Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 22STCV13214, Date: 2024-10-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 22STCV13214, Date: 2024-10-23 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

The court rules on defendant County of Los Angeles’s evidentiary objections, filed on October 18, 2024, as follows:

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Defendant County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order granting summary judgment in its favor and against plaintiff James Padilla (“Plaintiff”) on his First Amended Complaint, or, in the alternative, granting summary adjudication in its favor on each cause of action alleged by Plaintiff.

It is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer, because of the . . . age . . . of any person, . . . to bar or to discharge the person from employment . . . or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must show they were a member of a protected class; they were qualified for the position or were performing competently in the position they held; they suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and some other circumstance suggested discriminatory motive.” (Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390, 397.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the first cause of action for discrimination on the basis of age has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action) cannot be established because Defendant has shown that (1) the adverse employment actions relating to the alleged failure to promote Plaintiff fall outside of the limitations period, and (2) the other wrongful acts identified by Plaintiff in his First Amended Complaint and discovery responses do not constitute adverse employment actions.

In support of this cause of action, Plaintiff has alleged that he suffered the following adverse employment actions: (1) denial of promotions and career advancement, (2) reassignment to job posts in violation of his work restrictions, (3) being called a liar, and (4) receiving a reprimand for violating the honesty policy. (FAC ¶ 61.) Defendant has also submitted Plaintiff’s discovery responses, in which Plaintiff has identified additional adverse employment actions allegedly suffered by Plaintiff to be the denial of accommodations, the revocation of identified accommodations, the requirement of Plaintiff to work outside of his accommodations, and the failure to promote Plaintiff in 2005, 2007, and between 2010 and 2013. (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 50; Def. Volume of Documentary Evidence (“Def. Ex.”) PP, Pl. Responses to Special Interrogatory No. 130, p. 58:1-21 [identifying adverse employment actions alleged to support the discrimination cause of action].)

First, the court finds that Defendant has shown that the cause of action, to the extent it is based on the denials of promotions in 2005, 2007, and 2010 through 2013, is barred by the statute of limitations.

“FEHA claims are governed by two statutory deadlines: section 12960 and section 12965.” (Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1411.) For the period of January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2019, “[n]o complaint [alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) (“FEHA”)] may be filed after the expiration of one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred,” except that the period could be extended in certain circumstances set forth by statute.[1] (Gov. Code, § 12960, former subd. (d); Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 931 [“At the time of the alleged misconduct here, the FEHA provided that no administrative complaint alleging a violation of its provisions could be filed with the DFEH ‘after the expiration of one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred[,]’” which is the statute of limitations for FEHA actions].) “Section 12965 concerns a separate statutory deadline applicable after the DFEH issues a right-to-sue notice. The code section provides that after an employee files a complaint and the DFEH does not issue an accusation within a specified period, the DEFH must issue a right-to-sue letter notifying the employee that he or she may bring a civil suit within one year of the date of the notice.” (Acuna, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413.)

Plaintiff obtained two right to sue notices on September 16, 2021 and April 20, 2022, i.e., more than one year after the alleged denials of promotions in 2005, 2007, and 2010 through 2013. (FAC, Exs. 1-2; UMF No. 50; Gov. Code, § 12960, former subd. (d).) Thus, the court finds that Defendant has shown that the adverse employment actions relating to the alleged denials of promotions fall outside of the limitations period, such that Plaintiff cannot rely on those alleged wrongful acts in support of this cause of action.

Second, the court finds that Defendant has shown that the adverse employment actions identified by Plaintiff in his First Amended Complaint and discovery responses that relate to his transfers to job posts in violation of his work restrictions and the denial or revocation of accommodations do not constitute adverse employment actions. Instead, this conduct is alleging other unlawful employment practices (i.e., the failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability). Thus, the court finds that the alleged conduct relating to Defendant’s failure to accommodate Plaintiff cannot constitute an adverse employment action in support of his discrimination cause of action.[2] (Doe v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 721, 735-736 [“No court has ever held that a failure to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability—which is a separate cause of action under FEHA (§ 12940, subd. (m))—can qualify as the adverse action underlying a discrimination or retaliation claim”].)

Third, the court finds that Defendant has shown that the adverse employment action alleged in the Complaint relating to Plaintiff’s being called a liar does not constitute an adverse employment action because such conduct does not materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment. (Doe, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 734.)

Fourth, the court finds that Defendant has shown that the reprimand issued to Plaintiff does not constitute an adverse employment action.

