Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 22STCV20453, Date: 2023-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV20453    Hearing Date: May 19, 2023    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTIES:             Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Stephanie Wiggins

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff MARRS Services, Inc.

(1)   Demurrer to Complaint

(2)   Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The court sustains plaintiff MARRS Services, Inc.’s evidentiary objections to defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Stephanie Wiggins’s supplemental request for judicial notice as an improper attempt to introduce new evidence in reply.  (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537.)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court grants defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Stephanie Wiggins’s request for judicial notice filed on December 28, 2022.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); Requa v. Regents of University of California (2012) 213 Cal.App.4th 213, 223, fn. 7.)

The court denies defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Stephanie Wiggins’s supplemental request for judicial notice, filed on May 11, 2023, as an improper attempt to introduce new evidence in reply.  (Jay, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1537.)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff MARRS Services, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“LACMTA”) and Stephanie Wiggins (“Wiggins”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on June 22, 2022.  Plaintiff alleges 10 causes of action for (1) violation of Government Code section 4525, et seq.; (2) violation of Government Code section 4529.12, et seq.; (3) promissory estoppel; (4) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) negligence; (6) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (7) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; (8) civil conspiracy; (9) unfair and unlawful business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.); and (10) declaratory relief.

Defendants move the court for an order (1) sustaining their demurrer to each cause of action, and (2) striking from the Complaint various requests for general and punitive damages, equitable and injunctive relief, and supporting allegations.

DEMURRER

The court sustains defendant Wiggins’s demurrer to each cause of action alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint because they do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Wiggins since Plaintiff has not alleged any wrongful act or omission that is attributable to Wiggins.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

In its Complaint, Plaintiff alleges only that (1) Wiggins is the Chief Executive Officer of LACMTA, and (2) Plaintiff submitted its appeal of protest to Wiggins and other LACMTA personnel.  (Compl., ¶¶ 3, 31.)  Plaintiff does not allege that Wiggins denied Plaintiff’s appeal of protest or took any specific act that constitutes legal wrongdoing.  Further, most of Plaintiff’s causes of action are expressly based on LACMTA’s conduct without referencing Wiggins.  (Compl., ¶¶ 39 [alleging in first cause of action that “LA METRO failed to abide by the” subject standards], 52 [alleging in third cause of action that “LA METRO promised, represented, and gave assurances to Plaintiff”], 60 [alleging in fourth cause of action that “LA METRO breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing], 79 [alleging in eighth cause of action that “LA METRO conspired with Zephyr”], 84 [alleging in ninth cause of action that “LA METRO has engaged in unlawful and unfair business practices”], 91 [alleging in 10th cause of action that “An actual controversy exists between Defendant LA METRO and Plaintiff”].)  Although Plaintiff has generally referenced “Defendants” in support of its other causes of action, the facts alleged pertaining to Wiggins do not establish that she committed an act or omission that can support those causes of action.  (Compl., ¶¶ 63, 68, 74.) 

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts supporting any cause of action against Wiggins.

The court sustains LACMTA’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first through eighth causes of action because they do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff did not “allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1243.)

“[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . . .”  (Gov. Code, § 945.4.)

Plaintiff’s first through eighth causes of action allege that Plaintiff has been damaged as a result of LACMTA’s conduct and requests compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages against LACMTA, a public entity.  (Compl., ¶¶ 2, 9, 43, 50, 55, 61, 65, 70-71, 77, 81-82.)  The court notes that, in addition to requesting damages, Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action also request injunctive relief.  (Compl., ¶¶ 42, 49.)  “The [Government] Claims Act does not apply . . . to nonpecuniary actions, ‘such as those seeking injunctive, specific, or declaratory relief.’”  (Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation Dist. Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493.)  However, “[t]he claims filing requirement remains applicable to actions in which money damages are not incidental or ancillary to any specific relief that is also sought, but the primary purpose of the action.”  (Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 762.) 

The court finds that Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action, as alleged, have been asserted for the primary purpose of recovering damages, since (1) Plaintiff is seeking to remedy LACMTA’s past acts in awarding the Request for Proposal to a firm that did not meet the requirements when it (i) failed to abide by the standards set forth in Government Code section 4526 and its Policies and Procedures, and (ii) failed to procure services pursuant to a fair, competitive selection process, (2) Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are vague and do not specify any specific, future conduct that Plaintiff seeks to enjoin in order to prevent future harm to Plaintiff, and instead generally requests an injunction prohibiting LACMTA from violating various statutes, and (3) Plaintiff has titled its Complaint:  “Complaint for Damages.”  (Compl., p. 1:12, ¶¶ 39-40, 45-46.)  The court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s first through eighth causes of action are subject to the Government Claims Act.

A claim not relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or personal property must be presented “not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action” and must include specific information set forth by statute.  (Gov. Code, §§ 911.2, subd. (a), 910.)  “A claim has been presented to the public entity when the public entity ‘receives a document which contains the information required by section 910 and is signed by the claimant . . . .’”  (Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare District (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391, 400.)  If there has been an attempt to comply with the statute, “but the compliance is defective, the test of substantial compliance controls.”  (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].)  “‘Substantial compliance contemplates that there is at least some compliance with all of the statutory requirements.’”  (Ibid.)

However, “‘[a] claim that fails to substantially comply with sections 910 and 910.2 may still be considered a “claim as presented” if it puts the public entity on notice both that the claimant is attempting to file a valid claim and that litigation will result if the matter is not resolved.’  [Citations.]  A ‘claim as presented’ is also sometimes called a ‘trigger-claim’ because its receipt by a public entity ‘triggers a duty by the public entity to notify the potential claimant of the claim’s insufficiency stating, with particularity, the defects or omissions.’  [Citation]  ‘If the public entity fails to send this notice, it waives any defenses as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect or omission.’”  (Simms, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 400-401.)

