Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV14081, Date: 2023-10-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV14081    Hearing Date: October 23, 2023    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTIES:             Defendants Greenfield Care Center of Fillmore, LLC, Eva Care Group, LLC, Jenq H. Chen, Teresa Chen, and Paul Salazar

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Angela Bustamante

Motion to Compel Arbitration

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The court rules on defendants Greenfield Care Center of Fillmore, LLC, Eva Care Group, LLC, Jenq H. Chen, Teresa Chen, and Paul Salazar’s evidentiary objections, filed on October 16, 2023, as follows:

The court overrules Objections Nos. 2-11 and 15.

The court sustains Objections Nos. 1 and 12-14.

DISCUSSION

Defendants Greenfield Care Center of Fillmore, LLC, Eva Care Group, LLC, Jenq H. Chen, Teresa Chen, and Paul Salazar (“Defendants”) move the court for an order compelling plaintiff Angela Bustamante (“Plaintiff”) to arbitrate the claims alleged in her Complaint.

1.     Existence of Written Agreement to Arbitrate

A written provision in any contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.[1]¿ (9 U.S.C. § 2.)¿ The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) requires courts to direct parties to proceed to arbitration on issues covered by an arbitration agreement upon a finding that the making of the arbitration agreement is not in issue.¿ (9 U.S.C. § 4; Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.)¿ “The court’s role under the [FAA] is therefore limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.”¿ (Chiron Corp., supra, 207 F.3d at p. 1130.)¿ The FAA reflects “both a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,’ [citation], and the ‘fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract,’ [citation].”¿ (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.)¿¿ 

“‘ “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, while the party opposing the petition bears the burden of establishing a defense to the agreement’s enforcement.” ’”¿ (Beco v. Fast Auto Loans (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 292, 302.)¿ The burden of production as to this finding shifts in a three-step process.¿ (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.)¿ First, the moving party bears the burden of producing prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate, which can be met by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the opponent’s signature.¿ (Ibid.)¿ If the moving party meets this burden, the opposing party bears, in the second step, the burden of producing evidence to challenge its authenticity.¿ (Ibid.)¿ If the opposing party produces evidence sufficient to meet this burden, the third step requires the moving party to establish, with admissible evidence, a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.¿ (Ibid.)¿ 

First, the court finds Defendants have met their burden to show the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the controversy between Defendants and Plaintiff.

In support of their motion, Defendants submit two arbitration agreements purporting to bear the signature of Plaintiff.  Defendants first submit the “Mutual Agreement for Employment At-Will and Mediation/Arbitration,” which states that it was entered into by and between defendant Greenfield Care Center of Fillmore, LLC (“GCC Fillmore”), on the one hand, and Plaintiff, on the other hand, on December 14, 2021.  (Ambriz Decl., Ex. A, p. 1, ¶ 1.)  This arbitration agreement provides that the parties agree to submit to arbitration “any claim, dispute, and/or controversy . . . between Employee and Employer and its owners, directors, officers, shareholders, employees, agents, and parties affiliated with its employee benefit and health plans, arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with Employee’s seeking employment with . . . or termination with Employer, whether based on tort, contract, statute, equity, or otherwise . . . .”  (Id., p. 1, ¶ 2.)  This agreement further provides that “[n]on-signatory agents, employees and/or representatives of Employer have the benefit of electing to utilize this mediation and arbitration mechanism, to the extent that a claim is made against them by Employee or Employer and the underlying controversy arises from or relates to Employee’s employment by Employer, and may enforce the same as third-party beneficiaries or pursuant to any other applicable legal standard.”  (Id., p. 4, ¶ 17.) 

Next, Defendants submit the “Arbitration Agreement” entered into by and between defendant GCC Filmore, on the one hand, and Plaintiff, on the other hand, on December 15, 2022.  (Ambriz Decl., Ex. B, p. 3 [purporting to bear Plaintiff’s signature]; Ambriz Decl., ¶¶ 3 [Ambriz has access to GCC Fillmore’s personnel records], 8 [Plaintiff’s personnel file included the agreement].)  The second agreement provides that the parties agree to arbitrate “all statutory, contractual and/or common law claims arising from employment with the Company[,]” including claims for retaliation, discrimination, harassment, and claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.  (Ambriz Decl., Ex. B, p. 2.)  

