Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 22STCV12687, Date: 2024-07-01 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV12687    Hearing Date: July 1, 2024    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                 Plaintiff Gustavo Rosas         

RESPONDING PARTIES:    Defendants Nissan North America, Inc., and Wish Automotive, Inc., d/b/a Nissan of Van Nuys

Motion for Attorney’s Fees

The court considered the amended moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Gustavo Rosas (“Plaintiff”) moves the court for an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs in his favor and against defendants Nissan North America, Inc. and Wish Automotive, Inc., d/b/a Nissan of Van Nuys (“Defendants”) in the total amount of $23,367.15, consisting of $22,388.50 in attorney’s fees and $978.65 in costs.

First, the court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), provides:¿ “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”¿¿ 

Plaintiff has presented evidence, and Defendants do not dispute, that (1) the parties settled this action for the amount of $36,000 on Mrach 23, 2024, and (2) Defendants’ offer (which Plaintiff accepted) “provided for Plaintiff’s ‘attorney’s fees and costs reasonably incurred by Plaintiff[,]’” by either stipulation or noticed motion presented to the court.  (Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 20-21.)  Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs from Defendants pursuant to Civil Code section 1794.

Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has established, as to the attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action and the preparation of this fee motion, a lodestar amount of $20,697.50.

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted); Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691 [“To determine a reasonable attorney fee award, the trial court applies the lodestar method”].)  “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”¿ (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)¿¿ 

Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of attorney Michael Saeedian, in which Saeedian attests to the qualifications, skill, and experience of the attorneys that worked on this action.  (Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 2, 4-5.)  The court finds that a reasonable hourly rate for attorney Michael Saeedian is $600.  The court finds that (1) the $525 hourly rate charged by Christopher Urner is reasonable in light of his experience and qualifications, and (2) the two hourly rates charged by Jorge Acosta—i.e., $250 for work performed as a law clerk and $350 for work performed as an attorney—are reasonable in light of his experience and qualifications.  (Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, 23.) 

The court has reviewed (1) each work and time entry on the billing statement attached to Saeedian’s declaration, which establish that Plaintiff’s attorneys expended a total of 46.4 hours in prosecuting this action (consisting of 17.8 hours expended by Michael Saeedian, 8.5 hours expended by Christopher Urner, 14.8 hours expended by Jorge Acosta as a law clerk, and 5.3 hours expended by Acosta as an attorney), and (2) Defendants’ objections to the 28 entries set forth in their opposition papers.  (Saeedian Decl., Ex. A, Billing Statement; Saeedian Decl., ¶ 23; Opp., p. 6:1-28.)  Upon the court’s review of the billing statement and Defendants’ opposition papers, the court finds that all of the 46.4 hours were reasonably expended.  (Saeedian Decl., Ex. A.)   Moreover, while the court notes that Defendants take issue with the billing entries by Acosta on the ground that he was an “operations manager, not an assigned attorney on the matter[,]” the court disagrees that they are unreasonable, because Saeedian has explained in his declaration that, as operations manager, Acosta “work[s] on active cases in litigation” and “directly handles the litigation of lemon law cases for clients in [the] office as the primary assigned attorney.”  (Opp., p. 7:12-15; Saeedian Decl., ¶ 5.)

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has shown that his attorneys reasonably expended a total of 46.4 hours in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action at the hourly rates of $600 (Michael Saeedian), $525 (Christopher Under), $250 (Jorge Acosta, law clerk), and $350 (Jorge Acosta, attorney).  (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

Third, the court finds that Plaintiff has shown that he is entitled to costs in the amount of $978.65, consisting of $526.68 in filing fees, $168.52 in jury fees, $100 in service of process fees, and $91.46 in electronic filing and/or service fees.  (MC-010, ¶¶ 1, 2, 5, 14, 16; Opp., p. 2:19-20 [“Defendants do not dispute the costs and expenses of $978.65 for purposes of this motion”]; Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486 [“A ‘verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of the propriety’ of the items listed on it, and the burden is on the party challenging these costs to demonstrate that they were not reasonable or necessary”].)  

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has shown that he is entitled to recover $20,697.50 in attorney’s fees and $978.65 in costs from Defendants.  (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

ORDER

            The court grants in part plaintiff Gustavo Rosas’s motion for attorney’s fees as follows.

            The court orders that plaintiff Gustavo Rosas shall recover a total of $21,676.15 from defendants Nissan North America, Inc., and Wish Automotive, Inc., d/b/a Nissan of Van Nuys, consisting of $20,697.50 in attorney’s fees and $978.65 in costs, pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d).

            The court orders plaintiff Gustavo Rosas to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  July 1, 2024

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court