Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 23STCV31759, Date: 2025-01-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV31759, Date: 2025-01-06 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Security Industry Specialists, Inc., Matthew Garay, Omar Rosales, Glen Pacis, Vashti Simpson, Timika Rieves, and Manuel Montoya

The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with this motion. No opposition papers were filed.

Defendants Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (“SIS”), Matthew Garay, Omar Rosales, Glen Pacis, Vashti Simpson, Timika Rieves, and Manuel Montoya (collectively, “Defendants”) move the court for an order (1) compelling plaintiff Tiyon Christopher Paul Cooper (“Plaintiff”) to submit the claims alleged against them in his Complaint to binding arbitration, and (2) staying this action pending completion of arbitration.

As a threshold matter, the court finds that Defendants have not met their burden to show that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) (the “FAA”) governs this motion. (Evenskaas v. California Transit, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 285, 292 [“The party asserting the FAA applies to an agreement has ‘the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence’”].)

“‘The FAA’s basic coverage provision, section 2, makes the FAA applicable to contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) Courts broadly construe section 2 to “provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause.” [Citation.] “Accordingly, in most cases, the FAA mandates arbitration when contracts involving interstate commerce contain arbitration provisions.” ’ [Citations.]” (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 761-762; 9 U.S.C. § 2 [“A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” to arbitrate a controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for revocation of any contract].) “The United States Supreme Court has identified ‘three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, . . .”; and (3) “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” ’ [Citations.]” (Evenskaas, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 293.)

The court acknowledges Defendants have submitted evidence showing that (1) SIS, with which Plaintiff executed the subject the “Employment Arbitration Agreement and Procedure” (the “Arbitration Agreement”), is a private security contractor with offices in California, Washington, New York, Texas, and Florida and (i) provides contract security specialists to clients in California and elsewhere in the United States, (ii) provides security services in 29 states and 19 countries, and (iii) provides international services, and (2) during Plaintiff’s training with SIS, Plaintiff was trained on SIS’s US and global security operations. (Prybyla Decl., ¶¶ 2, 7.) Defendants have also presented evidence showing that Plaintiff was required to use the Internet to access SIS’s time management system and was required to wear a uniform that was purchased from an entity in Pennsylvania. (Prybyla Decl., ¶¶ 14-15.)

Thus, Defendants have presented evidence showing that SIS is involved in activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. However, the court finds that Defendants did not present evidence establishing that the Arbitration Agreement entered into by Plaintiff and SIS constitutes a contract involving interstate commerce because Defendants did not submit evidence showing that Plaintiff, while assigned as a security specialist to an Apple campus in Culver City, California, was meaningfully involved in activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. (Prybyla Decl., ¶ 6; Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 688 [finding that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the plaintiff’s employment involved interstate commerce because, inter alia, the plaintiff never admitted to being engaged in interstate commerce and the defendant was a California corporate entity doing business and with its principal place of business in California]; Hoover v. American Income Life Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207-1208 [although the defendant was based in Texas and the plaintiff in California, “there was no evidence in the record establishing that the relationship between [the defendant and the plaintiff] had a specific effect or ‘bear[ing] on interstate commerce in a substantial way[,]’” including because the plaintiff did not work in other states or engage in loan activity that affected interstate commerce by engaging with a bank headquartered in another state].)

The court acknowledges that the Arbitration Agreement states that “[a]ny proceeding pursuant” thereto “is deemed to be an arbitration proceeding subject to the [FAA], if applicable, to the exclusion of any state law inconsistent therewith; or, if the FAA is not applicable, to the law of the state of venue.” (Prybyla Decl., Ex. B, Arbitration Agreement, ¶ 22.1.) While the court agrees that parties to an arbitration agreement may incorporate the FAA’s procedural provisions if the agreement “‘contains a choice-of-law clause expressly incorporating them[,]’” the court finds that the language in the parties’ Arbitration Agreement does not expressly incorporate the procedural provisions of the FAA. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 345.) The Arbitration Agreement does not, for example, state that its enforcement shall be governed by the FAA. (Id. at p. 346 [“when an agreement provides that its ‘enforcement’ shall be governed by the FAA, the FAA governs a party’s motion to compel arbitration”].) Further, the Arbitration Agreement states that any proceeding pursuant thereto is subject to the FAA “if applicable[.]” (Prybyla Decl., Ex. B, Arbitration Agreement, ¶ 22.1 [emphasis added].) This language (1) is not broad and unconditional, and does not adopt the FAA to govern any arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement, and instead adopts the FAA only to the extent applicable, and (2) does not apply here because, as set forth above, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the Arbitration Agreement involves interstate commerce and therefore have not shown that the FAA is applicable. (Ibid.; Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1121-1122 [agreement to arbitrate “‘[p]ursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act’” was broad and unconditional and therefore adopted the procedural provisions of the FAA to govern their arbitration].)