“An ‘adverse employment action’ is one that ‘materially affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’ [Citation.] ‘In the case of an institutional or corporate employer, the institution or corporation itself must have taken some official action with respect to the employee, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, adverse job assignment, significant change in compensation or benefits, or official disciplinary action.’” (Doe, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 734 [internal citation omitted] [internal emphasis omitted].)

Defendant has submitted the declaration of Clint Yates, in which Yates has stated that (1) Plaintiff’s manager, Dan Maloney, issued Plaintiff a Performance Log Entry upon reviewing video footage of Plaintiff removing wood off the premises and shutting down the elevator with a master key that he should not have possessed; (2) Plaintiff filed a Policy of Equity complaint against Maloney; (3) thereafter, Plaintiff admitted to Yates that the events in his complaint did not happen; (4) Yates admonished Plaintiff for taking false actions; (5) Plaintiff was not issued a written reprimand or any other form of discipline due to his complaint, and instead, the incident was documented with a Performance Log Entry, which (i) is “wiped out every year” and therefore was not included in Plaintiff’s file as of 2020, (ii) is not considered a form of discipline, unlike a written reprimand or suspension, and (iii) was not included in Plaintiff’s performance evaluations. (Yates Decl., ¶¶ 21-22.)

The court finds that this evidence shows that Plaintiff was not disciplined by Defendant for his filing of a complaint against Maloney, such that Defendant has shown that it did not take an action that materially affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of Plaintiff’s employment. (Doe, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 734.)

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of an adverse employment action because Plaintiff has not shown that a triable issue of material fact exists (1) as to the application of the continuing violation doctrine regarding Defendant’s failure to promote Plaintiff, and (2) as to whether the conduct relating to Defendant’s (i) alleged failure to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability and work restrictions and (ii) admonishment of Plaintiff constitute an adverse employment action that can support Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination.

First, the court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that the continuing violation doctrine applies as to the adverse employment actions identified in his First Amended Complaint and discovery responses.

“Where applicable, the continuing violations doctrine provides an equitable exception to the one-year statute of limitations for FEHA actions. [Citation.] The doctrine ‘allows liability for unlawful employer conduct occurring outside the statute of limitations if it is sufficiently connected to unlawful conduct within the limitations period.’ [Citation.] The employer’s unlawful actions are ‘sufficiently connected’ if they satisfy three criteria: (1) the unlawful conduct occurring outside the statute of limitations is ‘sufficiently similar in kind’ to the unlawful conduct within the limitations period, (2) the unlawful actions have occurred with ‘reasonable frequency,’ and (3) they have not ‘acquired a degree of permanence.’ [Citation.]” (Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, 71 [internal citations omitted].)

As to the adverse employment actions relating to Defendant’s alleged refusal to promote Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not presented evidence showing that (1) Plaintiff was denied a promotion after 2013, such that this unlawful conduct is sufficiently similar to unlawful conduct within the limitations period, and (2) this conduct occurred with reasonable frequency after 2013. (Hoglund, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 71; Padilla Decl., ¶¶ 9-10 [Plaintiff was passed over for promotions in 2005 and 2007], 22 [Plaintiff was not promoted in 2012 and 2013].)

As to the adverse employment actions relating to Defendant’s alleged failure to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability, the court has determined, for the reasons set forth above, that such alleged wrongful acts allege the existence of an unlawful employment practice, and do not constitute an adverse employment action. (Opp., p. 13:22-27, 14:3-5.)

Second, the court notes that Plaintiff has stated, in his declaration, that he was “given a written memo stating that [he] violated the honesty policy by filing the Policy of Equality Complaint and that [he] should not make false accusations against Maloney.” (Padilla Decl., ¶ 32.) But Plaintiff did not (1) present evidence showing that the written memorandum was a reprimand or other disciplinary warning, or (2) present argument establishing that the effect of the written memorandum “‘materially affect[ed] the terms, conditions, or privileges of [Plaintiff’s]’” employment with Defendant. (Doe, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 734.)

Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of an adverse employment action taken against him.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the first cause of action for discrimination on the basis of age.

It is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer, because of the . . . physical disability . . . of any person, . . . to bar or to discharge the person from employment . . . or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must show they were a member of a protected class; they were qualified for the position or were performing competently in the position they held; they suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and some other circumstance suggested discriminatory motive.” (Khoiny, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 397.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the second cause of action for discrimination on the basis of disability has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action) cannot be established.

