Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV06799, Date: 2024-10-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV06799    Hearing Date: October 14, 2024    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                 Plaintiff Mona Golian

RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Mona Golian (“Plaintiff”) moves the court for an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs in her favor, to be paid by defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Defendant”), in the total amount of $27,593.78, consisting of (1) $24,132.50 in attorney’s fees, (2) $1,048.03 in costs, and (3) a lodestar multiplier of 1.1 amounting to $2,413.25.

First, the court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees from Defendant pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), provides:¿ “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”¿¿¿ 

Plaintiff has presented evidence showing, and Defendant does not dispute, that (1) on July 26, 2023, the parties formally agreed to resolve this action, and (2) Defendant also stipulated “that Plaintiff would be the ‘prevailing party’ so that Plaintiff could seek attorney’s fees and costs by motion.”  (Kohen Decl., ¶¶ 3, 11.)  The court therefore finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendant attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794.

Second, the court finds, as to the attorney’s fees incurred by Plaintiff in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action and the preparation of this fee motion, that Plaintiff has established a lodestar amount of $17,727.50.

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted); Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691 [“To determine a reasonable attorney fee award, the trial court applies the lodestar method”].)  “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”¿ (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)¿¿¿ 

Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of attorney Isaac Kohen, in which Kohen has attested to the qualifications, skill, and experience of the attorneys that worked on this action.  (Kohen Decl., ¶¶ 15-16, 18-19.)  The court finds that the hourly rates requested ($525 for attorney Kohen and $295 for attorney Imber) are reasonable in light of counsel’s qualifications and experience.  (Ibid.; Mot., p. 1:16-17.)

The court has reviewed each time and work entry on the billing statement attached to the declaration of Isaac Kohen, which establish that Plaintiff’s attorneys expended a total of 47.5 hours in prosecuting this action, and Defendant’s objections to the entries, attached to the declaration of Donna Hooper.  (Kohen Decl., Ex. 1, p. 2 [showing that attorney Kohen expended 44 hours and attorney Imber expended 3.5 hours]; Hooper Decl., Ex. A.)  Upon the court’s review of the billing statement, the court finds that (1) of the 7.40 hours expended to conduct research on February 22, 2023, 2.40 of those hours were not reasonably expended; (2) of the 0.8 hours expended to draft a demand letter on February 23, 2023, 0.8 of those hours were not reasonably expended because Defendant has presented evidence showing that Plaintiff did not serve a demand letter on it; (3) of the 0.5 hours expended on August 9, 2023 to review Defendant’s answer, 0.5 of those hours were not reasonably expended because the parties had settled the case as of July 26, 2023; (4) of the total 8.5 hours to draft the pending fee motion on April 17, 2024 and April 18, 2024, 4.0 of those hours were not reasonably expended; (5) of the estimated total 1.5 hours to draft an ex parte application and attend the hearing thereon, 1.5 of those hours were not expended because Plaintiff did not file an ex parte application; (6) of the estimated 4 hours to review the opposition and prepare a reply to this motion, 2.0 of those hours were not reasonably incurred; and (7) the 1.0 hour of “Misc. tasks to complete case” is vague and therefore does not show that the 1.0 hour was reasonably expended.  (Kohen Decl., Ex. 1, pp. 1, 2; Hooper Decl., ¶ 5 [Defendant “has no record of a demand letter sent to [it] on behalf of Plaintiff”]; Kohen Decl., ¶ 3 [the parties agreed to resolve this action on July 26, 2023].)

Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff’s attorneys reasonably expended a total of 35.3 hours (consisting of 31.8 hours expended by attorney Kohen and 3.5 hours expended by attorney Imber) in connection with this prosecuting this action and preparing the pending fee motion.  The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has established a lodestar amount of $17,727.50 ((31.8 hours x attorney Kohen’s $525 hourly rate) + (3.5 hours x attorney Imber’s $295 hourly rate)).

Third, the court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to a lodestar multiplier of 1.1.

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.¿ [Citation omitted.]¿ The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.¿ In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.¿ The ‘“experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’”¿ (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)¿¿¿¿  

Although the court recognizes that this matter was taken on a contingency basis and that Plaintiff’s attorneys displayed skill in prosecuting this action, the court finds that there is no evidence that this lemon law matter involved complex or novel issues that would justify the imposition of a multiplier.  (Kohen Decl., ¶ 28.)

Finally, the court finds that (1) Plaintiff has not sufficiently supported the request for $130 in costs for “TBD” messenger services costs, and (2) Plaintiff has therefore shown that she is entitled to recover $918.03 in costs.  (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d); Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 42 [noting that section 1794 permits prevailing buyers to recover costs not included in the statutory definition of costs set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5]; Kohen Decl., Ex. 2, Litigation Costs and Expenses].)

ORDER

            The court grants in part plaintiff Mona Golian’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs as follows.

            The court orders that plaintiff Mona Golian shall recover a total of $18,645.53 from defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, consisting of $17,727.50 in attorney’s fees and $918.03 in costs, pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d).

            The court orders plaintiff Mona Golian to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  October 14, 2024

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court