Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 24STCV12615, Date: 2025-02-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV12615, Date: 2025-02-03 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants City of Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles, erroneously sued and served as Los Angeles Police Department

The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with this demurrer. No opposition papers were filed.

Defendants City of Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles, erroneously sued and served as Los Angeles Police Department (“Defendants”) move the court for an order sustaining their demurrer to the first and second causes of action alleged by plaintiff Brandon Kristopher Smith (“Plaintiff”) in their Complaint.

The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the Complaint on the ground that Plaintiff has not identified statutory liability of Defendants as required because Plaintiff (1) has alleged, in connection with the first cause of action for negligence, that Defendants’ conduct “is consistent with maintaining a nuisance on public property, as outlined in CA Government Code Sections 815.2, 835 and 835.2[,]” which the court construes to allege liability pursuant to those statutes,[1] and (2) has incorporated all preceding allegations, including the allegation referencing those statutes, in support of the second cause of action for premises liability, therefore alleging statutory liability under those statutes in support of the second cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Compl., pp. PLD-PI-001(2), PLD-PI-001(4); Hernandez v. City of Stockton (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1229 [“Under the Government Claims Act, ‘there is no such thing as common law tort liability for public entities; a public entity is not liable for an injury “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute” ’”].)

The court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action for negligence and second cause of action for premises liability, which appear to be based on the same theory of premises liability based on the citation to Government Code section 835, because they do not state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action since Plaintiff has not alleged a dangerous condition of Defendants’ property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Gov. Code, § 835.)

“A public entity may be liable for a dangerous condition of public property even where the immediate cause of plaintiff’s injury is a third party’s negligent or illegal act if some physical characteristic of the property exposes its users to increased danger from third party negligence or criminality.” (Summerfield v. City of Inglewood (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 983, 994.) “‘ “[T]hird party conduct, by itself, unrelated to the condition of the property, does not constitute a ‘dangerous condition’ for which a public entity may be held liable.” ’” (Ibid.) Instead, “[t]here must be some defect in the physical condition of the property and that defect must have some causal relationship to the third party conduct that injures the plaintiff.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that the physical condition of the subject property—i.e., the area “next to Larchmont Charter School, Selma Campus”—“‘increased or intensified’ the dangers to users [i.e., Plaintiff] from third party conduct [i.e., the individuals at the alleged encampment].” (Compl., p. PLD-PI-001(2); Summerfield, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 994.) Instead, Plaintiff has alleged only the existence of an unlawful encampment, at which individuals openly used drugs, blocked use of a sidewalk, and subsequently attacked Plaintiff. (Compl., p. PLD-PI-001(2).) Plaintiff did not allege that some physical characteristic of the property increased the risk that it would be used by third parties in such a manner and that posed a risk of danger to other users of the property, including Plaintiff. At most, Plaintiff has alleged harmful third-party conduct based on the allegation that individuals attacked Plaintiff on the property, which is insufficient to allege the existence of a dangerous condition of property. (Ibid.; Summerfield, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 994.)

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that there existed a dangerous condition at Defendants’ property. (Gov. Code, § 835.)

The burden is on the plaintiff “to articulate how it could amend its pleading to render it sufficient.”¿ (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290.)¿ To satisfy that burden, a plaintiff “must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.”¿ (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendants’ demurrer or other papers with the court to identify the facts that he could allege to cure the defects with his first and second causes of action. Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to articulate how he could amend his Complaint to render it sufficient against Defendants and therefore sustains the demurrer without leave to amend.

The court sustains defendants City of Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles, erroneously sued and served as Los Angeles Police Department’s demurrer to plaintiff Brandon Kristopher Smith’s Complaint without leave to amend.

The court orders defendants City of Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles, erroneously sued and served as Los Angeles Police Department to prepare, serve, and lodge a proposed order of dismissal within 10 days from the date of this ruling.

The court vacates (1) the trial set for May 27, 2026, and (2) the Final Status Conference set for May 15, 2026.

The court sets an Order to Show Cause re dismissal (after sustaining demurrer without leave to amend) for hearing on June 10, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 53.

The court orders defendants City of Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles, erroneously sued and served as Los Angeles Police Department to give notice of this ruling.

[1] The court notes that, despite Plaintiff’s reference to a nuisance, these statutes do not impose liability on a public entity defendant for maintaining a nuisance. Section 815 sets forth the general rule that public entities are not liable for an injury. (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) Section 835 provides that a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property under certain circumstances, and section 835.2 concerns notice of such a dangerous condition. (Gov. Code, § 835.) Thus, section 835 provides for liability against Defendants based on a dangerous condition of their property. The court therefore evaluates whether Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action under that theory irrespective of Plaintiff’s reference to a nuisance.

brandon kristopher smith ; Plaintiff, vs. city of los angeles , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	24STCV12615

	Hearing Date:	February 3, 2025

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[tentative] Order RE: defendants’ demurrer to complaint