Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 23STCV17534, Date: 2024-06-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV17534, Date: 2024-06-28 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Wesco III Bex, LLC, Essex Management Corporation, and Essex Property Trust, Inc. (sued as Doe defendant 3)

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike.

The court grants defendants Wesco III Bex, LLC, Essex Management Corporation, and Essex Property Trust, Inc.’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924, n. 1 [trial court properly took judicial notice of recorded documents].)

Plaintiff Sheakh Imranul Kabir (“Plaintiff”) filed the operative First Amended Complaint in this action on November 30, 2023, against defendants Wesco III Bex, LLC (“Wesco”), Essex Management Corporation (“Essex Management”), and Essex Property Trust, Inc. (“Essex Property Trust”)[1] (collectively, “Defendants”).

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges 11 causes of action for (1) statutory breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (2) tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (4) breach of contract; (5) negligence; (6) negligent hiring, training, and supervision; (7) private nuisance; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) unfair competition; (10) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 45.33; and (11) violation of section IX of the County of Los Angeles COVID-19 Tenant Protections Resolution.

Defendants now move the court for an order (1) sustaining their demurrer (i) to the First Amended Complaint as alleged against defendant Essex Property Trust in its entirety, and (ii) to the second, fourth, and eighth causes of action as alleged against Defendants, and (2) striking from the First Amended Complaint Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages and related allegations.

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the First Amended Complaint, in its entirety, as alleged against defendant Essex Property Trust on the ground that Plaintiff cannot allege any cause of action against that defendant based on Defendants’ argument that it is not the landlord or owner of the subject property because the First Amended Complaint (1) states facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against Essex Property Trust, and (2) is not ambiguous or unintelligible and therefore is not uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).)

First, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Essex Property Trust, as the management company or operator of the subject property, cannot be held liable on all of the causes of action alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on the ground that it is not an owner of the subject property.

The court acknowledges that the grant deed, of which the court has taken judicial notice, establishes that defendant Wesco is the owner of the subject property. (RJN Ex. A, Grant Deed, pp. 2, 5 [listing subject real property to include lots 1-2 of West Ninth Street, Los Angeles, and lots 371-373 of Wilshire Harvard Heights, Los Angeles]; FAC ¶ 1 [describing subject property to be located at 900 South Irolo Street, Los Angeles, which has the legal description of lots 1 and 2 of West Ninth Street Heights, and lots 371, 372, and 373 of Wilshire Harvard Heights].) However, Plaintiff has also alleged Essex Property Trust was the “management company and/or operator of the Subject Property” (FAC ¶ 10). Defendants have not presented adequate argument or authority establishing that, because Essex Property Trust is not the owner of the subject property, Plaintiff cannot allege any of his causes of action against it.

Second, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the allegations, exhibits attached to the First Amended Complaint, and the judicially noticed document (i.e., the grant deed) establish that Plaintiff has not and cannot allege that Essex Property Trust is a landlord of the subject property.

As set forth above, Plaintiff has alleged that Essex Property Trust was, at all relevant times, “the owner,[2] management company and/or operator of the Subject Property” (FAC ¶ 10). Further, in support of the first through third, sixth, and eighth causes of action, Plaintiff has alleged that “Plaintiff and Defendants were in a landlord-tenant relationship” (FAC ¶¶ 57, 72), Defendants owed Plaintiff certain duties “[b]y virtue of their landlord-tenant relationship” (FAC ¶¶ 68, 80), or referenced Defendants’ position as landlords (FAC ¶ 115).

The court also acknowledges, as noted by Defendants in their moving papers, that the lease agreement attached to the First Amended Complaint identifies the landlord to be defendant Essex Management on several pages, which would ordinarily take precedence. (FAC Ex. A, Lease Agreement, p. 1; Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 283 [“‘If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence.’ [Citations.]”) But (1) Plaintiff has also alleged that (i) “at all relevant times, there existed a unity of ownership and interest between two or more of the Defendants and DOES such that any individuality and separateness between has ceased, and are the alter egos of one another” (FAC ¶ 13), (ii) Defendants “exercised domination and control over one another to such an extent that any individuality or separateness dose not, and at all times herein mentioned did not, exist” (FAC ¶ 13), and (iii) it would be unjust to adhere to the fiction of Defendants’ separate existence (FAC ¶ 13), such that Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that Essex Property Trust is an alter ego of Essex Management, and (2) the lease agreement—while identifying Essex Management as the landlord on various pages thereof—also identifies Essex Property Trust to be the landlord on various addendums to the lease. (Cam-Carson, LLC v. Carson Reclamation Authority (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 535, 549 [two conditions before alter ego doctrine will be invoked].)

Specifically, on the first page of the lease agreement, Essex Management is defined as “‘Landlord[,]’” and Essex Management signed the lease on June 16, 2022 as “LANDLORD.” (FAC Ex. A, pp. 1, 19.) However, on that same date, the parties executed several addendums to the lease, three of which identify Essex Property Trust to be the landlord as follows. The “Activities Participation and Recreational Facility Use Agreement, Waiver of Rights and General Release” identifies the landlord to be Essex Property Trust, Inc., “as agent for the Owner of the community commonly known as Windsor Court . . . .” (FAC Ex. A, Activities Addendum, p. 1 [emphasis omitted]; FAC Ex. A, Lease Agreement, p. 1, § A [stating that Essex Management is the landlord and “agent for the Owner of the Property commonly known as Windsor Court”] [emphasis omitted].) Similarly, the “Mold Addendum” identifies Essex Property Trust to be the landlord and “agent for Owner of the Community” for rental of the subject premises. (FAC Ex. A, Mold Addendum, p. 1.) The “Utilities Addendum” also identifies Essex Property Trust to be the agent for the owner of the property known as Windsor Court and as the “‘Landlord[.]’” (FAC Ex. A, Utilities Addendum, p. 1.)