Further, Defendants submit the declaration of Rosa Ambriz, the Director of Staff Development for defendant GCC Fillmore.  (Ambriz Decl., ¶ 2.)  Ambriz asserts that (1) she has access to personnel records of GCC Fillmore’s employees, which include copies of documents signed by employees in connection with their employment; (2) she is familiar with Plaintiff; (3) during the time of Plaintiff’s employment, GCC Fillmore’s employees were given a hard copy of the first arbitration agreement along with other onboarding documents, including the employee handbook; (4) as part of the onboarding process, employees underwent an eight-hour orientation, during which time they were presented with those documents and advised to sign them, including the first arbitration agreement; (5) she recalls providing Plaintiff with a hard copy of the first arbitration agreement; (6) she recalls Plaintiff returning a signed copy of the arbitration agreement on December 14, 2021, and Ambriz signed the same document in order to attest that the document was reviewed and signed by Plaintiff; and (7) the second arbitration agreement was also placed in Plaintiff’s personnel file.  (Ambriz Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.)

Thus, the court finds that Defendants have met their burden of showing that there is an agreement to arbitrate this controversy between Defendants and Plaintiff, as (1) a signatory (defendant GCC Fillmore), and (2) owners, directors, officers, shareholders, employees, and agents of defendant GCC Fillmore (defendants Eva Care Group, LLC, Jenq H. Chen, Teresa Chen, and Paul Salazar).  (Ambriz Decl., Ex. A, Mutual Agreement for Employment At-Will and Mediation/Arbitration, p. 1, ¶ 2; Compl., ¶¶ 4 [alleging that defendants Teresa Chen and Jenq H. Chen are principals of defendants GCC Fillmore and Eva Care Group, LLC], 11 [alleging that defendants GCC Fillmore and Eva Care Group, LLC are “joint employers”], 30 [alleging that Salazar is an employee].) 

Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden to challenge the authenticity of either arbitration agreement. 

As a threshold matter, the court notes that Plaintiff did not argue, in her opposition brief, that Plaintiff did not sign the arbitration agreements or otherwise dispute their authenticity.  However, Plaintiff has submitted her declaration, in which she states that (1) she “recognize[s] [her] signature on” the first arbitration agreement but attests that she “did not sign [the first arbitration agreement] on the date indicated[;]” (2) she does not recognize the second arbitration agreement and “den[ies] that [she] signed any arbitration agreement in December 2022[;]” and (3) she did not meet Ambriz until 2022.  (Bustamante Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.)

The court finds that this declaration is insufficient to challenge the authenticity of the arbitration agreements.  As to the first arbitration agreement, Plaintiff expressly “recognize[s] [her] signature” and does not dispute that she signed the agreement – only the date.  (Bustamante Decl., ¶ 4.)  Moreover, the court finds Plaintiff’s assertion that she did not meet Ambriz until 2022 is not supported by the first, wrtiten arbitration agreement, which includes Ambriz’s signature, dated December 14, 2021.  (Ambriz Decl., Ex. 5; Ambriz Decl., ¶ 7.)  Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff’s declaration is insufficient to show that Plaintiff did not sign the first arbitration agreement.  (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 756 [“In the absence of any evidence that [the plaintiffs’] purported signatures were not their own, there was no evidence that plaintiffs did not in fact sign the agreement”].)  The court further finds that Plaintiff’s assertions that she did not sign the second arbitration agreement are insufficient to challenge the authenticity of her signature thereto or the agreement.  (Id. at p. 758 [“If a party confronted with his or her handwritten signature on an arbitration agreement is unable to allege that the signature is inauthentic or forged, the fact that that person does not recall signing the agreement neither creates a factual dispute as to the signature’s authenticity nor affords an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed”].) 

Thus, the court finds that Defendants have met their burden “of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement[.]”  (Beco, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 302 [internal quotations omitted].) 