As with the first cause of action, Plaintiff (1) has alleged, in his First Amended Complaint, that he suffered the adverse employment actions of (i) denials of promotions and career advancement, (ii) reassignment to job posts in violation of his work restrictions and that exacerbated his medical condition, (iii) being called a liar, and (iv) receiving a reprimand for violating the honesty policy based on a complaint that he made to the department, and (2) has stated, in his discovery responses, that he has based his discrimination claim on the following adverse employment actions: (i) the refusal to provide and revocation of identified accommodations, and (ii) the failure to promote Plaintiff in 2005, 2007, and between 2010 and 2013. (FAC ¶ 71; UMF No. 100; Def. Ex. PP, Pl. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 130, p. 58:1-21.)

For the reasons set forth in connection with the first cause of action, the court finds that Defendant has shown that (1) the adverse employment actions relating to the failure to promote Plaintiff occurred outside of the limitations period and therefore may not support this cause of action, (2) the alleged wrongful acts relating to Defendant’s failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability do not constitute adverse employment actions and therefore may not support this cause of action, and (3) Defendant’s admonishment of Plaintiff did not materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment and therefore does not constitute an adverse employment action that may support this cause of action.

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of an adverse employment action because, for the reasons set forth in connection with the court’s ruling on the first cause of action, Plaintiff has not shown that a triable issue of material fact exists (1) as to the application of the continuing violation doctrine regarding Defendant’s failure to promote Plaintiff, and (2) as to whether the conduct relating to Defendant’s (i) alleged failure to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability and related work restrictions and (ii) admonishment of Plaintiff constitute an adverse employment action that can support Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the second cause of action for discrimination on the basis of disability

It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h).) Similarly, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to retaliate or otherwise discriminate against a person for requesting a reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an employee. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m)(2).) “‘[T]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “protected activity,” (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.’” (Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 878-879.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the third cause of action for retaliation has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (that Defendant subjected Plaintiff to an adverse employment action) cannot be established.

Plaintiff has based his retaliation cause of action on the same adverse employment actions that support his first and second causes of action for discrimination. (FAC ¶ 79 [alleging that he “suffered the adverse employment actions of denial of promotions and career advancement, reassignment to job posts in violation of his work restrictions that exacerbated his medical condition, being called a ‘liar,’ and reprimanding for violating the honesty policy based on a complaint that Plaintiff had made to the department”]; Def. Ex. PP, Pl. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 131 [stating that he bases his retaliation cause of action based on the adverse employment actions regarding Defendant’s refusal to provide him with and revocation of reasonable accommodations, requiring Plaintiff to work outside of his job restrictions, and denial of promotions in 2005, 2007, and 2010 through 2013].) Thus, for the reasons set forth in connection with the first and second causes of action, the court finds that Defendant has shown that (1) the adverse employment actions relating to the failure to promote Plaintiff occurred outside of the limitations period and therefore may not support this cause of action, (2) the alleged wrongful acts relating to Defendant’s failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability do not constitute adverse employment actions and therefore may not support this cause of action, and (3) Defendant’s admonishment of Plaintiff did not materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment and therefore does not constitute an adverse employment action that can support this cause of action.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the third cause of action for retaliation.

It is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m)(1).) “‘The essential elements of a failure to accommodate claim are: (1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by the FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual (i.e., he or she can perform the essential functions of the position); and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability. [Citation.]’” (Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 757, 766 [internal citation omitted].)

The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of showing that the fourth cause of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodation has no merit because Defendant has not shown that the element of Defendant’s failure to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability cannot be established.

The court acknowledges that Defendant has presented evidence showing that it may have reasonably accommodated Plaintiff by, inter alia, providing him with masks and offering him a position at the Hall of Justice. However, Defendant did not present evidence showing that, by requiring Plaintiff to work with fiberglass, it did not fail to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability.[3] (FAC ¶¶ 33 [“Maloney assigned Plaintiff to work with fiberglass in violation of his restrictions”], 40 [“In or around January 2020, [Plaintiff] again reported being put in unsafe working conditions, being forced to handle fiberglass . . . .”].)

