Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 23STCV28303, Date: 2024-06-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV28303, Date: 2024-06-14 Tentative Ruling

RESPONDING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Danaya Franklin, Kennisha Carey, Tysen Knight, Lauren Mangione, Kevin Moss, Brandon Lesane, Blake Johnson, Charity Racaniello, and Alberto Ramirez

The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with the motion to transfer venue. No opposition papers to that motion were filed.

The court did not consider the opposition to the demurrer filed by plaintiffs Danaya Franklin, Kennisha Carey, Tysen Knight, Lauren Mangione, Kevin Moss, Brandon Lesane, Blake Johnson, Charity Racaniello, and Alberto Ramirez on June 7, 2024, because that opposition was not filed at least nine court days before the hearing on this demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)

The court exercised its discretion to consider the reply papers filed on June 10, 2024, because, even though they were not filed at least five court days before the hearing on this demurrer, defendant Reliant Real Estate Management, Inc. could not have filed its reply papers within that timeframe since the opposition papers were not timely filed.

The court grants defendant Reliant Real Estate Management, Inc.’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)

Defendant Reliant Real Estate Management, Inc. (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order transferring this action, filed by plaintiffs Danaya Franklin, Kennisha Carey, Tysen Knight, Lauren Mangione, Kevin Moss, Brandon Lesane, Blake Johnson, Charity Racaniello, and Alberto Ramirez (“Plaintiffs”),[1] to the Orange County Superior Court.

“The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases: [¶] (a) When the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 397, subd. (a).) “A corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 395.5.) “Thus, under the legislative scheme, venue may be proper in more than one county, depending on the particular facts of a case.” (Battaglia Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 309, 313.) “There is a presumption that the county in which the plaintiff chose to file the action is the proper county. [Citations.] The burden rests on the party seeking a change of venue to defeat the plaintiff’s presumptively correct choice of court.” (Id. at pp. 313-314 [internal citations omitted]; Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 837 [“‘[i]t is the moving defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s venue selection is not proper under any of the statutory grounds’”] [emphasis added].)

The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden to show that Los Angeles County Superior Court is not the proper venue for this action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 397, subd. (a).)

The court recognizes that Defendant has submitted evidence establishing that its principal place of business is located in Orange County, not Los Angeles County. (RJN Exs. A, B.) Thus, Defendant has shown that Orange County is a proper venue for this action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395.5 [a corporation may be sued “in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is suited”].) However, Defendant has not shown that Orange County is the only county in which Plaintiffs were permitted to file this action.

As set forth above, “venue may be proper in more than one county, depending on the particular facts of a case.” (Battaglia Enterprises, Inc., supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 313.) Corporations such as Defendant may be sued in the counties in which, inter alia, their principal places of business are situated, “or where the obligation or liability arises . . . .” (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 395.5.) The Complaint alleges that Defendant obtained investigative consumer reports about Plaintiffs during the processing of their applications for apartment homes at various apartment complexes without complying with the mandatory requirements, disclosures, and authorizations set forth under the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (“ICRAA”), on which each cause of action is based. (Compl., ¶¶ 28, 43-44, 51, 53.) This alleged wrongdoing occurred, at least in part, in Los Angeles County.

Specifically, Plaintiffs have alleged that (1) plaintiff Tiffany Coffman was a prospective tenant and resident at The Vues on Gordon Apartments, located at 1558 Gordon Street, Los Angeles, California, 90028, which is located in Los Angeles County (Compl., ¶ 6), (2) plaintiff Jaime Castaneda was a prospective tenant and resident at The Palms Apartments located at 489 West 120th Street, Hawthorne, California, 90250, which is located in Los Angeles County (Compl., ¶ 7), (3) plaintiff Ariel Sanders was a prospective tenant and resident at The Fairmount Apartments located at 1001 East Villa Street, Pasadena, California, 91106, which is located in Los Angeles County (Compl., ¶ 8), (4) Defendant operates The Vues on Gordon Apartments, The Fairmount Apartments, and The Palms Apartments (Compl., ¶ 21), and (5) Defendant requested and obtained investigative consumer reports about Plaintiffs during the processing of their applications for apartment homes at, inter alia, The Vues on Gordon Apartments, The Fairmount Apartments, and The Palms Apartments, without complying with the mandatory requirements, disclosures, and authorizations under ICRAA (Compl., ¶ 28). Thus, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant’s “obligation or liability” as to those plaintiffs’ applications, in connection with each cause of action, arose in Los Angeles County. (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 395.5.)