2.     Defense to Enforcement

As set forth above, Plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing a defense” to the enforcement of the arbitration agreements.  (Beco, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 302 [internal quotations omitted].)  Plaintiff contends that the arbitration agreements are invalid and unenforceable pursuant to the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (9 U.S.C. §§ 402, 402) (the “Act”). 

The Act “represent[s] the first major amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) [citation] since its inception 100 years ago.”  (Murrey v. Superior Court (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1230 [internal citation omitted].)  It “voids predispute arbitration clauses in cases . . . involving sexual harassment allegations.”  (Ibid.)  Specifically, the Act states, in relevant part, as follows: “at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute . . ., no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.”  (9 U.S.C. § 402, subd. (a).) 

Here, because Plaintiff has included a cause of action for sexual harassment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) in her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Act applies and voids the arbitration agreements.  The court disagrees.

In evaluating whether the Act applies, the court must first determine whether Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges a plausible claim of sexual harassment.  (9 U.S.C. §§ 402, subd. (a), 401, subd. (4); Yost v. Everyrealm, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 2023 WL 2224450 at *10-11.)  “The term ‘sexual harassment dispute’ means a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.”  (9 U.S.C. § 401, subd. (4).)  As set forth above, Plaintiff has included in her Complaint a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim under the FEHA, which “requires a plaintiff employee to show [he or] she was subjected to sexual advances, conduct, or comments that were (1) unwelcome [citation]; (2) because of sex [citation]; and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his or] her employment and create an abusive work environment [citation].”  (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236.) 

In her Complaint, Plaintiff has alleged that (1) she experienced sexual harassment after she reported lapses in care and negligence on the part of defendant Salazar, who cursed at Plaintiff, threatened her, and “tried to intimidate Plaintiff because she was a female,” and (2) Defendants did not take remedial action after she complained of such harassment.  (Compl., ¶¶ 31-32.)  These allegations are conclusory and do not set forth specific facts establishing that she was subjected to sexual harassment by Salazar or any of the other named defendants.  Specifically, the court finds that these allegations do not allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief for sexual harassment under FEHA because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that (1) she was subjected to sexual advances, conduct, or comments that were unwelcome and because of her sex, or (2) the conduct of Salazar, as alleged in the Complaint, was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of” Plaintiff’s employment “and create an abusive work environment [citations].”  (Taylor, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236.)  

Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that the Act applies and renders unenforceable the arbitration agreements because Plaintiff has not “allege[d] conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute” by failing to allege facts sufficient to constitute a valid, plausible cause of action for sexual harassment under FEHA, or any other claims that would constitute a “sexual harassment dispute” or “sexual assault dispute” under the Act.  (9 U.S.C. §§ 401, subds. (3), (4), 402, subd. (a); Yost, supra, 2023 WL 2224450 at *10-11, 17 [“to read the [Act] to void arbitration agreements after the point at which plaintiffs have proven themselves unable to plead claims of sexual harassment consistent with Iqbal, [citation], could destabilize the FAA’s statutory scheme”] [internal citation omitted].)

3.     Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that (1) Defendants have met their burden to prove the existence of agreements to arbitrate the controversy alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, and (2) Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that the arbitration agreements are unenforceable or invalid.  The court therefore grants Defendants’ motion.  The court orders that this action is stayed pending resolution of arbitration.  (9 U.S.C. § 3.)

ORDER

            The court grants defendants Greenfield Care Center of Fillmore, LLC, Eva Care Group, LLC, Jenq H. Chen, Teresa Chen, and Paul Salazar’s motion to compel arbitration.

The court orders (1) plaintiff Angela Bustamante and defendants Greenfield Care Center of Fillmore, LLC, Eva Care Group, LLC, Jenq H. Chen, Teresa Chen, and Paul Salazar to arbitrate the claims alleged in plaintiff Angela Bustamante’s Complaint, and (2) this action is stayed until arbitration is completed.

The court sets an Order to Show Cause re: completion of arbitration for hearing on May 21, 2024, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 53.

The court orders defendants Greenfield Care Center of Fillmore, LLC, Eva Care Group, LLC, Jenq H. Chen, Teresa Chen, and Paul Salazar to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  October 23, 2023

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court