On March 13, 2013, Plaintiff presented work restrictions from Dr. Lonky noting that Plaintiff could not work in a dusty environment. (Yates Decl., ¶ 16.) On April 4, 2013, an interactive process meeting was held, and Plaintiff was accommodated via an assignment to the crime lab. (Ibid.; UMF No. 179; Def. Ex. M, p. PL000133 [April 4 Interactive Process Meeting Worksheet noting that Plaintiff’s medical certification stated that “‘he cannot work in a dusty environment’”].) Plaintiff testified that he felt that his restrictions were accommodated during the eight years in which he was assigned to the crime lab (from 2013 through 2021), except when Maloney required Plaintiff to work with fiberglass, which occurred “towards the end of [Plaintiff’s] time there [in the crime lab].” (Def. Ex. KK, Pl. Dep., pp. 136:24-137:15, 140:18-25.)

Thus, Defendant’s evidence shows that Plaintiff was required to work with fiberglass, which Plaintiff contends violated his work restrictions and therefore did not accommodate his disability. (Def. Ex. KK, Pl. Dep., pp. 136:24-137:15, 140:18-25; FAC ¶¶ 33, 40.) However, Defendant did not (1) present evidence showing that requiring Plaintiff to work with fiberglass did not violate his work restrictions, which restricted him from working in a dusty environment (e.g., by submitting evidence showing that fiberglass did not result in a dusty environment), or (2) present argument and authority showing that any such violation of Plaintiff’s work restriction does not constitute a failure to accommodate Plaintiff. While the court notes that, in reply, Defendant has argued that “not a single work restriction precludes Plaintiff from working with fiberglass[,]” Defendant did not raise that argument in its moving papers. (Reply, p. 9:27-28; Cox v. Griffin (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 440, 453 [points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered].)

The court therefore finds that Defendant has not met its burden to show that this cause of action has no merit since Defendant has not shown that it reasonably accommodated Plaintiff’s disability.

Even if the court were to find that Defendant had met its burden to show that it did not fail to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff, the court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that element. Plaintiff has submitted his declaration, in which Plaintiff asserts that he was assigned to work with fiberglass in violation of his work restrictions. (Padilla Decl., ¶¶ 27, 34.)

The court therefore denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the fourth cause of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodation.

5. Fifth Cause of Action for Failure to Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process

It is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n).) “‘The employee must initiate the process unless his or her disability and the resulting limitations are obvious. Once initiated, the employer has a continuous obligation to engage in the interactive process in good faith.’” (Kaur v. Foster Poultry Farms LLC (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 320, 347 [emphasis in original].)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the fifth cause of action for failure to engage in the interactive process has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (that Defendant failed to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process) cannot be established.

Defendant has submitted evidence showing that it engaged in multiple interactive process meetings with Plaintiff upon receiving (1) work restrictions presented by Plaintiff, and (2) complaints from Plaintiff regarding the adequacy of his accommodations. (Def. Exs. U [April 26, 2021 Interactive Process Meeting for the April 15, 2021 work restriction], V [June 24, 2021 Interactive Process Meeting for the April 15, 2021 work restriction]; W [October 12, 2021 Interactive Process Meeting for the April 15, 2021 work restriction], X [February 15, 2022 Interactive Process Meeting based on email sent by counsel for Plaintiff regarding the alleged failure to accommodate Plaintiff], Y [March 8, 2022 Interactive Process Meeting based on email sent by counsel for Plaintiff regarding the alleged failure to accommodate Plaintiff as well as his request to be relocated to the crime lab], DD [February 26, 2024 Interactive Process Meeting regarding work restriction].) Thus, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show that it did not fail to engage in the interactive process with Plaintiff.

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process with Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has submitted his declaration, in which he states that (1) Maloney assigned him to work with fiberglass in violation of his restrictions, (2) Defendant forced him to work in the Main Shop where his condition had been exacerbated by the bad air quality; and (3) he and Defendant engaged in meetings in which Plaintiff requested to return to the Crime Lab as the safer location, but Defendant (i) advised him that there were no vacancies there, and (ii) required him to work in the Main Shop. (Padilla Decl., ¶¶ 27, 33-34, 39, 41-43.)

First, as set forth above, the court notes that there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s work restrictions (and, therefore, his disability) by requiring him to work with fiberglass. But (1) “an employer’s failure to engage in the interactive process and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation represent independent causes of action subject to different elements of proof[,]” and (2) Plaintiff did not present argument and authority showing that Defendant violated its obligations to continue to engage in the interactive process in good faith regarding this restriction. (Miller v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 261, 2024 WL 4262759 at *7; Kaur, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 347.)

