Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 23STCV15069, Date: 2025-02-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV15069, Date: 2025-02-10 Tentative Ruling

The court considered the moving[1] and reply papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike.

The court has considered the opposition papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike by plaintiff Kendrick Jones on December 6, 2024, only to determine whether plaintiff Kendrick Jones has made sufficient requests for leave to amend because (1) those papers were not accompanied by a proof of service showing that plaintiff Kendrick Jones served them on defendant Watts Learning Center, Inc., and (2) counsel for defendant Watts Learning Center, Inc. has stated that she was not served with the opposition papers. (Frontman Decl., ¶ 5.)

The court denies defendant Watts Learning Center, Inc.’s requests for judicial notice filed on December 12, 2024 in support of its replies to the pending demurrer and motion to strike, because those matters are not relevant to the court’s disposition of these matters.

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation and the court’s June 3, 2024 order, plaintiff Kendrick Jones (“Plaintiff”) filed the operative Second Amended Complaint against defendant Watts Learning Center, Inc. (“Defendant”) in this action on June 20, 2024, alleging eight causes of action for (1) discrimination; (2) failure to prevent discrimination; (3) retaliation; (4) harassment; (5) failure to prevent harassment; (6) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 98.6; (7) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; and (8) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 6310. (Joint. Stip. & Order, p. 4.)

Defendant now moves the court for an order (1) sustaining its demurrer to each cause of action alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, and (2) striking from the Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages, attorney’s fees, prejudgment interest, and restitution.

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action for discrimination because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has alleged (1) that he suffered an adverse employment action based on his constructive discharge (SAC ¶ 31), and (2) circumstances suggesting discriminatory motive, including because Plaintiff has alleged that (i) “Defendant’s supervisor called Plaintiff the names of other [B]lack staff members repeatedly after being corrected multiple times,” such that Defendant’s supervisor was intentionally calling Plaintiff by the names of other Black employees to antagonize Plaintiff (SAC ¶ 9), (ii) Defendant assigned Black employees different, less desirable job duties than those assigned to similarly situated white employees (SAC ¶¶ 10-11), and (iii) Defendant’s operations manager made comments about Plaintiff’s sexual identity, including that “Plaintiff’s sexual orientation caused Plaintiff to be ‘too sensitive’” (SAC ¶ 14) and that he needed to be terminated for that reason. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390, 397 [elements of prima facie case for discrimination]; St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 315 [“Constructive discharge, like actual discharge, is a materially adverse employment action”] [internal quotation marks omitted].)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since the court has overruled Defendant’s demurrer to the underlying discrimination claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Dem., p. 19:21-22 [arguing that this cause of action fails because Plaintiff’s underlying cause of action fails].)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the third cause of action for retaliation because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has alleged facts establishing that (1) he engaged in protected activity by making complaints about racial discrimination and operations manager Plair’s comments about Plaintiff’s sexuality (SAC ¶¶ 12-13, 15), (2) Plaintiff suffered the adverse employment action of constructive discharge (SAC ¶ 31), in part because of the intolerable working conditions created by Plair as a result of Plair’s ordering the campus security officer, inter alia, to move in a hostile manner toward Plaintiff and follow him (SAC ¶¶ 18-20), and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the creation of intolerable working conditions that led to Plaintiff’s constructive discharge, including because Plaintiff has alleged that Plair stated that Plaintiff “should be terminated” because Plaintiff “‘has problems with his sexual identity’” (SAC ¶ 14). (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.app.5th 855, 878-879 [elements of retaliation].)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action for harassment because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has alleged that he was subjected to unwelcome harassment on the basis of his sexual orientation based on (1) the comments made by Defendant’s operations manager Plair about his sexual orientation (SAC ¶¶ 14, 21), and (2) Chavez’s conduct in following Plaintiff around and physically moving in a hostile manner toward Plaintiff on Plair’s direction (SAC ¶¶ 18, 20-21). (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Galvan v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 549, 563 [elements of harassment].)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action for failure to prevent harassment because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since the court has overruled Defendant’s demurrer to the underlying harassment claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Dem., p. 19:21-22 [arguing that this cause of action fails because Plaintiff’s underlying cause of action fails].)

The court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 98.6 because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that he engaged in activity protected by Labor Code section 98.6 (e.g., that he exercised a right afforded him under the Labor Code, made a complaint that he is owed unpaid wages, or has initiated an action under Labor Code section 2699). (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Lab. Code, § 98.6, subd. (a); Garcia-Brower v. Premier Automotive Imports of CA, LLC (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 961, 972 [“Section 98.6 prohibits an employer from retaliating against an applicant or an employee because the applicant or employee exercised a right afforded him or her under the Labor Code”].)

