Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV01808, Date: 2024-08-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV01808    Hearing Date: August 15, 2024    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

 

 

michael anthony estrada ;

 

Plaintiff,

 

 

vs.

 

 

city of los angeles , et al.;

 

Defendants.

Case No.:

24STCV01808

 

 

Hearing Date:

August 15, 2024

 

 

Time:

10:00 a.m.

 

 

 

[tentative] Order RE:

 

(1)   defendant’s demurrer to complaint

(2)   defendant’s motion to strike portions of complaint

(3)   defendants’ demurrer to complaint

(4)   defendants’ motion to strike portions of complaint

 

 

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendant City of Los Angeles         

 

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada

(1)   Demurrer to Complaint

(2)   Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

MOVING PARTIES:              Defendants Ahmad Zarekani, Gerald Woodyard, and Alcenda Neal 

 

RESPONDING PARTY:       Unopposed

(3)   Demurrer to Complaint

(4)   Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike filed by defendant City of Los Angeles.

The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike filed by defendants Ahmad Zarekani, Gerald Woodyard, and Alcenda Neal.  No opposition papers were filed in connection with that demurrer and motion to strike.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada (“Plaintiff”) filed this discrimination action on January 23, 2024 against defendants City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Police Department, Michel Moore, in his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police Department, Ahmad Zarekani, in his official capacity as Commander of the Los Angeles Police Department (“Zarekani”), Gerald Woodyard, in his official capacity as Deputy Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police Department (“Woodyard”), and Alcenda Neal, in his official capacity as Commander of the Los Angeles Police Department (“Neal”).

The Complaint alleged 15 causes of action for (1) discrimination based on race; (2) discrimination based on age; (3) discrimination based on gender; (4) hostile work environment; (5) failure to prevent discrimination; (6) harassment; (7) failure to promote; (8) failure to pay premium double time wages due; (9) failure to provide timely off duty meal periods; (10) failure to provide rest periods; (11) failure to maintain records and provide itemized wage statements; (12) failure to reimburse business expenses; (13) failure to provide day of rest; (14) failure to allow inspection of employment records; and (15) unfair competition.  On August 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal of the eighth through 15th causes of action.  The clerk dismissed those causes of action pursuant to Plaintiff’s request on August 2, 2024.

Two sets of responsive pleadings are now pending before the court.  First, defendant City of Los Angeles (“Defendant City”) moves the court for an order (1) sustaining its demurrer to each cause of action alleged in the Complaint, and (2) striking from the Complaint certain allegations and the prayers for punitive damages, statutory damages, restitution, penalties under the Labor Code, and injunctive relief.  Second, defendants Zarekani, Woodyard, and Neal (“Individual Defendants”) move the court for an order (1) sustaining their demurrer to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action, and (2) striking from the Complaint certain allegations and the request for punitive damages.

DEMURRER FILED BY DEFENDANT CITY

The court overrules Defendant City’s demurrer to the first through sixth causes of action on the ground of uncertainty because those causes of action are not ambiguous or unintelligible.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f); Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292 [“demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond”] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

The court sustains Defendant City’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action for hostile work environment because (1) it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendant City’s conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive [so as] to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working environment[,]” and (2) it is duplicative of the sixth cause of action for harassment, which is alleged against all defendants and based on the same facts and legal theory (i.e., that the alleged conduct created an abusive working environment (Compl., ¶ 81)).  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Martin v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 170 [elements of cause of action for harassment]; Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290 [court may sustain demurrer to duplicative causes of action].)

The court sustains Defendant City’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action for harassment because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendant City’s conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive [so as] to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Martin, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 170 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

The court sustains Defendant City’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action for failure to promote because (1) it is ambiguous and unintelligible since Plaintiff has alleged this cause of action for “Failure to Promote,” which appears to allege an element of a discrimination claim (i.e., an adverse employment action) and is not a standalone cause of action, and (2) to the extent that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for discrimination, this cause of action is duplicative of the first through third causes of action, which are based on the same set of facts (i.e., that Plaintiff was denied raises and promotions because of his race, gender, and age (Compl., ¶¶ 18 [Plaintiff has been denied promotions on four occasions], 21, 33, 45, 53, 86)).  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f); Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 879 [the failure to promote constitutes an adverse employment action]; Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 290 [court may sustain a demurrer to a duplicative cause of action].)

The court finds that the demurrer directed to the eighth through 15th causes of action is moot because the clerk dismissed those causes of action on August 2, 2024 pursuant to Plaintiff’s request for dismissal.  (Pl. Request for Dismissal filed Aug. 1, 2024, ¶¶ 1, 5.)

The court notes that, in reply, Defendant City contends that the Los Angeles Police Department and its Chief of Police, defendant Michel Moore, are not proper parties to this action.  While Defendant City raised this issue in its supporting memorandum of points and authorities, it did so only in a footnote, and did not state, in its notice of demurrer, that it was moving for an order sustaining its demurrer as to those entities on that ground.  (Notice of Dem.; Memo., p. 1, n. 1; Reply, p. 2:14-3:2.)  Thus, to the extent that Defendant City requests that the court sustain its demurrer on that ground, the court overrules that request.

