Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV15033, Date: 2024-02-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV15033    Hearing Date: February 28, 2024    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Equity Residential Management, LLC

RESPONDING PARTIES:    Plaintiffs James Brown, Mark Burnside, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, and Elizabeth McGuire

(1)   Demurrer to Complaint

(2)   Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant TransUnion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTIES:     Plaintiffs James Brown, Mark Burnside, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, and Elizabeth McGuire              

(1)   Demurrer to Complaint

(2)   Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with each demurrer and motion to strike.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court denies defendant Equity Residential Management, LLC’s requests for judicial notice, filed on December 15, 2023, because the rulings of other Superior Court departments are not relevant to a material issue presented by its demurrer and motion to strike.  (Malek Media Group LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 825.)

The court denies plaintiffs James Brown, Mark Burnside, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, and Elizabeth McGuire’s request for judicial notice, filed on December 11, 2023, because the matters to be judicially noticed are not relevant to a material issue presented by the demurrer and motion to strike filed by defendant TransUnion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc.  (Malek Media Group LLC, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 825.)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Erica Elliot, Clifton Taylor Jr., Allean Blacksher, Leah-Camille Blacksher, James Brown, Mark Burnside, Henryk Garcia, Rebecca Hagedorn, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, Gabriela Espinoza, Juan Castro, Ivana Ivy, Erik Jaksch, Amair Jaber, Don Logan, Elizabeth McGuire, Shanise Reed, and Ashley Colbert filed their Complaint in this action against defendant Equity Residential Management, LLC (“Equity”) on June 28, 2023.  The plaintiffs filed an Amendment to Complaint on July 20, 2023, amending the Complaint by substituting defendant TransUnion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc. (“TransUnion”) for the fictitious name Doe 1 wherever it appears in the Complaint.

Thereafter, on January 8, 2024, plaintiffs Allean Blacksher, Leah-Camille Blacksher, Henryk Garcia, Rebecca Hagedorn, Ivana Ivy, Amair Jaber, Erik Jaksch, and Shanise Reed were dismissed pursuant to the Request for Dismissal filed by the plaintiffs on January 8, 2024.  Plaintiffs Gabriela Espinoza, Juan Castro, Ashley Colbert, Erica Elliot, Clifton Taylor Jr., and Don Logan were dismissed on February 21, 2024, pursuant to the Request for Dismissal filed by the plaintiffs on February 16, 2024.

Remaining plaintiffs James Brown, Mark Burnside, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, and Elizabeth McGuire (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege three causes of action in their Complaint for (1) violations of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act;          (2) invasion of privacy; and (3) declaratory relief.

Two sets of responsive pleadings are now pending before the court.  First, Equity moves the court for an order (1) sustaining its demurrer to Plaintiffs’ second and third causes of action, and (2) striking from the Complaint Plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and punitive damages.  Second, defendant TransUnion moves the court for an order (1) sustaining its demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first, second, and third causes of action, and (2) striking from the Complaint all requests for relief set forth in the prayer.

DEMURRER FILED BY EQUITY

The court sustains Equity’s demurrer to the second cause of action for invasion of privacy because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing that Equity invaded Plaintiffs’ privacy in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person and sufficiently serious in nature and scope, including because, although Plaintiffs have alleged that Equity did not comply with the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (Civ. Code, § 1786 et seq.) (“ICRAA”), Plaintiffs have also alleged that they completed an application that included a consent to release their information.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Compl., ¶ 35;  Mezger v. Bick (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 76, 86 [“The elements of a common law invasion of privacy claim are intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter, in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person”], 88 [“‘Actionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying their privacy right’”].)

The court sustains Equity’s demurrer to the third cause of action for declaratory relief because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since (1) “‘[d]eclaratory relief operates prospectively, serving to set controversies at rest before obligations are repudiated, rights are invaded or wrongs are committed’” and does not redress past wrongs;     (2) although Plaintiffs have alleged that declaratory relief is necessary because Equity, when demanding that leases be renewed or recertified, uses the same forms authorizing it to obtain investigative consumer reports about tenants, Plaintiffs have not alleged that they intend to renew or recertify their leases and therefore may be required to use forms that do not comply with ICRAA; and (3) Plaintiffs therefore have not alleged facts establishing the existence of an actual, present controversy within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1060.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10, subd. (e), 1060; In re Tobacco Cases II (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 779, 804-805 [emphasis in original]; Compl., ¶ 65.)

MOTION TO STRIKE FILED BY EQUITY

Equity moves for an order striking the following from Plaintiffs’ Complaint: (1) the requests for declaratory relief set forth in paragraphs 1, 5, 47, 59, and 61; (2) the request for injunctive relief set forth in paragraph 61; (3) the requests for punitive damages set forth in paragraphs 5, 47, and 59; and (4) paragraphs 4, 8, 9, and 10 of the prayer in their entirety.

The court grants Equity’s motion to strike the requests for injunctive relief set forth in paragraph 61 of the Complaint and paragraphs 9 and 10 of the prayer because injunctive relief is not an available remedy for violation of the ICRAA and therefore those requests are improper.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Civ. Code, § 1786.50 [setting forth available remedies for the failure to comply with ICRAA].)