The court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that he engaged in activity protected by Labor Code section 1102.5 (i.e., that Plaintiff disclosed information that he had a reasonable cause to believe disclosed a violation of law). (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b); St. Myers, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 307 [“Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) prohibits retaliation for disclosing information about a violation or noncompliance with federal, statue, or local statute, rule, or regulation”].)

The court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the eighth cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 6310 because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts establishing that Defendant discriminated against or discharged him because he made a complaint to Defendant of unsafe working conditions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Lab. Code, § 6310, subd. (b); St. Myers, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 307 [Labor Code section 6310 “provides for reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and benefits for an employee discharged or discriminated against for reporting unsafe working conditions”].) The court acknowledges that Plaintiff has alleged that he was required “to work under intolerable hot temperatures and [Defendant] failed to remedy such even after Plaintiff brought it to the administration’s attention” (SAC ¶ 25). But (1) this allegation does not allege that Defendant discriminated against or discharged him because he made such a complaint, instead alleging only that Defendant failed to remedy that condition, and (2) the other allegations in the Second Amended Complaint do not support an inference that Defendant discriminated against him or created the intolerable conditions that led to his constructive discharge as a result of his making such a complaint.

The burden is on the plaintiff “to articulate how it could amend its pleading to render it sufficient.”¿ (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290.)¿ To satisfy that burden, a plaintiff “must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.”¿ (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The court has reviewed Plaintiff’s opposition papers for the limited purpose of determining whether Plaintiff has supported any request for leave to amend. Although Plaintiff requests leave to amend, the court finds that Plaintiff has not articulated how he could amend his sixth through eighth causes of action to render them sufficient against Defendant. The court therefore sustains Defendant’s demurrer to those causes of action without leave to amend.

Defendant moves the court for an order striking from the Second Amended Complaint (1) the requests for punitive damages and supporting allegations (SAC ¶¶ 38, 44, 49, 54, 59, 64, 69, 74, and Prayer, ¶ 4); (2) the prayer for attorneys’ fees (Prayer, ¶ 6); (3) the prayer for prejudgment interest (Prayer, ¶ 8); and (4) the prayer for restitution (Prayer, ¶ 10).

First, the court denies as moot Defendant’s motion to strike the requests for punitive damages set forth in paragraphs 64, 69, and 74, because the court has sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth through eighth causes of action (in which those allegations are included) without leave to amend. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

Second, the court denies Defendant’s motion to strike (1) the requests for punitive damages set forth in paragraphs 38, 44, 49, 54, and 59, and (2) the prayer for punitive damages because Plaintiff has alleged facts establishing that Defendant is guilty of malice or oppression based on the alleged discrimination, harassment, and retaliation of Plaintiff.[2] (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)

Third, the court denies Defendant’s motion to strike the prayer for attorney’s fees because Plaintiff may recover attorney’s fees if he prevails on his causes of action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq). (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, 81 [“‘[A] prevailing plaintiff in a [FEHA] lawsuit is usually entitled by statute to receive an award of attorney fees’”].)

Fourth, the court denies Defendant’s motion to strike the prayers for prejudgment interest and restitution because Defendant has not shown that those prayers are improper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

The court overrules defendant Watts Learning Center, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiff Kendrick Jones’s first through fifth causes of action.

The court sustains defendant Watts Learning Center, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiff Kendrick Jones’s sixth through eighth causes of action without leave to amend.

The court orders defendant Watts Learning Center, Inc. to give notice of this ruling.

[1] The court considered the moving papers filed on October 14, 2024 in connection with the demurrer.

[2] The court notes that Defendant did not argue, in its motion to strike, that Plaintiff did not allege the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification, or act of oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of Defendant’s officer, director, or managing agent, as required by Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b). Plaintiff has alleged (1) acts of malice or oppression based on the discrimination against him by Defendant based on “Defendant’s management” assigning Plaintiff less desirable classes than similarly situated White employees, which may qualify as an act of malice or oppression by the managing agents of Defendant, and (2) acts of malice or oppression based on the harassment and retaliation of him by Plair, who is alleged to be Defendant’s “Operations Manager” and therefore may constitute acts of malice or oppression by a managing agent of Defendant. (SAC ¶¶ 11 [emphasis added], 12; Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

kendrick jones ; Plaintiff, vs. watts learning center, inc. , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	23STCV15069

	Hearing Date:	February 10, 2025

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[tentative] Order RE: (1) defendant’s demurrer to second amended complaint (2) defendant’s motion to strike portions of second amended complaint