reconsider its prior rulings on its own motion at any
time before entry of judgment.” (Ibid.) “In addition, the court may consider a number
of factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion, including the
importance of the change of law, the timing of the motion, and the
circumstances of the case.” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 107.)
First, the court notes that, as a threshold matter,
Defendant contends that the court does not have jurisdiction to hear this
motion because the court has already ordered this matter to arbitration. The court disagrees. “While it is correct as a general matter that
the granting of a stay under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4 places the
proceedings before the trial court in ‘the twilight zone of abatement’
[citation], such a stay does not effect the ‘ouster of the judicial power
vested in the trial court of this state by our Constitution’ [citation]. Because contractual arbitration ‘dr[aws] its
vitality from the contract’ [citation], a trial court has inherent power to
revisit the foundational ‘question of whether the parties are bound by a
particular arbitration agreement’ [citation], just as it may on its own motion
revise any other interim ruling in the action pending before it
[citation].” (Pinela
v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 227, 238 [internal
citations omitted].)
Second, the court finds that there has been a
material change in law regarding the enforcement of arbitration agreements by
nonsignatory defendants.
Numerous recent appellate cases have since
disagreed with and rejected Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 486 (“Felisilda”), on which
the court relied in granting Defendant’s motion on December 16, 2022. (Dec. 16, 2022 Order, pp. 4:8-22,
6:13-20.) First, in Ford
Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1334-1335, review
granted July 19, 2023, S279969, the Court of Appeal (1) expressly disagreed
with and declined to follow Felisilda, concluding
that equitable estoppel did not apply since the plaintiffs’ claims were based
on the manufacturer defendant’s statutory obligations, and not the underlying
sale contracts, and (2) concluded that the defendant could not enforce the
arbitration agreement as a third party beneficiary. Second, in Montemayor v. Ford Motor Co.
(2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 958, 961, review granted September 20, 2023, S281237, the Court of Appeal similarly disagreed with Felisilda and concluded
that the nonsignatory defendant could not enforce the arbitration provision in
the underlying sales contract because the plaintiffs’ claims were founded on
the manufacturer’s express warranty, and not any obligation imposed by the
underlying sales contract. Finally, in Kieler
v. Superior Court of Placer County (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 614, 616,
621, the Court of Appeal joined the other decisions disagreeing with Felisilda, again
concluding that equitable estoppel was inapplicable.
The court finds that these cases demonstrate that
there has been a material change in the law because the weight of authority now
disagrees with the reasoning set forth in Felisilda and supports
Plaintiff’s position that Defendant cannot enforce the arbitration at issue
here. The court also finds that other
factors warrant reconsideration, including the importance of this change of law
and Plaintiff’s promptness in filing this motion on June 22, 2023. The court therefore exercises its discretion
to grant Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (c).)
Third, the court orders that its December 16, 2022
order granting Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is
vacated.
The court finds that the authorities rejecting Felisilda are better
reasoned and elects to follow the reasoning set forth therein. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 [when appellate decisions
are in conflict, “the court exercising inferior jurisdiction can and must make
a choice between the conflicting decisions”].) Thus, the court finds that Defendant cannot
enforce the underlying arbitration agreement, as set forth in the Retail
Installment Sale Contract – Simple Finance Charge (With Arbitration Provision)
entered into by and between Plaintiff, on the one hand, and Galpin Motors,
Inc., on the other hand, either (1) pursuant to the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, or (2) as a third-party beneficiary, pursuant to the authority set
forth above. (Furse Decl., Ex. 1, RISC,
p. 7, Arbitration Provision; Kielar, supra, 94
Cal.App.5th at p. 621 [language extending to “third parties who do not sign
this contract” in arbitration agreement “‘was a “delineation of the subject
matter of claims the purchasers and dealers agreed to arbitrate” ’ and does
not bind the purchaser ‘ “to arbitrate with the universe of unnamed third
parties” ’”] [emphasis in original]; Ford Motor Warranty Cases, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 1340, rev. granted.) The court therefore finds that Defendant’s
motion should be denied.
The court grants plaintiff Roberto Valencia Martinez’s motion for
reconsideration.
The court orders that the December 16, 2022 order granting defendant
Ford Motor Company’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is
vacated.
The court issues a new order denying defendant Ford Motor Company’s
motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.
The court orders plaintiff Roberto Valencia Martinez to give notice of
this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court