Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 22STCV14051, Date: 2023-01-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV14051 Hearing Date: January 24, 2023 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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22STCV14051 |
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January
24, 2023 |
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[Tentative]
Order RE: defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings |
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Kia America, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Jennifer Gonzalez
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
The court
considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with
this motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jennifer
Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) filed this lemon law action against defendant Kia
America, Inc. (“Defendant”) on April 28, 2022.
Plaintiff asserts four causes of action against Defendant for (1)
violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (2) violation of
subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (3) violation of subdivision
(a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2; and (4) breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability.
Defendant now
moves the court for an order granting its motion for judgment on the pleadings
as to each of Plaintiff’s causes of action.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
The court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); In re Ge M.
(1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1519, 1523, fn. 2 [“Judicial notice may properly be
taken of legislative history”].)
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
The court denies Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first cause of action for
violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2 because it states
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since (1) Plaintiff does not
allege that she purchased the vehicle from a seller not affiliated with
Defendant, and (2) even if Plaintiff did allege that she purchased the subject
vehicle from a third-party seller, she also alleges that she “entered into a
warranty contract with Defendant” regarding the subject vehicle, and therefore
has alleged facts establishing that the subject vehicle is a “new motor vehicle”
under the Song-Beverly Act. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).)
The court notes that Defendant
moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s first, second, and third
causes of action on the same ground: that Plaintiff “only alleges that she
purchased the subject vehicle from an unidentified seller” and therefore has
not alleged that she purchased a new motor vehicle from Defendant pursuant to Rodriguez
v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209 (“Rodriguez”). (Mot., p. 7:13-15.) First, although Plaintiff does not allege
that she purchased the subject vehicle directly from Defendant, Plaintiff does
not allege that she purchased the vehicle from a third party not affiliated
with Defendant. Instead, Plaintiff
alleges only that she “entered into a warranty contract with Defendant”
regarding the subject vehicle on or about September 4, 2019. (Compl., ¶ 9.) The allegations of the Complaint do not
establish that Plaintiff did not purchase the vehicle from Defendant or any of
its authorized dealers.
Second, as noted by Plaintiff,
on July 13, 2022, the California Supreme Court granted the petition for review
of Rodriguez. Thus, while the
court may cite Rodriguez for its persuasive value, the court may not
cite its holding as binding or precedential.
(Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.1115, subd. (e)(1).) While the court recognizes that Rodriguez concluded
that Civil Code section 1793.22’s definition of a “new motor vehicle” extends
to “cars sold with a full warranty, [and] not to previously sold cars
accompanied by some balance of the original warranty[,]” the court is not bound
by that holding. (Rodriguez, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 225 [emphasis added].)
Finally, as set forth above, even if Plaintiff had alleged that she
purchased the vehicle from another party, courts have concluded that “cars sold
with a balance remaining on the manufacturer’s new motor vehicle warranty are
included within its definition of ‘new motor vehicle.’” (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995)
35 Cal.App.4th 112, 123.) Plaintiff
alleges that she entered into a warranty contract with Defendant on September
4, 2019, and therefore has sufficiently alleged that the subject vehicle is a
“car[] sold with a balance remaining on the manufacturer’s new motor vehicle
warranty” and may constitute a “new motor vehicle” under the Song-Beverly
Act. (Ibid.; Compl., ¶ 9.)
The court denies Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the second cause of action for
violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2 because it states
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the same reasons set forth
in connection with the first cause of action.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).)
The court denies Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action for
violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2 because it states
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the same reasons set forth
in connection with the first cause of action.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).)
The court denies Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fourth cause of action for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability because it states facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).)
Defendant contends that it, as
a manufacturer, cannot be held liable for breach of the implied warranty as to
used cars. The court recognizes that
“liability for breach of implied warranty lies with distributors and retailers,
not the manufacturer, where there is no evidence the manufacturer played any
role in the sale of [a] used car to [the] plaintiff.” (Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 385, 398.) However, as set
forth above, Plaintiff (1) has not alleged that the subject vehicle was used,
and (2) in any event, has alleged facts establishing that the subject vehicle
is a “new motor vehicle” as defined by the Song-Beverly Act. The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has
alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability against Defendant as a manufacturer.
The
court denies defendant Kia America, Inc.’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
The court orders plaintiff Jennifer Gonzalez to give notice of this
ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court