Thus, the court finds that the California Arbitration Act governs this motion and therefore does not apply the FAA.[1]

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists[,]” unless the court finds that the right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner or that grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., §¿1281.2.)¿¿¿¿

“‘ “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, while the party opposing the petition bears the burden of establishing a defense to the agreement’s enforcement.” ’”¿ (Beco v. Fast Auto Loans (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 292, 302.)¿ To determine the existence of an arbitration agreement, the court uses “a three-step burden-shifting process.”¿ (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755.)¿ “The arbitration proponent must first recite verbatim, or provide a copy of, the alleged agreement.¿ [Citations.]¿ A movant can bear this initial burden ‘by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signature.’”¿ (Ibid. [internal citations omitted].)¿ “If the movant bears its initial burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to identify a factual dispute as to the agreement’s existence . . . .”¿ (Ibid.)¿ If the opposing party meets its burden to “submit sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute” as to the existence of the agreement, the burden shifts back to the arbitration proponent, who retains the ultimate burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.¿ (Ibid.; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165-166.)¿

First, the court finds that Defendants have met their burden to show that an arbitration agreement exists between SIS and Plaintiff by submitting a copy of the Arbitration Agreement entered into by and between Plaintiff, on the one hand, and defendant SIS, on the other hand, and executed upon Plaintiff’s commencement of employment with SIS for the second time. (Prybyla Decl., Ex. B, Arbitration Agreement.)

The Arbitration Agreement (1) states that all disputes are subject to the Arbitration Agreement, (2) defines disputes to mean “any and all claims, disputes, or issues of which the Employee (including former Employee) is or should be aware during the employment relationship or after termination thereof, and which relate to or arise out of the employment of the Employee by the Employer (including without limitation any claim of constructive termination, any benefits-related claim or any related claim against an individual Employee of the Employer),” including claims that arise out of or are related to, inter alia, civil rights laws, fair employment laws, wage and hour laws, laws against discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, and the employee’s employment or termination thereof, and (3) was electronically signed by Plaintiff on August 17, 2022. (Prybyla Decl., Ex. B, Arbitration Agreement, ¶¶ 1.1, 1.2, and PDF p. 31 [signature page].)

Thus, the court finds that Defendants have met their burden to produce prima facie evidence of an arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and defendant SIS.

Second, the court finds that Defendants have met their burden to produce prima facie evidence of an arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and individual defendants Matthew Garay, Omar Rosales, Glen Pacis, Vashti Simpson, Timika Rieves, and Manuel Montoya.

The Arbitration Agreement defines “Employer” to include SIS as well as “its parent company, subsidiaries and affiliates and/or their respective directors, officers, employees, or agents and/or affiliated benefits plan administrators and/or plan fiduciaries and their respective employees or agents.” (Prybyla Decl., Ex. B, ¶ 1.3.) Plaintiff has alleged that individual defendants Matthew Garay, Omar Rosales, Glen Pacis, Vashti Simpson, Timika Rieves, and Manuel Montoya are employees of SIS, such that those defendants therefore fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. (Ibid.; Compl., ¶¶ 14, subds. (a) [defendant Garay was brought onto the team as a security guard training for a manager], (l) [identifying defendant Rosales as a hiring manager], and (m) [identifying defendant Simpson as a supervisor], 11 [alleging that Plaintiff was hired by supervisor defendant Pacis (using the incorrect name of Glen Casias)], 2 [defendants Rieves and Montoya were both human resources generalists].)

The court further finds that Defendants have shown that the Arbitration Agreement applies to the claims that Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint, which (1) arise from Plaintiff’s employment and his termination of employment with SIS, and (2) allege causes of action for discrimination, harassment, retaliation and whistleblower retaliation, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation, breaches of an oral and implied-in-fact agreement not to terminate Plaintiff without good cause, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Compl., ¶¶ 21-24, 29, 37, 44, 52, 60, 67-68, 71-72, 75, 78, 85.)

Third, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden (1) to identify a factual dispute as to the Arbitration Agreement’s existence, or (2) to establish a defense to the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement because Plaintiff did not file an opposition or other evidence with the court disputing that he signed the Arbitration Agreement or that it is not authentic or enforceable for any other reason. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755; Beco, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 302.)

The court therefore grants Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and to stay this action.

The court grants defendants Security Industry Specialists, Inc., Matthew Garay, Omar Rosales, Glen Pacis, Vashti Simpson, Timika Rieves, and Manuel Montoya’s motion to compel arbitration and stay civil proceedings.

The court orders (1) plaintiff Tiyon Christopher Paul Cooper and defendants Security Industry Specialists, Inc., Matthew Garay, Omar Rosales, Glen Pacis, Vashti Simpson, Timika Rieves, and Manuel Montoya to arbitrate the claims alleged in plaintiff Tiyon Christopher Paul Cooper’s Complaint, and (2) this action is stayed until arbitration is completed.

The court sets an Order to Show Cause re completion of arbitration for hearing on June 17, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 53.

The court orders defendant Security Industry Specialists, Inc., Matthew Garay, Omar Rosales, Glen Pacis, Vashti Simpson, Timika Rieves, and Manuel Montoya to give notice of this ruling.

[1] The court notes that this finding does not substantially affect the court’s ruling on this motion, since “under both the FAA and California law, ‘arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’” (Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.)

tiyon christopher paul cooper ; Plaintiff, vs. security industry services inc. , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	23STCV31759

	Hearing Date:	January 6, 2025

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[tentative] Order RE: defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and stay civil court proceedings