Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 22STCV37414, Date: 2023-10-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV37414    Hearing Date: October 13, 2023    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTIES:             Defendants Quick Transport, Inc., and Beatriz Villalpondo

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Efren Lagunas

(1)   Demurrer to Complaint

(2)   Motion to Strike Punitive Damages

The court considered the moving and opposition papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike.  No reply papers were filed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Efren Lagunas (“Plaintiff”) filed this wage and hour and wrongful termination action on November 29, 2022, against defendants Quick Transport, Inc., Beatriz Villalpondo, and Miguel Doe.  Plaintiff alleges 13 causes of action for (1) failure to provide meal breaks; (2) failure to provide rest breaks; (3) failure to pay wages; (4) failure to pay overtime; (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6) violation of Business and Professions Code sections 17200-17208; (7) medical discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; (8) failure to accommodate; (9) failure to engage in the interactive process; (10) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment; (11) harassment and hostile work environment; (12) retaliation; and (13) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Defendants Quick Transport, Inc. (“Quick Transport”) and Beatriz Villalpondo (collectively, “Defendants”) now move the court for an order (1) sustaining their demurrer to the sixth through 13th causes of action, and (2) striking Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.

DEMURRER

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code sections 17200-17208 because, although Defendants have cited general standards for pleading a cause of action under this statutory scheme, Defendants have not challenged any specific element that Plaintiff has not alleged and therefore have not met their burden to show that the demurrer to this cause of action should be sustained.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh cause of action for medical discrimination because Defendants have not challenged any specific element that Plaintiff has not alleged in support of this cause of action and therefore have not met their burden of showing that the demurrer to this cause of action should be sustained.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)  Moreover, to the extent that Defendants dispute the facts alleged in the Complaint, filing a demurrer is not an appropriate motion to contest those facts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [“When any ground for objection to a complaint . . . appears on the face thereof” or matters to be judicially noticed, “the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”] [italics added]; Dem., p. 6:14-15 [“the complaint is just factually inaccurate”].)

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the eighth cause of action for failure to accommodate because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff alleges that (1) he requested accommodations from Defendants and that Defendants retaliated against him for making that request, and (2) Defendants refused to accommodate him, and therefore has alleged that Defendants “fail[ed] to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability” of Plaintiff.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Compl., ¶¶ 97, 88; Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m)(1).)

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the ninth cause of action for failure to engage in the interactive process because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has alleged that (1) Plaintiff informed Defendants of his medical condition and requested reasonable accommodation, and (2) “[r]ather than engaging in the interactive process of accommodation with Plaintiff[,]” Defendants instead “began a campaign to terminate Plaintiff’s employment” and refused to accommodate him.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Compl., ¶¶ 106-108; Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 97 [a claim for failure to engage in the interactive process “is the appropriate cause of action where the employee is unable to identify a specific, available reasonable accommodation while in the workplace and the employer fails to engage in a good faith interactive process to help identify one, but the employee is able to identify a specific, available reasonable accommodation through the litigation process”] [internal quotations omitted].)

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the 10th cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since the court has overruled Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh cause of action for medical discrimination, which is sufficient to support this cause of action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k).) 

The court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the 11th cause of action for harassment and hostile work environment because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendants’ conduct, in throwing Plaintiff’s belongings into his vehicle, was “‘severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their [protected status].’”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Compl., ¶¶ 122-123; Galvan v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 549, 564.)

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the 12th cause of action for retaliation in violation of FEHA because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has alleged that (1) he engaged in the protected act of requesting accommodations, and (2) thereafter, Defendants “began a campaign to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Compl., ¶¶ 139-140; Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 878-879 [setting forth elements of claim for retaliation under FEHA].)

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the 13th cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants terminated him in violation of various fundamental public policies, including as set forth in FEHA.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Compl., ¶ 155; Garcia-Brower v. Premier Automotive Imports of CA, LLC (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 961, 973 [setting forth elements of claim for wrongful discharge].)

The court also notes that Defendants have argued that various causes of action are barred and preempted by the remedy provided by workers’ compensation.  In support of that argument, Defendants have cited Labor Code section 132a and Dutra v. Mercy Medical Center Mt. Shasta (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 750 (“Dutra”).  “Labor Code section 132a extends certain civil rights protections to employees who are injured in the course of their employment.”  (Dutra, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 754.)  To that end, this statute makes a misdemeanor (1) the discharge, or threat of discharge, or discrimination against any employee by an employer because the employee has filed or made known his intention to file a claim for compensation with his employer; (2) for any insurer to advise, direct, or threaten an insured under penalty of cancellation or raise in premium, to discharge an employee because the employee has filed or made known his intention to file a claim for compensation with his employer; (3) the discharge, or threat of discharge, or discrimination against any employee by an employer because the employee has or intends to testify in another employee’s case before the appeals board; and (4) for any insurer to advise, direct, or threaten an insured under penalty of cancellation or raise in premium, to discharge or discriminate against an employee because the employee testified or will testify in another employee’s case before an appeals board.  (Lab. Code, § 132a, subds. (1)-(4).)  Here, Plaintiff does not appear to have alleged facts that would be actionable under this statute, and Defendants have not pointed to any such allegations.  The court therefore finds that Defendants have not met their burden of establishing that the ninth, 11th, 12th, and 13 causes of action are preempted by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants request that the court strike from the Complaint (1) Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, as set forth in paragraph 6 of the prayer; and (2) the related allegations and requests for punitive damages as set forth in paragraphs 76, 91, 101, 119, 148, 159, and 162.

The court denies Defendants’ motion to strike because Plaintiff has alleged facts establishing (1) that Defendants were guilty of oppression or malice, and (2) advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression or malice on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of corporate defendant Quick Transport.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Compl., ¶¶ 29-30, 35-36, 15, 101, 152.)

ORDER

            The court overrules defendants Quick Transport, Inc., and Beatriz Villalpondo’s demurrer to plaintiff Efren Lagunas’ sixth through 10th and 12th through 13th causes of action.

The court sustains defendants Quick Transport, Inc., and Beatriz Villalpondo’s demurrer to plaintiff Efren Lagunas’ 11th cause of action for harassment and hostile work environment.

The court denies defendants Quick Transport, Inc., and Beatriz Villalpondo’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff Efren Lagunas’ Complaint.

The court grants plaintiff Efren Lagunas 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies as to the 11th cause of action set forth in this ruling.

The court orders plaintiff Efren Lagunas to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  October 13, 2023

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court