Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV13581, Date: 2025-01-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV13581    Hearing Date: January 24, 2025    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTIES:              Defendants Descartes Financial Corporation and Descartes Financial Ltd.        

RESPONDING PARTIES:    Plaintiffs Graciela Fernandez, Armando Fernandez, Courtney Abrams, and Damunique Ledane Wilson

(1)   Demurrer to Complaint

(2)   Motion to Strike Complaint

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court grants defendants Descartes Financial Corporation and Descartes Financial Ltd.’s request for judicial notice, filed on September 16, 2024 in support of the demurrer.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924, n. 1 [trial court properly granted judicial notice of recorded documents].)

The court denies defendants Descartes Financial Corporation and Descartes Financial Ltd.’s request for judicial notice, filed on September 16, 2024 in support of their motion to strike, because that matter is not relevant to the court’s disposition of the motion to strike.  (Malek Media Group LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 825.)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Graciela Fernandez, Armando Fernandez, Courtney Abrams, Jacob Rose, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Courtney Abrams, Damunique Ledane Wilson, Janae Gomez, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem Damunique Ledane Wilson, Ja’Saih Gomez, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Damunique Ledane Wilson, Khylee Wilson, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Damunique Ledane Wilson, and Ayanna Wilson, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Damunique Ledane Wilson (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this breach of warranty of habitability action on May 31, 2024 against defendants Descartes Financial Corporation, Descartes Financial Ltd., and 3900 South Nicolet Ave., LLC.

Defendants Descartes Financial Corporation and Descartes Financial Ltd. (“Defendants”) now move the court for an order (1) sustaining their demurrer to the fourth, fifth, and seventh causes of action, as alleged by plaintiffs Graciela Fernandez, Armando Fernandez, Courtney Abrams, and Damunique Ledane Wilson (collectively, “Adult Plaintiffs”), and the request for treble damages alleged in support of the second cause of action, and (2) striking from the Complaint the fourth, fifth, and seventh causes of action in their entirety as well as Plaintiffs’ request for treble damages in the second cause of action.   

DEMURRER

The court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action for negligence because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Defendants have shown, on the face of the Complaint and the judicially noticed grant deed, that this cause of action is necessarily barred by the two-year statute of limitations because (1) Adult Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants, “[a]s landowners and/or managers of land,” owed, but breached, a duty of care in managing the subject property, but (2) the (i) Complaint alleges that Defendants were the owners and managers of the subject apartment building only through October 5, 2021, and (ii) grant deed recorded on October 5, 2021, of which the court has taken judicial notice, provides that defendant Descartes Financial Ltd. granted to nonmoving defendant 300 South Nicolet Ave., LLC the subject property, such that (3) the alleged breaches of Defendants’ duties as owners or managers of the land necessarily must have occurred before October 5, 2021 (i.e., the date on which Adult Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants owned and managed the property), which is more than two years before the date that Adult Plaintiffs filed this action on May 31, 2024.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10, subd. (e), 335.1 [the statute of limitations for “injury to . . . an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” is two years]; Compl., ¶¶ 1 [“Defendants Descartes Financial Ltd., a limited partnership, since on or about October 5, 2021 to October 5, 2021; and Descartes Financial Corporation, a stock corporation, from all relevant periods prior to October 5, 2021, were the owners and manager of an apartment building with APN 5030-008-009 . . . .”], 27 [alleging duty and breach of duty based on Defendants’ “mis-manag[ing] the property” and negligently using and maintaining the property]; RJN Ex. No. A, Grant Deed, p. 2 [granting assessor’s parcel number 5030-008-009]; SLPR, LLC v. San Diego Unified Port District (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 284, 321 [“if on the face of the complaint a statute of limitations bars the action, a general demurrer must be sustained”].)  