Thus, the court finds, based on (1) the allegations of the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants (i.e., including Essex Property Trust), (2) the references to Essex Property Trust as a landlord in the addendums to the lease agreement attached to the First Amended Complaint, and (3) the allegations regarding the theory of alter ego liability, that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to establish that Essex Property Trust was either acting as the landlord of the subject property, or may be held liable as an alter ego of the landlord. The court therefore overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the First Amended Complaint as alleged against defendant Essex Property Trust.

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause of action for tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since (1) “a tenant may state a cause of action in tort against his landlord for damages resulting from a breach of the implied warranty of habitability[,]” and (2) Plaintiff has alleged facts establishing that Defendants breached the warranty of habitability by alleging that (i) there existed material defective conditions affecting the premises’ habitability, including, inter alia, a continuing cockroach infestation (FAC ¶¶ 22, 47), electrical wall outlet shortages (FAC ¶ 29), and piled up garbage outside of the garbage room (FAC ¶ 41), (ii) Plaintiff notified Defendants of the conditions within a reasonable time after discovery of the conditions (FAC ¶¶ 22, 29), (iii) Defendants were given reasonable time to correct the deficiency (Ibid.), and (iv) resulting damages to Plaintiff (FAC ¶¶ 73, 75-76). (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 918-919; Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297 [setting forth elements of affirmative claim for breach of the habitability warranty]; Civ. Code, § 1941.1, subds. (a)(5), (a)(6).)

The court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action for breach of contract because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendants breached the parties’ lease agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 402 [elements of cause of action for breach of contract]; FPI Development, Inc. v Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 383 [in an action for breach of a written contract, the plaintiff must plead the terms of the written contract that “establish the obligation in issue” and “the breach of that obligation”].) Here, Plaintiff has alleged that (1) Defendants were obligated to comply with all laws (FAC ¶ 88), and (2) Defendants breached the contract by “failing to perform their central duties under the contract – i.e. – not interfering with Plaintiff’s quiet enjoyment of his home, and not demanding or collecting any monies to which they are not lawfully entitled” (FAC ¶ 90). However, these facts do not appear to allege Defendants’ breach of a specific obligation set forth in the parties’ lease, and instead alleges Defendants’ violations of law, including the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.

The court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the eighth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendants’ conduct was so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community and therefore has not alleged the element of extreme and outrageous conduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051 [elements of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress].)

Defendants move the court for an order striking (1) the prayer for punitive damages, and (2) the allegations made in support of the prayer for punitive damages, as set forth in paragraphs 52-55, 77, 99, 105, 112, 118, 140, and 147 of the First Amended Complaint.

First, the court denies as moot Defendants’ motion to strike paragraph 118, because that fact is alleged in support of the eighth cause of action, to which the court has sustained Defendants’ demurrer, and therefore this cause of action and all supporting allegations are removed from the First Amended Complaint.

Second, the court grants Defendants’ motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages (FAC, Prayer, ¶ 3) and supporting allegations (FAC ¶¶ 52-55, 77, 99, 105, 112, 140, and 147) because Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that (1) Defendants are guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, or (2) Defendants’ officers, directors, or managing agents had advance knowledge and conscious disregard of, or authorized, ratified, or committed, an act of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (b).)

The court sustains defendants Wesco III Bex, LLC, Essex Management Corporation, and Essex Property Trust, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiff Sheakh Imranul Kabir’s fourth and eighth causes of action.

The court overrules defendants Wesco III Bex, LLC, Essex Management Corporation, and Essex Property Trust, Inc.’s demurrer to all other challenged causes of action.

The court grants defendants Wesco III Bex, LLC, Essex Management Corporation, and Essex Property Trust, Inc.’s motion to strike. The court orders that the prayer for punitive damages (FAC, Prayer, ¶ 3) and supporting allegations (FAC ¶¶ 52-55, 77, 99, 105, 112, 140, and 147) alleged in the First Amended Complaint are stricken.

The court grants plaintiff Sheakh Imranul Kabir 20 days leave to file a Second Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies set forth in this ruling as to (1) the fourth and eighth causes of action, and (2) the request for punitive damages.

The court orders defendants Wesco III Bex, LLC, Essex Management Corporation, and Essex Property Trust, Inc. to give notice of this ruling.

[1] On September 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed an “Amendment to Complaint,” amending the Complaint to substitute defendant Essex Property Trust, Inc., as defendant Doe 3.

[2] As set forth above, the grant deed, of which the court has taken judicial notice, establishes that Essex Property Trust was not the owner of the subject property. (RJN Ex. A.)

sheakh imranul kabir ; Plaintiff, vs. wesco iii bex, llc , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	23STCV17534

	Hearing Date:	June 28, 2024

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[tentative] Order RE: (1) defendants’ demurrer to first amended complaint (2) defendants’ motion to strike portions of first amended complaint