Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV01808, Date: 2024-08-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV01808 Hearing Date: August 15, 2024 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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24STCV01808 |
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August
15, 2024 |
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[tentative]
Order RE: (1)
defendant’s
demurrer to complaint (2)
defendant’s
motion to strike portions of complaint (3)
defendants’
demurrer to complaint (4)
defendants’
motion to strike portions of complaint |
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant City of Los Angeles
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada
(1)
Demurrer
to Complaint
(2)
Motion
to Strike Portions of Complaint
MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Ahmad
Zarekani, Gerald Woodyard, and Alcenda Neal
RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed
(3)
Demurrer
to Complaint
(4)
Motion
to Strike Portions of Complaint
The court
considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with the
demurrer and motion to strike filed by defendant City of Los Angeles.
The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with the
demurrer and motion to strike filed by defendants Ahmad Zarekani, Gerald
Woodyard, and Alcenda Neal. No
opposition papers were filed in connection with that demurrer and motion to
strike.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael Anthony
Estrada (“Plaintiff”) filed this discrimination action on January 23, 2024
against defendants City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Police Department, Michel
Moore, in his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police
Department, Ahmad Zarekani, in his official capacity as Commander of the Los
Angeles Police Department (“Zarekani”), Gerald Woodyard, in his official
capacity as Deputy Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police Department
(“Woodyard”), and Alcenda Neal, in his official capacity as Commander of the
Los Angeles Police Department (“Neal”).
The Complaint alleged 15
causes of action for (1) discrimination based on race; (2) discrimination based
on age; (3) discrimination based on gender; (4) hostile work environment; (5)
failure to prevent discrimination; (6) harassment; (7) failure to promote; (8)
failure to pay premium double time wages due; (9) failure to provide timely off
duty meal periods; (10) failure to provide rest periods; (11) failure to
maintain records and provide itemized wage statements; (12) failure to
reimburse business expenses; (13) failure to provide day of rest; (14) failure
to allow inspection of employment records; and (15) unfair competition. On August 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request
for Dismissal of the eighth through 15th causes of action. The clerk dismissed those causes of action
pursuant to Plaintiff’s request on August 2, 2024.
Two sets of responsive
pleadings are now pending before the court.
First, defendant City of Los Angeles (“Defendant City”) moves the court
for an order (1) sustaining its demurrer to each cause of action alleged in the
Complaint, and (2) striking from the Complaint certain allegations and the
prayers for punitive damages, statutory damages, restitution, penalties under
the Labor Code, and injunctive relief.
Second, defendants Zarekani, Woodyard, and Neal (“Individual Defendants”)
move the court for an order (1) sustaining their demurrer to Plaintiff’s sixth
cause of action, and (2) striking from the Complaint certain allegations and
the request for punitive damages.
DEMURRER FILED BY DEFENDANT CITY
The court overrules Defendant City’s demurrer to the first through sixth causes of action on
the ground of uncertainty because those causes of action are not ambiguous or
unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.10, subd. (f); Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 279, 292 [“demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are
granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot
reasonably respond”] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)
The court sustains Defendant
City’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action for hostile work environment because
(1) it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since
Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendant City’s conduct was
“sufficiently severe or pervasive [so as] to alter the conditions of
[Plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working environment[,]” and (2)
it is duplicative of the sixth cause of action for harassment, which is alleged
against all defendants and based on the same facts and legal theory (i.e., that
the alleged conduct created an abusive working environment (Compl., ¶
81)). (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd.
(e); Martin v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 149, 170 [elements of cause of action for harassment]; Palm
Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th
268, 290 [court may sustain demurrer to duplicative causes of action].)
The court sustains Defendant
City’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action for harassment because it does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has not
alleged facts establishing that Defendant City’s conduct was “sufficiently
severe or pervasive [so as] to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff’s] employment
and create an abusive working environment.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Martin, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 170 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)
The court sustains Defendant
City’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action for failure to promote because
(1) it is ambiguous and unintelligible since Plaintiff has alleged this cause
of action for “Failure to Promote,” which appears to allege an element of a
discrimination claim (i.e., an adverse employment action) and is not a
standalone cause of action, and (2) to the extent that Plaintiff has alleged
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for discrimination, this cause
of action is duplicative of the first through third causes of action, which are
based on the same set of facts (i.e., that Plaintiff was denied raises and
promotions because of his race, gender, and age (Compl., ¶¶ 18 [Plaintiff has
been denied promotions on four occasions], 21, 33, 45, 53, 86)). (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f); Meeks
v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 879 [the failure to promote
constitutes an adverse employment action]; Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners
Assn., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 290 [court may sustain a
demurrer to a duplicative cause of action].)
The court finds that the
demurrer directed to the eighth through 15th causes of action is moot because
the clerk dismissed those causes of action on August 2, 2024 pursuant to
Plaintiff’s request for dismissal. (Pl.
Request for Dismissal filed Aug. 1, 2024, ¶¶ 1, 5.)
The court notes that, in
reply, Defendant City contends that the Los Angeles Police Department and its
Chief of Police, defendant Michel Moore, are not proper parties to this
action. While Defendant City raised this
issue in its supporting memorandum of points and authorities, it did so only in
a footnote, and did not state, in its notice of demurrer, that it was moving
for an order sustaining its demurrer as to those entities on that ground. (Notice of Dem.; Memo., p. 1, n. 1; Reply, p.
2:14-3:2.) Thus, to the extent that
Defendant City requests that the court sustain its demurrer on that ground, the
court overrules that request.
