Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV12500, Date: 2024-01-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV12500 Hearing Date: January 23, 2024 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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23STCV12500 |
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January
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[Tentative]
Order RE: defendant’s motion to compel binding arbitration
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Tesla, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed
Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration
The court
considered the moving papers filed in connection with this motion. No opposition papers were filed.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The court grants defendant
Tesla, Inc.’s request for judicial notice.
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
DISCUSSION
Defendant Tesla, Inc. (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order (1)
compelling plaintiff Joseph Delpriore (“Plaintiff”) to arbitrate all the claims
alleged in the Complaint, and (2) staying this action pending completion of
arbitration.
A
written provision in any contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.[1]¿ (9 U.S.C. §
2.)¿ The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) requires courts to direct parties to
proceed to arbitration on issues covered by an arbitration agreement upon a
finding that the making of the arbitration agreement is not in issue.¿ (9
U.S.C. § 4; Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys. (9th Cir. 2000) 207
F.3d 1126, 1130.)¿ “The court’s role under the [FAA] is therefore limited to
determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does,
(2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.”¿ (Chiron Corp.,
supra, 207 F.3d at p. 1130.)¿ The FAA reflects “both a ‘liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration,’ [citation], and the ‘fundamental principle that
arbitration is a matter of contract,’ [citation].”¿ (AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.)¿¿
“‘
“The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the
existence of an arbitration agreement, while the party opposing the petition
bears the burden of establishing a defense to the agreement’s enforcement.” ’”¿
(Beco v. Fast Auto Loans (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 292, 302.)¿ The burden of
production as to this finding shifts in a three-step process.¿ (Gamboa v.
Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.)¿ First, the
moving party bears the burden of producing prima facie evidence of a written
agreement to arbitrate, which can be met by attaching a copy of the arbitration
agreement purporting to bear the opponent’s signature. (Ibid.)¿ If the
moving party meets this burden, the opposing party bears, in the second step,
the burden of producing evidence to challenge its authenticity.¿ (Ibid.)¿
If the opposing party produces evidence sufficient to meet this burden, the
final step requires the moving party to establish, with admissible evidence, a
valid arbitration agreement between the parties.¿ (Ibid.)¿¿¿
The court
finds that Defendant has met its burden of producing prima facie evidence of an
agreement to arbitrate.
Defendant has submitted evidence showing that, on
November 21, 2021, Plaintiff submitted an order for the subject vehicle with
Defendant. (Kim Decl., ¶ 3.) The Motor Vehicle Order Agreement includes an
agreement to arbitrate (the “Arbitration Agreement”), which states, in relevant
part, the following: “If you have a
concern or dispute, please send a written notice describing it and your desired
resolution to resolutions@tesla.com. If
not resolved within 60 days, you agree that any dispute arising out of or
relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will not be
decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an arbitration
administered by the American Arbitration Association . . . .” (Kim Decl., Motor Vehicle Order Agreement, p.
3.) The Arbitration Agreement further
states that it “includes claims arising before this Agreement, such as claims
related to statements about our products.”
(Ibid.) It also sets forth
a procedure to opt out of arbitration. (Ibid)
Although
the Arbitration Agreement does not bear Plaintiff’s signature, Defendant has
submitted the declaration of Raymond Kim, a Staff Business Resolution Partner
for Defendant, in which Kim states that (1) Plaintiff would not have been able
to place their order for the subject vehicle without clicking the “Place Order”
button on Defendant’s website; (2) before placing the order, Plaintiff would
have (i) seen text advising them that they were agreeing to the Order
Agreement’s terms and conditions and (ii) had the option to click on a
hyperlink to view those terms; (3) once executed, the Order Agreement becomes
visible to consumers on their account with Defendant; (4) once executed, the
Order Agreement is automatically saved to the electronic document storage
system; and (5) Defendant’s records show that Plaintiff did not opt out of the
Arbitration Agreement. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 2,
4-5.) Thus, Defendant has submitted
evidence showing that Plaintiff, when placing the order for the subject
vehicle, agreed to the terms of the Motor Vehicle Order Agreement, including
its Arbitration Agreement.
The court
therefore finds that Defendant has submitted evidence sufficient to show that
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement to arbitrate claims arising
from the Motor Vehicle Order Agreement.
The court
further finds that Defendant has shown that the Arbitration Agreement
encompasses the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
As set
forth above, the Arbitration Agreement extends to “any dispute between
[Plaintiff] and [Defendant] and [Defendant’s] affiliates[,]” including any
disputes “arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between
[Plaintiff] and [Defendant] . . . .”
(Kim Decl., Ex. 1, Motor Vehicle Order Agreement, p. 3.) In their Complaint, Plaintiff has alleged
four causes of action against Defendant for (1) violation of subdivision (d) of
Civil Code section 1793.2, (2)
violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2, (3) violation of
subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2, and (4) breach of the implied
warranty of habitability. Plaintiff’s
causes of action are based on the allegations that Defendant did not conform
the subject vehicle to the applicable express and implied warranties within a
reasonable time and that Defendant failed to provide to its repair facilities
sufficient literature to effect repairs.
(Compl., ¶¶ 14-15, 20, 24, 26, 31-33.) The court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s
causes of action arise from the relationship between Plaintiff, as the
consumer, and Defendant, as the seller and manufacturer.
The court finds that Plaintiff has
not met their burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the
Arbitration Agreement. Plaintiff did not
file opposition papers with the court arguing that they did not agree to the
Arbitration Agreement or that it is unenforceable for any reason.
The court therefore grants
Defendant’s motion. The court orders
that this action is stayed pending completion of arbitration. (9 U.S.C. § 3.)
ORDER
The court grants defendant
Tesla, Inc.’s motion to compel binding arbitration.
The court orders (1) plaintiff
Joseph Delpriore and defendant Tesla Motors, Inc. to submit all the claims
alleged in plaintiff Joseph Delpriore’s Complaint to binding arbitration, and
(2) this action is stayed until arbitration is completed.
The court sets an Order to
Show Cause re completion of arbitration for hearing on August 22, 2024, at 8:30
a.m., in Department 53.
The court orders defendant
Tesla, Inc. to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
The court finds that the Federal Arbitration Act governs Defendant’s motion
because Defendant has shown that the subject agreement—regarding the sale of a
vehicle—involves commerce. (Evenskaas
v. California Transit, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 285, 292-293.)