The court grants Equity’s motion to strike the requests for declaratory relief set forth in paragraphs 1, 5, 47, 59, and 61 of the Complaint and paragraph 8 of the prayer because the court has determined, for the reasons set forth above, that Plaintiffs have not stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for declaratory relief.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) 

The court denies Equity’s motion to strike the requests for punitive damages set forth      in paragraphs 5, 47, and 59 and paragraph 4 of the prayer because Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing that (1) Equity willfully violated the ICRAA, and (2) Equity, in willfully violating the ICRAA, engaged in conduct while willfully and consciously disregarding Plaintiffs’ rights, such that Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing that Equity is guilty of malice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Civ. Code, §§ 3294, subds. (a), (c)(1), 1786.50, subd. (b) [the court may assess punitive damages upon a finding that the defendant willfully violated the ICRAA]; Compl., ¶¶ 40-48, 59.)

To the extent that Equity requests that the court strike paragraphs 1, 5, 47, 59, and 61 of the Complaint in their entirety, the court denies that request because Equity has not shown that all the information set forth in those paragraphs is irrelevant or improper.

DEMURRER FILED BY TRANSUNION

The court overrules TransUnion’s demurrer to the first cause of action for violation of the ICRAA on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because (1) TransUnion contends that Plaintiffs’ claims under this statute are not applicable to TransUnion since it is not a landlord, but (2) TransUnion has not pointed to any allegation in the Complaint or judicially noticed matter establishing that fact, instead relying on a declaration outside of the pleadings, and therefore has not met its burden to show that this cause of action does not state facts sufficient against it.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Demurrer, p. 6:1-4, 6:13-19; Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 834 [“Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can refer to matters outside the pleading only if those matters are subject to judicial notice”] [emphasis in original].) 

The court sustains TransUnion’s demurrer to the second cause of action for invasion of privacy because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing that TransUnion invaded their privacy in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person and sufficiently serious in nature and scope.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Compl., ¶¶ 32, 39, 63;  Mezger, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 86 [elements of invasion of privacy claim], 88 [“‘Actionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying their privacy right’”].)

The court sustains TransUnion’s demurrer to the third cause of action for declaratory relief because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since, as set forth in connection with the court’s ruling on Equity’s demurrer, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing the existence of an actual, present controversy and instead appear to request a judicial declaration to address an alleged past wrong.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10, subd. (e), 1060; In re Tobacco Cases II, supra, 240 Cal.App.5th at p. 805 [“‘[D]eclaratory relief          “‘operates prospectively, and not merely for the redress of past wrongs’”’”]; Compl., ¶ 65.)

MOTION TO STRIKE FILED BY TRANSUNION

TransUnion moves the court for an order striking the following from the Complaint:       (1) paragraphs 5, 47, 57, 59, 61, and 68, and (2) paragraphs 1 through 10 of the prayer.

The court grants TransUnion’s motion to strike the requests for injunctive relief set forth in paragraph 61 of the Complaint and paragraphs 9-10 of the prayer because injunctive relief is not an available remedy for violation of the ICRAA and therefore those requests are improper.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Civ. Code, § 1786.50 [setting forth available remedies for the failure to comply with ICRAA].)

The court grants TransUnion’s motion to strike the request for declaratory relief in paragraph 8 of the prayer because the court has determined, as set forth above, that Plaintiffs have not stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for declaratory relief.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

The court denies TransUnion’s motion to strike the requests for punitive damages set forth in paragraphs 5, 47, and 59 of the Complaint and in paragraph 4 of the prayer because Plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing that (1) TransUnion willfully violated the ICRAA (Compl., ¶¶ 47-48, 54-55, 59), and (2) TransUnion, in willfully violating the ICRAA, engaged in conduct with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have therefore alleged that TransUnion is guilty of malice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Civ. Code, §§ 3294, subds. (a), (c)(1), 1786.50, subd. (b) [the court may assess punitive damages upon a finding that the defendant willfully violated the ICRAA]; Compl., ¶¶ 40-48, 59.)

The court denies TransUnion’s motion to strike (1) paragraphs 57, 61, and 68, and          (2) paragraphs 1-7 of the Prayer because the court has overruled its demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Mot., p. 5:23-25 [contending that the court should strike all relief requested in the prayer on the ground that “Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged any cause of action under which the sought relief may be properly awarded”] [emphasis in original].)

ORDER

The court sustains defendant Equity Residential Management, LLC’s demurrer to plaintiffs James Brown, Mark Burnside, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, and Elizabeth McGuire’s second and third causes of action.

The court grants defendant Equity Residential Management, LLC’s motion to strike the following portions of plaintiffs James Brown, Mark Burnside, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, and Elizabeth McGuire’s Complaint: (1) the requests for injunctive relief set forth in paragraph 61 of the Complaint and paragraphs 9 and 10 of the prayer, and (2) the requests for declaratory relief set forth (i) in paragraphs 1, 5, 47, 59, and 61, and (ii) in paragraph 8 of the prayer.  The court denies all other relief requested in the motion.

The court overrules defendant TransUnion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiffs James Brown, Mark Burnside, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, and Elizabeth McGuire’s first cause of action.

The court sustains defendant TransUnion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiffs James Brown, Mark Burnside, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, and Elizabeth McGuire’s second and third causes of action.

The court grants defendant TransUnion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc.’s motion to strike the following portions of plaintiffs James Brown, Mark Burnside, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, and Elizabeth McGuire’s Complaint: (1) the request for injunctive relief set forth in paragraph 61 of the Complaint and paragraphs 9-10 of the prayer, and (2) the request for declaratory relief set forth in paragraph 8 of the prayer.  The court denies all other relief requested in the motion.

The court grants plaintiffs James Brown, Mark Burnside, Tashiya Matthis, Raviear Koppenhofer, and Elizabeth McGuire 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies set forth in connection with this ruling.

The court orders defendant Equity Residential Management, LLC to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  February 28, 2024

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court