Second, the court acknowledges that Plaintiff has stated that Defendant forced him to work in the Main Shop where his condition was exacerbated by the bad air quality. However, Plaintiff did not present evidence or adequate argument and authority showing that Defendant violated its obligation to continue to engage in the interactive process in good faith regarding this restriction. Specifically, although Plaintiff stated that he provided an updated doctor’s note recommending that he work in an environment with good air quality in January 2021, Plaintiff did not submit such a doctor’s note. (Padilla Decl., ¶ 38.) Moreover, Plaintiff did not meaningfully dispute that he and Defendant engaged in the interactive process regarding his April 15, 2021 work restriction that prohibited him from being exposed to dust, fumes, and bad air quality (1) by holding meetings on April 26, 2021, June 24, 2021, and October 12, 2021, and (2) offering an accommodation for this restriction (i.e., the provision of masks). (Def. Exs. U, p. 1 [accepting accommodation of masks by the employee], V, W.)

Third, Plaintiff has stated that Defendant informed Plaintiff that his requested transfer location (the crime lab) had no vacancies and stated that he could only be transferred to the Department of Justice Building. (Padilla Decl., ¶ 41.) However, Plaintiff did not present argument and authority to show that Defendant’s election not to transfer Plaintiff to the crime lab shows that it was not engaging in the interactive process by attempting to offer to Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation to address his work restriction. Moreover, the interactive process meeting notes assert that Defendant offered Plaintiff temporary accommodations at the STARS Center “pending the results of an air quality test that will be conducted at the Hall of Justice[,]” which shows an attempt by Defendant to identify a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff. (Def. Ex. Y, ¶ IV [March 8, 2022 Interactive Process Meeting] [emphasis added].)

Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant violated its obligation to engage in the interactive process in good faith or obstructed the process. (Kaur, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 347.)

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the fifth cause of action for failure to engage in the interactive process.

It is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k).)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the sixth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (that Defendant discriminated or retaliated against Plaintiff) cannot be established since Defendant has, for the reasons set forth above, met its burden to show that Plaintiff’s first through third causes of action for discrimination and retaliation have no merit. (FAC ¶ 97 [alleging that Defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination and retaliation from occurring]; Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1166 [“Where, as here, a plaintiff cannot establish a claim for discrimination, the employer as a matter of law cannot be held responsible for failing to prevent same”].)

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of an underlying claim for discrimination or retaliation because Plaintiff has not, for the reasons set forth above, met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the merits of his first through third causes of action.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the sixth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation.

“Any person . . . who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another . . . may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights or duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) The two elements of declaratory relief are “‘(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.’” (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546.)

The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of showing that the seventh cause of action for declaratory judgment has no merit because Defendant has not shown that the element of an actual controversy between Plaintiff and Defendant cannot be established since the court has denied Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the fourth cause of action, and therefore this cause of action, to the extent that it seeks a declaration that Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability, survives. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060; Mot., p. 28:1-4 [arguing that there is no active controversy]; FAC ¶ 106 [requesting a declaration that Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability].)

The court exercises its discretion to deny Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his First Amended Complaint. (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280.)

The court denies defendant County of Los Angeles’s motion for summary judgment.

The court grants defendant County of Los Angeles’s motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiff James Padilla’s first cause of action for discrimination (age), second cause of action for discrimination (disability), third cause of action for retaliation, fifth cause of action for failure to engage in a good faith interactive process, and sixth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation.

The court denies defendant County of Los Angeles’s motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiff James Padilla’s fourth cause of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodation and seventh cause of action for declaratory judgment.

[1] Government Code section 12960 was amended effective January 1, 2020 to set forth a three-year statute of limitations.

[2] The court notes that an adverse job assignment may constitute an adverse employment action in some circumstances. (Doe, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 734.) However, Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that Plaintiff has based this cause of action not on an adverse job assignment that affected the terms of his employment, but rather on a job assignment that conflicted with his work restrictions and accommodations. (FAC ¶ 61 [Plaintiff suffered the adverse employment action of “reassignment to job posts in violation of his work restrictions”] [emphasis added].)

[3] The court does not rule on whether Defendant’s other accommodations were reasonable since (1) such a ruling could not find that Defendant met its burden to show that the cause of action, in its entirety, has no merit, and (2) summary adjudication is proper only if it completely disposes of a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

james padilla ; Plaintiff, vs. county of los angeles , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	22STCV13214

	Hearing Date:	October 23, 2024

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[Tentative] Order RE: defendant’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication