Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 22STCV26302, Date: 2023-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV26302    Hearing Date: February 15, 2023    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTIES:             Defendants Dill Veterinary Hospital, Inc., Amber Oliver, and Terrie Johnson

RESPONDING PARTIES:    Plaintiffs Mark Goodwein, Bonnie Goodwein, Teri Chang, Bernadette Ducker, Lynda O’Connor Schneider, Christina Uyeno, and Nancy Xander

(1)   Demurrer to Complaint

(2)   Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Mark Goodwein, Bonnie Goodwein, Teri Chang, Bernadette Ducker, Lynda O’Connor Schneider, Christina Uyeno, Nancy Xander, and William Turner[1] (“Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants Dill Veterinary Hospital, Inc., Amber Oliver, Terrie Johnson, and Sehaj Grewal on August 15, 2022.  Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges seven causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of bailment, (3) negligence, (4) gross negligence, (5) premises liability, (6) negligent interference with prospective economic relations, and (7) conversion and trespass to chattels.

Defendants Dill Veterinary Hospital, Inc., Amber Oliver, and Terrie Johnson (“Defendants”) now move the court for an order (1) sustaining their demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fourth and seventh causes of action, and (2) striking from the Complaint various allegations and Plaintiffs’ requests for general and non-economic damages.

DEMURRER

The court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action for gross negligence because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since (1) there is no distinct cause of action for gross negligence in California “independent of a statutory basis[,]” and (2) Plaintiffs do not allege a statutory basis for their cause of action for gross negligence.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Eriksson v. Nunnink (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, 856, fn. 18 [“California does not recognize a distinct cause of action for ‘gross negligence’ independent of a statutory basis”]; City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 779-780 [stating that its ruling is not one “recognizing a cause of action for gross negligence”].)

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for conversion and trespass to chattel because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiffs allege that Defendants (1) converted their property by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights, and (2) interfered with the possession of their property when Defendants destroyed the material.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Compl., ¶¶ 30-31, 67; Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240 [elements of conversion claim].)

The court notes that Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege intentional conduct on the part of Defendants, and therefore have failed to allege a claim for both conversion and trespass to chattel.  However, in California, conversion is a strict liability tort.  (Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1150.)  “The act must be knowingly or intentionally done, but a wrongful intent is not necessary.”  (Taylor v. Forte Hotels Int’l (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1119, 1124.)   Thus, a conversion claim “does not require bad faith, knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant have intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful possession.”  (Voris, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1158.)  Here, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants substantially interfered with Plaintiffs’ property by knowingly or intentionally destroying the specialty dog semen and/or the material.”  (Compl., ¶ 67.)  The court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants intentionally performed the act depriving Plaintiffs of their right to use and possess their property and have therefore sufficiently alleged a cause of action for conversion.

Similarly, a claim for trespass to chattel “‘lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has proximately caused injury.’”  (Levy v. Only Cremations for Pets, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 203, 216.)  The court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged intentional interference with their property based on (1) the same allegation described above, which establishes that Defendants intentionally destroyed Plaintiffs’ personal property (i.e., the material), and (2) the allegation that “Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs’ use and/or possession of the specialty dog semen and/or the material.”  (Compl., ¶¶ 67-68.)  The court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a cause of action for trespass to chattel.

The burden is on the plaintiffs “to articulate how it could amend its pleading to render it sufficient.”¿ (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290.)¿ To satisfy that burden, a plaintiff “must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.”¿ (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)  The court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show how they could amend their pleading to render it sufficient as to their fourth cause of action for gross negligence.  The court therefore sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action without leave to amend.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants move the court for an order striking the following from the Complaint: (1) the allegation “Plaintiffs’ specialty dogs live in Plaintiffs’ homes, played with Plaintiffs’ children, and have become members of Plaintiffs’ families” located in paragraph 20; (2) the allegation “Plaintiffs share a deep emotional connection with each of the specialty dogs that was forged through years of upbringing, caretaking, breeding, training, playing, traveling, competing, campaigning and/or spending time together” located in paragraph 20; (3) the term “conversion” located in paragraph 30; (4) the term “conversion” located in paragraph 31; (5) the term and request for “general damages” located in paragraph 32; (6) the allegation “Among the harms they suffered was the emotional distress and mental suffering they endured because of the damage to the Material which would have secured the ongoing existence of genetic offspring which would remind Plaintiffs of the beloved dogs whose existence they were seeking to perpetuate through the services promised by the Defendants, and each of them” located in paragraph 70; and (7) Plaintiffs’ request for past and future non-economic damages including emotional distress and mental suffering damages, described in paragraph 2 of the Prayer.

The court denies Defendants’ motion to strike the challenged allegations located in paragraph 20 because they are not irrelevant, false, or improper.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683 [motions to strike should not be used as a “line item veto”].)

The court denies Defendants’ motion to strike the references to “conversion” in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Complaint since the court has overruled the demurrer to this cause of action, making the references to a claim for conversion proper.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

The court denies Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ request for general damages in paragraph 32, because that request is not irrelevant, false, or improper.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

The court denies Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ request for non-economic damages and supporting allegation because non-economic damages are appropriately requested in connection with conversion and trespass to chattel claims.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Voris, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1151 [“emotional distress damages are also recoverable by the victim of conversion in appropriate circumstances”]; Levy, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 216 [“Emotional distress damages may be recovered for a trespass to chattel”].)

ORDER

            The court sustains defendants Dill Veterinary Hospital, Inc., Amber Oliver, and Terrie Johnson’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action for gross negligence without leave to amend.

The court overrules defendants Dill Veterinary Hospital, Inc., Amber Oliver, and Terrie Johnson’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action for conversion and trespass of chattel.

The court denies defendants Dill Veterinary Hospital, Inc., Amber Oliver, and Terrie Johnson’s motion to strike.

The court orders defendants Dill Veterinary Hospital, Inc., Amber Oliver, and Terrie Johnson to file an answer to the Complaint within 10 days of the date of service of this order.

The court orders defendants Dill Veterinary Hospital, Inc., Amber Oliver, and Terrie Johnson to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  February 15, 2023

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court