Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV06652, Date: 2023-12-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV06652 Hearing Date: December 14, 2023 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
53
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Case
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23STCV06652 |
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Hearing
Date: |
December
14, 2023 |
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Time: |
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[Tentative]
Order RE: defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and
stay action |
MOVING PARTIES:
Defendants Miod and Company,
LLP, and Jeremy J. Salvador, CPA
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Amitiss Nasiri
Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action
The court
considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with
this motion.
DISCUSSION
Defendants Miod and Company, LLP (“Miod”) and Jeremy J. Salvador, CPA
(“Salvador”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move the court for an order (1)
compelling plaintiff Amitiss Nasiri (“Plaintiff”) to submit the claims alleged
in her Complaint to binding arbitration, and (2) staying this action pending
completion of arbitration.
“On
petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a
written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement
refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and
the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement
to arbitrate the controversy exists[,]” unless the court finds that the right
to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner or that grounds exist
for rescission of the agreement.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., §¿1281.2.)¿¿
“‘
“The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the
existence of an arbitration agreement, while the party opposing the petition
bears the burden of establishing a defense to the agreement’s enforcement.” ’”¿
(Beco v. Fast Auto Loans (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 292, 302.)¿ The burden of
production as to this finding shifts in a three-step process.¿ (Gamboa v.
Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.)¿ First, the
moving party bears the burden of producing prima facie evidence of a written
agreement to arbitrate, which can be met by attaching a copy of the arbitration
agreement purporting to bear the opponent’s signature. (Ibid.)¿ If the
moving party meets this burden, the opposing party bears, in the second step,
the burden of producing evidence to challenge its authenticity.¿ (Ibid.)¿
If the opposing party produces evidence sufficient to meet this burden, the
final step requires the moving party to establish, with admissible evidence, a
valid arbitration agreement between the parties.¿ (Ibid.)¿¿
First, the
court finds that Defendants have met their burden of producing prima facie
evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate between Plaintiff, on the one
hand, and defendant Miod, on the other hand.
Defendants
have submitted a copy of the October 9, 2020 Engagement Letter, authored and
signed by defendant Miod, confirming that Plaintiff retained Miod “to perform
certain accounting services in connection with” Plaintiff’s underlying marital
dissolution. (Salvador Decl., Ex. A,
Engagement Letter, p. 1.) The letter
includes an arbitration provision (the “Arbitration Provision”) which states,
in relevant part, that “[a]ll claims or disputes relating to the determination
of the payment of fees under this Agreement shall be settled by binding
arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association . . . .” (Salvador Decl., Ex. A, Engagement Letter, p.
2.) The Engagement Letter purports to
bear Plaintiff’s signature. (Salvador
Decl., Ex. A, Engagement Letter, p. 3.) Thus, the court finds that Defendants have
submitted prima facie evidence of an arbitration agreement between Plaintiff
and Miod.
Second, the
court finds that Defendants have not met their burden to show that the
Arbitration Provision encompasses the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
“‘“[T]he
decision as to whether a contractual arbitration clause covers a particular
dispute rests substantially on whether the clause in question is ‘broad’ or ‘narrow.’”’
[Citations.] A broad clause includes language that requires arbitration
of ‘ “ ‘any claim arising from or related to’ ” ’ the
agreement.” (Ahern v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 675, 689 [emphasis in original].) “A narrow clause, on the
other hand, typically includes language that requires arbitration of ‘a claim,
dispute, or controversy “arising from” or “arising out of” an agreement, i.e.,
excluding language such as “relating to this agreement” or “in connection with
this agreement.” ’ [Citation.] Narrow arbitration clauses are generally
interpreted ‘ “ ‘to be more limited in scope’ ” ’ [citations] and ‘apply only
to disputes regarding the interpretation and performance of the agreement’
[citations].” (Id. at pp. 689-690
[internal citations omitted].)
Here,
as set forth above, the Arbitration Provision applies to “[a]ll claims or
disputes relating to the determination of the payment of fees under this
Agreement . . . .” (Salvador Decl., Ex.
A, Engagement Letter, p. 2.) The court
finds that the Arbitration Provision is narrow.
It does not include language that encompasses “any claim arising from or
related to” the engagement letter, as typically included in broad arbitration
clauses. (Ahern, supra, 74
Cal.App.5th at p. 689.) It also does not
include the language typically included in narrow clauses, i.e., language requiring
arbitration of claims, disputes, or controversies arising from or arising out
of an agreement. (Ibid.) The Arbitration Provision at issue here is
particularly narrow, because it applies only to claims or disputes “relating to
the determination of the payment
of fees” under the parties’
agreement. (Salvador Decl., Ex. A,
Engagement Letter, p. 2 [emphasis added].)
Plaintiff has not alleged a claim relating to the
“determination of the payment of fees” to Defendants under the parties’
agreement. (Salvador Decl., Ex. A,
Engagement Letter, p. 2 [emphasis added].)
Instead, Plaintiff alleges one cause of action for professional
negligence, based on the allegations that Defendants performed their services
in a manner below the standard of care by, inter alia, failing to
properly appraise Plaintiff’s dental practice, failing to appear at the marital
dissolution action, failing to confer with Plaintiff’s retained experts, and
acting negligently in providing accounting services to Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶¶ 17-23, 24-25, 31.)
The court notes that Defendants argue, in reply,
that Plaintiff’s action relates to the determination of the payment of fees because
(1) “ascertaining whether accounting services were rendered is a prerequisite
to determining whether the payment of fees follows[,]” and (2) accounting services are intertwined with
the payment of fees. (Reply, p. 2:20-22,
2:27-28.) The court disagrees. Plaintiff’s action is not based on a fee
dispute between the parties relating to their agreement, but rather whether
Defendants were negligent in providing their services to Plaintiff.
Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff’s cause of
action for professional negligence does not relate to the determination of the
payment of fees to Defendants under their agreement and therefore is not
encompassed by the Arbitration Provision.
(Eminence Healthcare, Inc. v. Centuri Health Ventures, LLC (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 869, 875 [“Arbitration is strictly a matter of consent and,
therefore, a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute that it has not
agreed to submit to arbitration”].)
The court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to
compel Plaintiff to submit the claims alleged in her Complaint to arbitration.
ORDER
The court denies defendants Miod and
Company, LLP, and Jeremy J. Salvador, CPA’s motion to compel arbitration and
stay action.
The court orders plaintiff Amitiss
Nasiri to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court