The court notes that Adult Plaintiffs have argued, in their opposition papers, that this cause of action is based on a contract (i.e., Defendants’ breach of the underlying lease), such that the four-year statute of limitations applies to this cause of action.  (Opp., p. 4:14-26.)  The court disagrees.  Adult Plaintiffs did not allege that Defendants negligently carried out their duties pursuant to a contract or lease agreement, and instead have generally alleged that Defendants owed a duty to exercise due care in the management of the subject property based on common law and Civil Code section 1714.  (Compl., ¶ 27.)

            The court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4 because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Defendants have shown, on the face of the Complaint and the matters of which the court has taken judicial notice, that this cause of action is necessarily barred by the one-year statute of limitations because (1) the Complaint and judicially noticed matters show that Defendants did not own or manage the subject property beyond October 5, 2021, such that (2) Defendants could not have demanded, collected, or issued a notice of a rent increase to Adult Plaintiffs beyond that date despite Adult Plaintiffs’ general allegations that all of the named defendants issued notices on, inter alia, March 9, 2022, March 13, 2023, and July 27, 2023 and that violations have continued through the present, and therefore (3) this action is barred by the statute of limitations since Plaintiffs filed this action more than one year after Defendants’ alleged issuances of the notices on December 10, 2019, April 28, 2020, and May 3, 2021.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10, subd. (e), 340, subd. (a) [the statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual,” is one year]; Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (b)(1) [“[a] landlord who violates this section is liable to the tenant or lessee for the actual damages sustained by the tenant or lessee and special damages of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000)”]; SLPR, LLC, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 321; Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 978 [“Generally, section 340, subdivision (a) applies if a civil penalty is mandatory”]; Compl., ¶¶ 1, 32.)  

Further, although Adult Plaintiffs have argued that the discovery rule applies, they did not allege facts establishing that they did not discover or have reason to discover Defendants’ alleged violations of this statute within one year of the filing of this action.  (Opp., pp. 5:23-6:9; Eisenberg Village of Los Angeles Jewish Home for the Aging v. Suffolk Construction Company (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1201, 1213 [“Under the discovery rule, accrual of a qualifying cause of action is postponed ‘until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action, until, that is, [the plaintiff] at least suspects, or has reason to suspect, a factual basis for its elements’”].)

            The court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh cause of action for violation of the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance because Defendants have not shown that this cause of action is necessarily barred by the statute of limitations.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); SLPR, LLC, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 321.)  The court acknowledges, as Defendants have pointed out, that the Complaint and judicially noticed matters show that Defendants did not own or manage the subject property beyond the date of October 5, 2021, such that Defendants, as the owners and managers of the property, could not have engaged in the harassment of Plaintiffs after that date.  (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 40 [alleging that Defendants “have, during their duties as owners and managers, knowingly and willfully harassed Plaintiffs”] [emphasis added].)  However, Defendants have not shown that the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance has a statute of limitations of one year. 

As noted by Defendants, causes of action based on statutes that “provide for mandatory recovery of damages additional to actual losses incurred, such as treble damages, are considered penal in nature, and thus are governed by the one-year limitations period under section 340, subdivision 1.”  (Menefee v. Ostawari (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 239, 243; Shamsian, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 978.)  While the court acknowledges that the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance provides for the recovery “of civil penalties up to $10,000 per violation depending upon” various factors, it does not mandate the imposition of civil penalties; instead, the ordinance allows for the imposition of penalties pursuant to the court’s discretion.  (Los Angeles Municipal Code, Chapter IV, Art. 5.3, § 45.35, subds. (B) [a prevailing tenant “may be awarded  . . . civil penalties up to $10,000 per violation . . . .”] [emphasis added], (C) [if a prevailing tenant is older than 65 years or disabled, “the court may impose additional civil penalties . . . .”] [emphasis added].)  Thus, because the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance does not provide for the “mandatory recovery of damages additional to the actual losses incurred,” it is not governed by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in section 340, subdivision (a).  (Menefee, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 243 emphasis added]; Ibid. [“Where a statute vests the trial court with the discretionary option of awarding treble damages [or other penalties] in addition to actual damages, a claim based upon such statute is not governed by section 340, subdivision (1)”].)