Moreover, while the court acknowledges that, on March 21, 2024, those plaintiffs were dismissed pursuant to Plaintiffs’ March 18, 2024 request for dismissal, at the time that Defendant’s motion was made (i.e., on January 16, 2024), those plaintiffs were parties to the Complaint and venue in Los Angeles County was therefore proper. (Williams v. Superior Court for County of Contra Costa (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 101, 109 [“‘ “Venue is determined based on the complaint on file at the time the motion to change venue is made” ’”]; Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 732, 738 [“Proper venue is not made improper by a subsequent amendment to the complaint”].)

Further, to the extent that Defendant contends that certain of the other Plaintiffs’ causes of action were not properly filed in this court, Defendant did not cite authority establishing that the court has the authority to order only certain of the plaintiffs to file their actions against Defendant in Orange County. For example, the court agrees that, in a mixed action (i.e., in an action in which “a plaintiff alleges two or more causes of action[,] each of which is governed by a different venue statute” or “two or more defendants are named who are subject to different venue standards”), “a motion for change of venue must be granted on the entire complaint if the defendant is entitled to a change of venue on any one cause of action.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 488.) However, Defendant has not shown that this is a mixed action within the meaning of that authority because Defendant did not show that Plaintiffs have alleged “two or more causes of action each of which is governed by a different venue statute” or that Defendant is entitled to a change of venue on any one cause of action. (Ibid.) Thus, the court finds that Defendant has not shown that this is a mixed action that must be transferred to Orange County.

The court denies Defendant’s motion to transfer this action to “Santa Monica County Superior Court” because (1) Santa Monica is not a county and there are no Santa Monica County superior courts, and (2) Defendant did not file a proper motion in Department 1 in the Central District requesting that this action be transferred to another district (i.e., the West District or Santa Monica courthouse). (Local Rule, rule 2.3, subd. (b)(2).)

Defendant moves the court for an order sustaining its demurrer to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for invasion of privacy. Plaintiffs have based this cause of action on the allegation that Defendant “invaded the Plaintiffs’ rights of privacy by obtaining investigative consumer reports about the Plaintiffs without complying with the mandatory requirements under” ICRAA. (Compl., ¶ 51.)

The court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action for invasion of privacy because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing that Defendant, in obtaining investigatory reports about Plaintiffs (including criminal backgrounds and previous eviction backgrounds) without complying with ICRAA (Compl., ¶¶ 28, 34, 51), committed a serious intrusion into Plaintiffs’ private matters “in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person[,]” as required for both constitutional and common law invasion of privacy claims, including because Plaintiffs completed a consent to the release of such information (Compl., ¶¶ 27, 29-30). (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Mezger v. Bick (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 76, 87 [“The elements of a common law invasion of privacy claim are intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter, in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person”], 88 [“‘Actionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right’”]; Garrabrants v. Erhart (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 486, 498 [“Any state constitutional invasion of privacy claims . . . includes three elements: ‘(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy’”].)

The court denies defendant Reliant Real Estate Management, Inc.’s motion to transfer venue.

The court sustains defendant Reliant Real Estate Management, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiffs Danaya Franklin, Kennisha Carey, Tysen Knight, Lauren Mangione, Kevin Moss, Brandon Lesane, Blake Johnson, Charity Racaniello, and Alberto Ramirez’s second cause of action for invasion of privacy.

The court grants plaintiffs Danaya Franklin, Kennisha Carey, Tysen Knight, Lauren Mangione, Kevin Moss, Brandon Lesane, Blake Johnson, Charity Racaniello, and Alberto Ramirez 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the defects with the second cause of action set forth in this ruling.

The court orders defendant Reliant Real Estate Management, Inc. to give notice of this ruling.

[1] Plaintiffs Tiffany Coffman, Jamie Castaneda, Adriel Sanders, Bianca Quezada, Amaris Cleveland, and Daniel Cleveland were dismissed without prejudice on March 21, 2024.

tiffany coffman , et al.; Plaintiffs, vs. reliant real estate management, inc. , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	23STCV28303

	Hearing Date:	June 14, 2024

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[tentative] Order RE: (1) defendant’s motion to transfer venue (2) defendant’s demurrer to complaint