Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 23STCV31853, Date: 2025-07-12 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

Case Number: 23STCV31853    Hearing Date: July 12, 2025    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                 Plaintiffs Allycia Parrett and Andre Parrett  

RESPONDING PARTY:       n/a

Request for Entry of Default Judgment

Plaintiffs Allycia Parrett and Andre Parrett (“Plaintiffs”) filed, on May 22, 2025, a proposed judgment by default against defendants Campbell S. Grey (“Grey”), En Construction Services Inc., and Marinella de Pineda Vallejos (collectively, “Defendants”).[1]  

Plaintiffs now request that the court enter default judgment in their favor and against Defendants in the total amount of $375,328.38, consisting of $350,000 in damages, $24,500 in attorney’s fees, and $828.38 in costs.  (JUD-100, ¶ 6.)

The court notes the following defects with Plaintiffs’ request for default judgment against Defendants.

First, Plaintiffs did not file all documents required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, including (1) the mandatory request for entry of default judgment on Judicial Council form CIV-100,[2] (2) a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, and (3) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought (i.e., Doe defendants 1-20).  (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1800, subds. (a)(1), (a)(7); Compl., ¶ 10 [describing Doe defendants 1-20].)

Second, even if Plaintiffs had filed all documents required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, the court finds that it cannot award Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $350,000 as requested because that amount exceeds what was requested in the Complaint.[3]  (JUD-100, ¶ 6, subd. (a)(1).)

“The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 580, sud. (a).)  “Thus, ‘in all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on recovery,’ and a judgment purporting to grant relief beyond that ceiling is void for being in excess of jurisdiction.  [Citation.]”  (Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 863 [internal citation omitted].)

The prayer of Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not request a specific amount of damages, and instead requests “damages according to proof.”  (Compl., Prayer, ¶ 1.)  That prayer is insufficient to give Defendants notice of the damages sought.  Thus, the court has reviewed the allegations in the Complaint to determine the amount of damages alleged therein.  (Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898, 909 [“‘a prayer for damages according to proof passes muster under section 580 only if a specific amount of damages is alleged in the body of the complaint’”] [emphasis in original] [internal citation omitted].)

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that (1) they entered into a written contract with defendants Grey and Greyco, which required Plaintiffs to pay a total of $177,440 (Compl., ¶ 17), (2) they fulfilled all their obligations to Grey and Greyco under the contract by “timely paying all payments that were due under the Contract” (Compl., ¶ 59), and (3) Grey converted more than $57,000 of Plaintiffs’ funds for his own personal use, including by converting those funds into his personal cryptocurrency and options accounts (Compl., ¶ 29).  None of Plaintiffs’ causes of action requests a specific amount of damages.  Instead, at most, the Complaint alleges that, as a result of Defendants’ conduct, “Plaintiffs have been damaged by the costs associated with fixing the defective construction work done by Grey and Greyco and completing the renovations that were not finished by Grey and Greyco at the time of their termination.  Plaintiffs have also been damaged by the amount of funds that Grey has kept without permission in his personal cryptocurrency and options account and refuses to return as well as any other portion of Plaintiffs’ funds that were transferred to Grey and Greyco but were not spent towards completing the tasks set forth in the Contract” (Compl., ¶¶ 53, 62, 67, 77).

Thus, although Plaintiffs have alleged that they paid to defendant Grey the amounts due under the contract (i.e., the $177,440), Plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish that they are seeking that amount from Defendants.  Instead, as set forth above, Plaintiffs seek an unspecified amount of damages for the costs that they incurred to fix the allegedly defective work performed by Grey and to complete renovations that were not finished by Grey and Greyco.  (Compl., ¶¶ 53, 62, 67, 77.)  The court, however, finds that the allegations that Plaintiffs have been damaged as a result of Grey’s misappropriating and converting the funds paid to him by Plaintiffs—elsewhere alleged to amount to $57,000—are sufficient to allege damages in that amount.  (Compl., ¶¶ 29, 53, 62, 67, 74, 77.)

The court therefore finds that (1) the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to request damages in the amount of $57,000, such that (2) entry of default judgment in excess of that amount would be void.  (Sass, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 863.)

For the reasons set forth above, the court denies Plaintiffs’ request for entry of default judgment against Defendants.  The court denies this request without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ filing a new request for default judgment against Defendants that (1) is limited to seeking $57,000 in damages, and (2) is accompanied by all the documents required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.[4]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  June 12, 2025

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court