The court therefore finds that Defendants have not shown that this cause of action is, on the face of the Complaint, necessarily barred by the statute of limitations.

Finally, the court notes that Defendants have also argued, in their demurrer, that the second cause of action does not state facts sufficient to support Plaintiffs’ claim for treble damages.  However, such an argument is improper on demurrer because it does not show that the second cause of action does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but instead challenges propriety of the request for a remedy.  (Dem., p. 8:16-25; Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1562 [“a demurrer tests the sufficiency of the factual allegations of the complaint rather than the relief suggested in the prayer of the complaint”]; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 7:42.1 [“A motion to strike, not a general demurrer, is the procedure to attack an improper claim for punitive damages or other remedy demanded in the complaint”].)

MOTION TO STRIKE

The court denies as moot Defendants’ request to strike the fourth and fifth causes of action because the court has sustained Defendants’ demurrer thereto. 

The court denies Defendants’ request to strike the seventh cause of action because Defendants have not shown, for the reasons set forth in connection with the ruling on Defendants’ demurrer, that it is barred by the statute of limitations.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

The court grants Defendants’ request to strike the request for treble damages, as set forth in paragraph 18 in connection with the second cause of action for breach of statutory warranty of habitability and as alleged by all Plaintiffs, because (1) the statutes on which Plaintiffs base this cause of action do not authorize the recovery of treble damages, and (2) in their opposition papers, Plaintiffs (i) have not cited authority establishing that they may recover treble damages in connection with this cause of action, and (ii) have only cited Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, which, while finding that a tenant may state tort causes of action for breach of the warranty of habitability, does not stand for the proposition that a tenant may recover treble damages.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Civ. Code, §§ 1941 [requiring lessors to put buildings into a condition fit for such occupation], 1941.1 [listing characteristics that untenable dwellings lack]; Health & Safety Code, § 17920.3 [setting forth conditions of substandard building]; Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 918 [finding that “a tenant may state a cause of action in tort against his landlord for damages resulting from a breach of the implied warranty of habitability”].)

The court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown how they may amend their request for treble damages to render it sufficient against Defendants.  (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290 [The burden is on the plaintiff “to articulate how it could amend its pleading to render it sufficient”].)  The court therefore grants Defendants’ motion to strike the request for treble damages without leave to amend.

ORDER

            The court sustains defendants Descartes Financial Corporation and Descartes Financial Ltd.’s demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action, as alleged by plaintiffs Graciela Fernandez, Armando Fernandez, Courtney Abrams, and Damunique Ledane Wilson, with leave to amend.

            The court overrules defendants Descartes Financial Corporation and Descartes Financial Ltd.’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action, as alleged by plaintiffs Graciela Fernandez, Armando Fernandez, Courtney Abrams, and Damunique Ledane Wilson.

            The court grants in part defendants Descartes Financial Corporation and Descartes Financial Ltd.’s motion to strike as follows.

            The court orders that “treble damages,” as set forth on page 8, between lines 25-26 of the Complaint, as filed by plaintiffs Graciela Fernandez, Armando Fernandez, Courtney Abrams, Jacob Rose, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Courtney Abrams, Damunique Ledane Wilson, Janae Gomez, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem Damunique Ledane Wilson, Ja’Saih Gomez, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Damunique Ledane Wilson, Khylee Wilson, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Damunique Ledane Wilson, and Ayanna Wilson, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Damunique Ledane Wilson, is stricken without leave to amend.

            The court grants plaintiffs Graciela Fernandez, Armando Fernandez, Courtney Abrams, and Damunique Ledane Wilson 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the defects with the fourth and fifth causes of action set forth in this ruling.

            The court orders defendants Descartes Financial Corporation and Descartes Financial Ltd. to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  January 24, 2025

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court