MOTION TO STRIKE FILED BY DEFENDANT CITY

Defendant City moves the court for an order striking the following from Plaintiff’s Complaint: (1) the references to Business and Professions Code section 17200 and requests for relief thereunder (Compl., ¶ 1 and pp. 25:24-25, 26:14-15, 26:16-17, 26:18-19); (2) the allegations that Plaintiff was harassed and discriminated against by defendants Zarekani, Woodyard, and Neal (Compl., ¶ 17); (3) the allegations that Plaintiff was denied the promotion to which he applied on four occasions (Compl., ¶ 18); (4) the requests for punitive damages and supporting allegations (Compl., ¶¶ 39-40, 49, 60-61, 69, 77, 84, 91-92); and (5) the prayers for remedies under the Labor Code, including for statutory damages and wages (Compl., pp. 25:16-17, 25:23, 25:26-26:3, 26:3-4, 26:5, 26:6-8, 26:9-10, 26:21-22).

First, the court denies the motion to strike (1) the references to Business and Professions Code section 17200, including the remedies requested pursuant thereto, because Plaintiff has dismissed the 15th cause of action for unfair competition and therefore that cause of action and its remedies are removed from the Complaint, and (2) the prayers for remedies under the Labor Code, because Plaintiff has dismissed the eighth through 14th causes of action, and therefore those causes of action and the remedies requested therein are removed from the Complaint.

Second, the court denies the motion to strike the allegations that Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination and harassment by defendants Zarekani, Woodyard, and Neal, and that he was denied the position of Senior Lead Officer on four occasions, because Defendant City has not shown that those allegations are improper.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) 

The court notes that Defendant City contends that Plaintiff is barred from asserting claims based on actions taken in 2019-2020 because (1) Plaintiff alleges that he filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing on January 22, 2024 (Compl., ¶ 23), but (2) any such complaint alleging claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act “shall not be filed after the expiration of three years from the date upon which the unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred.”  (Gov. Code, § 12960, subd. (e)(5).) However, Defendant City did not establish that Plaintiff’s potential failure to file an administrative complaint within the time required by statute renders the allegation describing conduct taking place in 2019-2020—which, as Plaintiff asserts in opposition, is relevant background information that may establish a pattern of conduct—improper or irrelevant.  Moreover, Defendant City has moved to strike the entire allegations setting forth the alleged discrimination and harassment, including actions that occurred in 2022 and 2023 (Compl., ¶¶ 17-18; Notice of Mot., p. 2:7-12), but did not show that the allegations in their entirety are improper.

Third, the court denies as moot the prayer for punitive damages and related allegations against Defendant City because the clerk dismissed Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages against Defendant City on August 2, 2024, pursuant to the Request for Dismissal that Plaintiff filed on August 1, 2024.  (Request for Dismissal filed Aug. 1, 2024, ¶¶ 1, subd. (6) [requesting dismissal of the “Punitive damages claims to Defendant City of Los Angeles”], 5.)  

DEMURRER FILED BY INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

The court overrules Individual Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth cause of action for harassment on the ground of uncertainty because it is not ambiguous or unintelligible.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)

The court sustains Individual Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth cause of action for harassment on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that Individual Defendants engaged in harassing conduct that was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Martin, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 170 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

MOTION TO STRIKE FILED BY INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

Individual Defendants move the court for an order striking the following from the Complaint: (1) the allegations that Plaintiff (i) was subjected to race, gender, and age discrimination (Compl., ¶ 17), and (ii) was denied the position of Senior Lead Officer on four occasions beginning in 2019 (Compl., ¶ 18), and (2) the prayer for punitive damages and related allegations (Compl., ¶¶ 39-40, 49, 60-61, 69, 77, 84, 91-92; Compl., p. 26:11).

First, the court denies Individual Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations in paragraphs 17-18 because Individual Defendants have not shown, for the reasons set forth in connection with the court’s ruling on Defendant City’s motion to strike, that these allegations are improper.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

Second, the court denies as moot Individual Defendants’ motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages and related allegations against them because the court has sustained Individual Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth cause of action for harassment for the reasons set forth above, which is the only cause of action alleged against Individual Defendants and therefore the only cause of action that may support Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages against them.

ORDER

            The court sustains in part defendant City of Los Angeles’s demurrer to plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s Complaint as follows.

The court sustains defendant City of Los Angeles’s demurrer to plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action.

            The court overrules (1) as moot defendant City of Los Angeles’s demurrer to plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s eighth through 15th causes of action, and (2) defendant City of Los Angeles’s demurrer to plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s first through third and fifth causes of action.

            The court denies defendant City of Los Angeles’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s complaint.

            The court sustains defendants Ahmad Zarekani, Gerald Woodyard, and Alcenda Neal’s demurrer to plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s sixth cause of action for harassment.

            The court denies as moot defendants Ahmad Zarekani, Gerald Woodyard, and Alcenda Neal’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada’s Complaint.

            The court grants plaintiff Michael Anthony Estrada 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the defects in the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action set forth in this order.

            The court orders defendants Ahmad Zarekani, Gerald Woodyard, and Alcenda Neal to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

DATED:  August 15, 2024

 

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court