MOTION TO STRIKE FILED BY DEFENDANT CITY
Defendant City moves the court for an order striking the following
from Plaintiff’s Complaint: (1) the references to Business and Professions Code
section 17200 and requests for relief thereunder (Compl., ¶ 1 and pp. 25:24-25,
26:14-15, 26:16-17, 26:18-19); (2) the allegations that Plaintiff was harassed
and discriminated against by defendants Zarekani, Woodyard, and Neal (Compl., ¶
17); (3) the allegations that Plaintiff was denied the promotion to which he
applied on four occasions (Compl., ¶ 18); (4) the requests for punitive damages
and supporting allegations (Compl., ¶¶ 39-40, 49, 60-61, 69, 77, 84, 91-92);
and (5) the prayers for remedies under the Labor Code, including for statutory
damages and wages (Compl., pp. 25:16-17, 25:23, 25:26-26:3, 26:3-4, 26:5,
26:6-8, 26:9-10, 26:21-22).
First, the court denies the motion to strike (1) the references to
Business and Professions Code section 17200, including the remedies requested pursuant
thereto, because Plaintiff has dismissed the 15th cause of action for unfair
competition and therefore that cause of action and its remedies are removed
from the Complaint, and (2) the prayers for remedies under the Labor Code,
because Plaintiff has dismissed the eighth through 14th causes of action, and
therefore those causes of action and the remedies requested therein are removed
from the Complaint.
Second, the court denies the motion to strike the allegations that
Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination and harassment by defendants
Zarekani, Woodyard, and Neal, and that he was denied the position of Senior
Lead Officer on four occasions, because Defendant City has not shown that those
allegations are improper. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)
The court notes that Defendant City contends that Plaintiff is barred
from asserting claims based on actions taken in 2019-2020 because (1) Plaintiff
alleges that he filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair
Employment and Housing on January 22, 2024 (Compl., ¶ 23), but (2) any such
complaint alleging claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act “shall not
be filed after the expiration of three years from the date upon which the
unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred.” (Gov. Code, § 12960, subd. (e)(5).) However,
Defendant City did not establish that Plaintiff’s potential failure to file an
administrative complaint within the time required by statute renders the
allegation describing conduct taking place in 2019-2020—which, as Plaintiff
asserts in opposition, is relevant background information that may establish a
pattern of conduct—improper or irrelevant.
Moreover, Defendant City has moved to strike the entire allegations
setting forth the alleged discrimination and harassment, including actions that
occurred in 2022 and 2023 (Compl., ¶¶ 17-18; Notice of Mot., p. 2:7-12), but
did not show that the allegations in their entirety are improper.
Third, the court denies as moot the prayer for punitive damages and
related allegations against Defendant City because the clerk dismissed
Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages against Defendant City on August 2,
2024, pursuant to the Request for Dismissal that Plaintiff filed on August 1,
2024. (Request for Dismissal filed Aug.
1, 2024, ¶¶ 1, subd. (6) [requesting dismissal of the “Punitive damages claims
to Defendant City of Los Angeles”], 5.)
DEMURRER FILED BY INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
The court overrules Individual Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth cause
of action for harassment on the ground of uncertainty because it is not
ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)
The court sustains Individual Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth cause
of action for harassment on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing
that Individual Defendants engaged in harassing conduct that was “sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff’s] employment and
create an abusive working environment.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Martin, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 170 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)
MOTION TO STRIKE FILED BY INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS
Individual Defendants move the court for an order striking the
following from the Complaint: (1) the allegations that Plaintiff (i) was
subjected to race, gender, and age discrimination (Compl., ¶ 17), and (ii) was
denied the position of Senior Lead Officer on four occasions beginning in 2019
(Compl., ¶ 18), and (2) the prayer for punitive damages and related allegations
(Compl., ¶¶ 39-40, 49, 60-61, 69, 77, 84, 91-92; Compl., p. 26:11).
First, the court denies Individual Defendants’ motion to strike the
allegations in paragraphs 17-18 because Individual Defendants have not shown,
for the reasons set forth in connection with the court’s ruling on Defendant
City’s motion to strike, that these allegations are improper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)
Second, the court denies as moot Individual Defendants’ motion to
strike the prayer for punitive damages and related allegations against them
because the court has sustained Individual Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth
cause of action for harassment for the reasons set forth above, which is the
only cause of action alleged against Individual Defendants and therefore the
only cause of action that may support Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages
against them.
ORDER
The court sustains in part defendant
City of Los Angeles’s demurrer to plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s Complaint
as follows.
The court sustains defendant City of Los Angeles’s demurrer to
plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of
action.
The court overrules (1) as moot
defendant City of Los Angeles’s demurrer to plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s
eighth through 15th causes of action, and (2) defendant City of Los Angeles’s
demurrer to plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s first through third and fifth
causes of action.
The court denies defendant City of
Los Angeles’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s
complaint.
The court sustains defendants Ahmad
Zarekani, Gerald Woodyard, and Alcenda Neal’s demurrer to plaintiff Michael
Anthony Estrada’s sixth cause of action for harassment.
The court denies as moot defendants
Ahmad Zarekani, Gerald Woodyard, and Alcenda Neal’s motion to strike portions
of plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s Complaint.
The court grants plaintiff Michael
Anthony Estrada 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the
defects in the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action set forth in this
order.
The court orders defendants Ahmad
Zarekani, Gerald Woodyard, and Alcenda Neal to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court