Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV24097, Date: 2025-01-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV24097 Hearing Date: January 31, 2025 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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23STCV24097 |
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January
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[tentative]
Order RE: plaintiff’s motion for relief from
arbitration agreement and for sanctions |
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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Noor Abbas,
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Space Exploration
Technologies Corp., d/b/a SpaceX
Motion for Relief from Arbitration Agreement and Sanctions
The court
considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with
this motion.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff Noor Abbas, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals (“Plaintiff”)[1]
moves the court for an order (1) finding that defendant Space Exploration
Technologies Corp., d/b/a SpaceX (“Defendant”) is in material breach of the
parties’ arbitration agreement and has waived the right to proceed in
arbitration, such that Plaintiff may therefore proceed in court, and (2)
awarding monetary sanctions in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the
amount of $7,360.
“Perceiving that a ‘company’s failure to pay the fees of an
arbitration provider’ as required by an arbitration agreement or applicable law
‘hinders the efficient resolution of disputes and contravenes public policy,’
in 2019 the California Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 707 and added
sections 1281.97 and 1281.98 to the California Arbitration Act (CAA) (§ 1280 et
seq.).” (De Leon v. Juanita’s Foods (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 740, 750
[internal citations and internal footnote omitted].) Under section 1281.97,
“[i]n an employment or consumer arbitration that requires, either expressly or
through application of state or federal law or the rules of the arbitration
provider, the drafting party to pay certain fees and costs before the
arbitration can proceed, if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration
proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date the drafting party is
in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the
arbitration, and waives its right to compel arbitration under Section 1281.2.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.97, subd. (a)(1).)
The court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that she
is entitled to the requested relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
sections 1281.97 and 1281.99.
The court acknowledges that Plaintiff has submitted evidence showing
that (1) on October 30, 2024, JAMS sent a retainer invoice to Defendant in the
amount of $15,000, stating that the payment was due upon receipt, and (2)
Defendant had not paid the retainer as of December 9, 2024, i.e., more than 30
days after the due date of October 30, 2024.
(Siddiqui Decl., ¶¶ 6, 7-8; Siddiqui Decl., Ex. B [JAMS October 30, 2024
Invoice to Defendant in amount of $15,000 stating, at the bottom of the page,
“Payment is due upon receipt”].) However,
Plaintiff has not shown that section 1281.97 applies to the parties.
“‘[T]he [Federal Arbitration Act’s] procedural provisions (9
U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 10, 11) do not apply unless the contract contains a
choice-of-law clause expressly incorporating them.’ [Citation.]
‘[T]he question is not whether the parties adopted the [California
Arbitration Act’s] procedural provisions: The state’s procedural statutes
([Code Civ. Proc.,] §§ 1281.2, 1290.2) apply by default because Congress
intended the comparable [Federal Arbitration Act] sections (9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4,
10, 11) to apply in federal court.’”¿ (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties
8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 345 [emphasis in original] [internal
citation omitted].) Thus, parties are permitted to expressly designate
that the procedural provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act apply in place of
state law. (Ibid.; Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge
Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 394.)
Defendant has submitted a copy of the parties’ “Employee Arbitration
and Dispute Resolution Agreement” (the “Arbitration Agreement”) in its
opposition to this motion. The
Arbitration Agreement, signed by Plaintiff on April 23, 2015, provides, inter
alia, that it “is made under the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act
(9 U.S.C., Sections 1-14) (‘FAA’) and will be construed and governed
accordingly. It is the parties’
intention that both the procedural and substantive provisions of the FAA
shall apply.” (Patel Decl., Ex. 1,
Arbitration Agreement, ¶ 10 [emphasis added], and p. 14 [signature page].)
The court finds that the language in the Arbitration Agreement is “broad
and unconditional” and expressly incorporates the Federal Arbitration Agreement
in its entirety. (Rodriguez v.
American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1122.) Further, although Plaintiff has argued that Defendant
has not met its burden to show that the Federal Arbitration Act applies since
it did not produce evidence establishing that the Arbitration Agreement is a
contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce, the court
disagrees. (Reply, pp. 1:408, 2:3-5.) As set forth above, parties may adopt the
Federal Arbitration Agreement in their contracts by including a choice-of-law
provision. (Victrola 89, LLC, supra,
46 Cal.App.5th at p. 345.) Here, the
parties included such a choice-of-law provision in the Arbitration Agreement,
such that Defendant was not required to present evidence to show that the
contract evidenced a transaction involving interstate commerce. (Rodriguez, supra, 136
Cal.App.4th at p. 1122.)
Thus, because the Arbitration Agreement is governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act in its entirety, the court finds that Plaintiff has not shown
that the procedural provisions of the California Arbitration Act—including Code
of Civil Procedure sections 1281.98 and 1281.99—apply to the parties and any
arbitration proceedings between them.[2]
(Gallo v. Wood Ranch USA, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 621, 633 [“In 2019,
the California Legislature added sections 1281.97 and 1281.99 to the
[California Arbitration Act]”]; Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises, Inc. (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 222, 238, review granted August 21, 2024, S285696 [concluding
that “the parties selected the FAA in its entirety[,]” and that, “[u]nder
th[o]se circumstances, section 1281.97 of the [California Arbitration Act] does
not apply and the order [finding a material breach of the arbitration agreement
for paying the arbitration fees late] under section 1281.97 must be reversed”];
Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.1115, subd. (e)(1) [“Pending review and filing of the
Supreme Court’s opinion, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court under
(3), a published opinion of a Court of Appeal in the matter has no binding or
precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive value only”].)
The court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion (1) for an order finding
that Defendant materially breached the Arbitration Agreement and has waived its
right to arbitrate, such that Plaintiff may proceed in court under section
1281.97, and (2) for an award of attorney’s fees and costs in her favor and against
Defendant pursuant to section 1281.99.
ORDER
The court denies plaintiff Noor
Abbas, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals’ motion
for relief from arbitration agreement and for sanctions.
The court orders defendant Space
Exploration Technologies Corp., d/b/a SpaceX to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
Ashley Foltz filed this action on October 3, 2023. Thereafter, on February 13, 2024, plaintiff
Ashley Foltz, along with plaintiff Noor Abbas, filed the operative First
Amended Complaint in this action.
[2] The
court notes that the parties dispute whether the Federal Arbitration Act
preempts section 1281.97. However, the
court does not need to reach that issue since the court has concluded that the
California Arbitration Act does not apply to the parties. (Hernandez, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at pp. 240, rev. granted August 21, 2024, S285696 [“if parties agree
to apply the [Federal Arbitration Act’s] procedural provisions, rather than the
procedures of the [California Arbitration Act], then the state arbitration
procedures do not apply and there is no preemption issue”], 242 [discussing the
issue of preemption in the alternative, i.e., finding that the order should be
reversed on the ground of preemption “[e]ven if [the court] were to
conclude that section 1281.97 applie[d]”] [emphasis added].)