Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 23STCV15168, Date: 2025-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV15168, Date: 2025-05-22 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Darlene Atkins, Olivia Stephanie Aggas, and Phyllis A. Peevy

The court considered the moving and non-opposition papers filed in connection with this motion.

Plaintiffs Darlene Atkins, Olivia Stephanie Aggas, and Phyllis A. Peevy (“Plaintiffs”) seek an order approving the settlement of their claims under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Labor Code, §¿2698, et seq.) (“PAGA”), set forth in the “PAGA Settlement Agreement” (the “Settlement Agreement”) entered into by and between Plaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendant Epidaurus d/b/a Amity Foundation (“Defendant”), on the other hand.

The parties have reached a settlement of $850,000. (Clark Decl., Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement, ¶ 1.11 [defining gross settlement amount].)

Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (s)(2) provides that “[t]he superior court shall review and approve any settlement of any civil action pursuant to” PAGA.¿ The court’s review of PAGA settlements “ensur[es] that any negotiated resolution is fair to those affected.”¿ (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.)¿ In an effort to aid the court in the determination of the fairness of the settlement, Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 244-245 (disapproved on other grounds), discusses factors that the court should consider when determining the reasonableness of a settlement agreement.¿ “[A] presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.”¿ (Id. at p. 245.)¿ “[T]he test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances.”¿ (Id. at p. 250.)¿¿¿¿¿

The court has reviewed (1) the terms of the Settlement Agreement, including (i) the gross settlement amount of $850,000, the $1,000 enhancement payment to each of Plaintiffs (amounting to a total of $3,000), attorney’s fees not to exceed 33 and 1/3 percent of the gross settlement amount ($283,333.33) and litigation expenses (not to exceed $25,000), the administrator expense payment (not to exceed $12,000), (ii) the estimated amounts of the net settlement amount of $526,666.67, of which 75 percent, or $395,000, will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency, and of which the remaining 25 percent, or $131,666.67, will be allocated to the aggrieved employees, (iii) the settlement funding procedures, and (iv) the release of the claims by Plaintiffs and the aggrieved employees, the latter of which are deemed to release all claims for PAGA penalties that were or reasonably could have been alleged based on the PAGA period facts alleged in the Complaint and the PAGA notice; (2) the declarations of Plaintiffs, in which Plaintiffs each attest to their involvement in this action; and (3) the declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel, James Clark, in which Clark asserts that (i) Plaintiffs’ counsel investigated the PAGA claims against Defendant, (ii) the parties attended an all-day mediation, at which the parties reached an agreement in principle to settle this action, (iii) the settlement was reached through arms-length bargaining, and (iv) counsel is experienced in employment law and wage and hour claims. (Clark Decl., Ex. A, Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 1.11, 3.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 4, 5.2; Pl. Aggas Decl., ¶¶ 7-9; Pl. Atkins Decl., ¶¶ 7-9; Pl. Peevy Decl., ¶¶ 7-9; Clark Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, 16-17, 19-22.)

The court has also considered counsel’s declaration to determine the reasonableness of the request for attorney’s fees in the amount of $283,333.33, which is the maximum amount permitted by the Settlement Agreement. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that an award of reasonable attorney’s fees is $201,125 and will therefore approve an award in that modified amount.

The court recognizes that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created.”[1] (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 503.) The court further notes that “[a] lodestar cross-check . . . provides a mechanism for bringing an objective measure of the work performed into the calculation of a reasonable attorney fee. If a comparison between the percentage and lodestar calculations produces an imputed multiplier far outside the normal range, indicating that the percentage fee will reward counsel for their services at an extraordinary rate even accounting for the factors customarily used to enhance a lodestar fee, the trial court will have reason to examine its choice of a percentage.” (Id. at p. 504.)

The requested amount of attorney’s fees is 33 percent of the gross settlement amount. The court (1) has exercised its discretion to conduct a lodestar cross-check on the percentage fee, and (2) finds that Plaintiffs have established a lodestar of $80,450 ((35 hours x attorney Lavi’s $1,000 hourly rate) + (30 hours x attorney Granberry’s $750 hourly rate) + (34 hours x attorney Clark’s $675 hourly rate)). (Laffitte, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 506 [trial courts have discretion to conduct lodestar cross-check]; Clark Decl., ¶¶ 47, 52, 57, 60-62, 64.) In order to reach the requested $283,333.33 in attorney’s fees, the court would have to impose a 3.52 multiplier. (Mot., p. 18:17-18.) In light of the excellent result achieved, the skill displayed in litigating this action, the experience of counsel, and the contingent nature of the fee award, the court finds that a reasonable multiplier is 2.5. (The Kennedy Com. v. City of Huntington Beach (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 436, 467 [setting forth factors to consider in determining whether to apply lodestar multiplier]; Clark Decl., ¶¶ 5-8, 57, 64.) The court will therefore award to Plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the total amount of $201,125. The remaining $82,208.33 will be allocated to the net settlement amount. (Clark Decl., Ex. A, Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3.2.2 [“if the Court approves a PAGA Counsel Fees Payment and/or a PAGA Counsel Litigant Expenses Payment less than the amounts requested, the Administrator will allocate the remainder to the Net Settlement Amount”].)

The court finds that Plaintiffs have supported their request for $19,353 in litigation costs. (Clark Decl., Ex. 2.) The remaining $5,647 will be allocated to the net settlement. (Clark Decl., Ex. A, Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3.2.2.)

Based on the arguments and evidence set forth in Plaintiffs’ motion and supporting declarations, the court finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. The court therefore grants in part Plaintiffs’ motion, as modified to reduce the award of attorney’s fees to $201,125 and to reduce the award of litigation expenses to the requested amount of $19,353. The court has calculated the new net settlement amount to be $614,522 ($850,000 gross settlement -- $201,125 in attorney’s fees -- $19,353 in litigation expenses -- $3,000 total enhancement payment to Plaintiffs -- $12,000 in administration expenses to Simpluris). The court has calculated 75 percent of that amount, which will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency, to be $460,891.50, and has calculated 25 percent, which will be distributed to the aggrieved employees, to be $153,630.50.

The court grants plaintiffs Darlene Atkins, Olivia Stephanie Aggas, and Phyllis A. Peevy’s motion for approval of Private Attorneys General Act settlement as modified in the manner set forth in this ruling.

The court will modify, sign, and file the proposed “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Approvl of Private Attorneys General Act Settlement; and Judgment Thereon” consistent with this order.

The court orders plaintiffs Darlene Atkins, Olivia Stephanie Aggas, and Phyllis A. Peevy to give notice of this ruling.

[1] Although PAGA representative actions are not class actions, the court finds this authority persuasive. (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73,86 [“Although representative in nature, a PAGA claim is not simply a collection of individual claims for relief, and so is different from a class action”].)

darlene atkins , et al.; Plaintiffs, vs. epidaurus d/b/a amity foundation , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	23STCV15168

	Hearing Date:	May 22, 2025

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[tentative] Order RE: plaintiffs’ motion for approval of private attorneys general act settlement