Plaintiff has not attached copies of its protest and appeal of protest to its Complaint.  However, Plaintiff has pleaded that (1) it timely submitted a protest to LACMTA on October 13, 2021, which was denied by LACMTA on November 29, 2021, and (2) it timely submitted its appeal of the protest to Wiggins on December 3, 2021, which was denied by LACMTA on December 2, 2021.  (Compl., ¶¶ 27, 30-32.)  The protest detailed Plaintiff’s concerns with the proposal selection process and requested that Zephyr be excluded from the Request for Proposal.  (Compl., ¶ 28.)  The appeal of protest “reiterated [Plaintiff’s] concerns with the procurement process and [LACMTA’s] repeated failure to justify awarding the [Request for Proposal] to Zephyr . . . .”  (Compl., ¶ 31.)

The court finds, and Plaintiff does not appear to contest, that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts establishing that it submitted a timely claim to LACMTA setting forth all the contents required by Government Code section 910.  The court further finds that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts establishing that it substantially complied with the Government Claims Act by submitting to LACMTA its protest and appeal of protest since the facts do not establish that “there [was] at least some compliance with all of the statutory requirements.”  (Simms, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 400.)

Plaintiff also contends that LACMTA has waived any defense because it never notified Plaintiff that the claim was deficient.  (Opp., pp. 6:27-7:1.)  As set forth above, a claim that fails to substantially comply with the Government Claims Act may still be considered “a ‘claim as presented’” that “‘triggers a duty by the public entity to notify the potential claimant of the claim’s insufficiency,’” the failure of which results in the public entity’s waiver of “‘any defenses as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect or omission.’”  (Simms, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 400-401.)  However, for a claim to be considered a “claim as presented,” it must “put[] the public entity on notice both that the claimant is attempting to file a valid claim and that litigation will result if the matter is not resolved.”  (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].)  Here, although Plaintiff has alleged that its protest and appeal of protest discussed Plaintiff’s concerns with the proposal selection process, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts establishing that its filings put LACMTA on notice that Plaintiff would commence litigation against LACMTA if the matter was not resolved.  Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts establishing that it submitted to LACMTA a “claim as presented” such that LACMTA has waived any defenses regarding deficiencies of Plaintiff’s claims. 

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts establishing that Plaintiff’s protest or appeal of protest constituted “a written claim” for money or damages that was “presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board” within the scope of the Government Claims Act.  (Gov. Code, § 945.4; Bodde, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1239 [“failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action”].)

The court sustains LACMTA’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action for unfair and unlawful business practices because it does not facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since LACMTA, as a government entity, is not a person that can be sued pursuant to California’s unfair competition law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. California Milk Producers Advisory Bd. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 871, 878-879; Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 681, fn. 18.)

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for declaratory relief because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff properly requests a declaration that LACMTA’s award of the Request for Proposal to Zephyr is null and void, which is a proper subject for declaratory relief.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Compl., ¶ 94; Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909.)

The burden is on the plaintiff “to articulate how it could amend its pleading to render it sufficient.”¿ (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 290.)¿ To satisfy that burden, a plaintiff “must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.”¿ (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)¿ The court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show what facts it can allege to render its Complaint sufficient against defendant Wiggins, and therefore sustains Wiggins’s demurrer without leave to amend.  The court further finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show what facts it can allege to render its ninth cause of action sufficient against LACMTA and therefore sustains LACMTA’s demurrer to that cause of action without leave to amend.

The court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden to show that it can amend its Complaint to render it sufficient as to the first through eighth causes of action since Plaintiff states that it can allege additional facts regarding the “substance and claims brought to [LACMTA’s] attention in the Protest and Appeal” and therefore has shown that it may be able to allege facts establishing compliance or substantial compliance with the Government Claims Act.  The court therefore sustains LACMTA’s demurrer to the first through eighth causes of action with leave to amend.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants move the court for an order striking Plaintiff’s requests and prayers for       (1) loss of good will, interference with business opportunities, and other damages,                     (2) compensatory damages, (3) general damages, (4) consequential damages, (5) punitive damages and related allegations, (6) equitable relief, as requested in connection with its third cause of action, and (7) injunctive relief, as requested in connection with its second, ninth, and tenth causes of action.  (Compl., ¶¶ 50, 71, 82; Compl., Prayer.)

The court denies as moot Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations and remedies requested in connection with Plaintiff’s first through ninth causes of action because the court has sustained Defendants’ demurrer to those causes of action, and therefore the allegations and remedies in support of those causes of action are removed from the Complaint.

The court denies Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, made in connection with the 10th cause of action, because the court finds that it properly requests an injunction to address ongoing or future unlawful misconduct.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

ORDER

The court sustains defendant Stephanie Wiggins’s demurrer to plaintiff MARRS Services, Inc.’s Complaint without leave to amend.

The court sustains defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s demurrer to plaintiff MARRS Services, Inc.’s first through eighth causes of action with leave to amend.

The court sustains defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s demurrer to plaintiff MARRS Services, Inc.’s ninth cause of action without leave to amend.

The court overrules defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s demurrer to plaintiff MARRS Services, Inc.’s 10th cause of action.

The court denies defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Stephanie Wiggins’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff MARRS Services, Inc.’s Complaint.

The court grants plaintiff MARRS Services, Inc. leave to file a First Amended Complaint that addresses the deficiencies outlined in this ruling within 20 days of the date of this order.

The court orders defendant Stephanie Wiggins to lodge and serve a proposed judgment of dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(1) within 10 days of the date of this order. 

The court orders defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Stephanie Wiggins to give notice of this ruling.

DATED:  May 19, 2023

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court