Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV17156, Date: 2024-11-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV17156 Hearing Date: November 8, 2024 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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24STCV17156 |
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November
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[tentative]
Order RE: plaintiffs’ motion for leave to conduct
limited discovery |
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MOVING PARTIES: Plaintiffs LA Forward Institute,
Sylvia Aroth, Kathleen L. Coates, and Gary Willimas
RESPONDING PARTIES: Defendants City of Los Angeles, on behalf of
itself and its component parts, erroneously named as Los Angeles City Council,
Los Angeles Housing Department, and the Los Angeles Department of
Transportation
Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery
The court
considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with
this motion.[1]
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
The court sustains defendants
City of Los Angeles, on behalf of itself and its component parts, erroneously
named as Los Angeles City Council, Los Angeles Housing Department, and the Los
Angeles Department of Transportation’s evidentiary objections to the
declaration of Katherine J.G. McKeon, filed on November 1, 2024. (Jack v. Ring LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
1186, 1210 [the general rule of motion practice is that new evidence is not
permitted with reply papers].)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs LA Forward Institute, Sylvia Aroth, Kathleen L. Coates, and
Gary Williams (“Plaintiffs”) move the court for an order granting them leave to
conduct limited discovery pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,
subdivision (g) by taking the depositions of Meredith Abood and Juliet Oh in
order to oppose the special motion to strike that was filed by defendants City
of Los Angeles, on behalf of itself and its component parts, erroneously named
as Los Angeles City Council, Los Angeles Housing Department, and the Los
Angeles Department of Transportation (“Defendants”).
“All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the
filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this section. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect
until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. The court, on noticed motion and for good
cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding
this subdivision.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
425.16, subd. (g).) “To establish good
cause, the plaintiff must file a noticed motion identifying the specific
discovery sought and showing that this discovery is ‘ “needed . . . to
establish a prima facie case” ’ and ‘ “tailored to that end.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Murray v. Tran (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 10, 37 [internal citation
omitted].)
The court finds that Plaintiffs have established good cause to take
the depositions of Meredith Abood and Juliet Oh because Plaintiffs have
presented argument and evidence showing that (1) Plaintiffs seek to question
the deponents about “what the City has been doing or, more accurately, not
doing, to advance the [Venice Dell Community] Project in these four areas on
the causes of delay on the City’s part[,]” which (2) will support Plaintiffs’
prima facie case because, for example, their testimony is relevant (i) to making
a prima facie showing that Defendants’ conduct to obstruct and delay the
subject project violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and (ii) to making
a prima facie showing that Defendants did not administer its programs and
activities relating to housing development in a manner to affirmatively further
fair housing. (Mot., pp. 12:24-26,
13:7-16, 14:1-6; Gov. Code, §§ 12955.8, subd. (a) [“Proof of an intentional
violation of this article includes, but is not limited to, an act or failure to
act that is otherwise covered by this part, that demonstrates an intent to
discriminate in any manner in violation of this part[,]” which includes if
race, color, or source of income is a motivating factor in committing a
discriminatory housing practice], 8899.50, subd. (b)(1); Compl., ¶¶ 123, 126
[alleging violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act], 147-149 [alleging
that Defendants have taken an action materially inconsistent with its
obligation to affirmatively further fair housing]; Larson Decl., ¶ 15
[explaining that information is not publicly available because “the topics
[that] Plaintiffs seek to discover through the two depositions relate to the
internal, behind-the-scenes City policies, practices, actions taken, reasons
why actions were taken or not taken, and formal and informal orders from
leadership . . . .”].)
The court notes that, in opposition, Defendants assert that this
evidence is not necessary or tailored to the issues raised by their special
motion to strike because they have challenged, in their motion, the legal
sufficiency of the Complaint. (Opp., p.
10:10-21; The Garment Workers Center v. Superior Court (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 1156, 1162 [noting that if a “defendant contends the plaintiff
cannot establish a probability of success on the merits because its complaint
is legally deficient, no amount of discovery will cure that defect”] [internal
footnote omitted].) The court
acknowledges that Defendants’ special motion to strike argues that the
Complaint is legally deficient. (Def.
Special Mot. to Strike, pp. 15:5-16:5 [arguing that Plaintiff does not have
standing], 16:6-18:10 [arguing the controversy is not ripe], 18:11-19:2
[arguing privilege], 19:3-20:11 [arguing misjoinder].) To address those issues, Plaintiffs may not rely
on the discovery sought. However, in
order for Plaintiffs to meet their burden on the second prong, Plaintiffs will
be required to show both that the Complaint (1) is legally sufficient and
states facts sufficient to constitute causes of action, and (2) is
supported by facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case. (Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 181, 200 [“To meet this burden under the second prong of the
statute, ‘the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both
legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of
facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the
plaintiff is credited.” [Citations.]’”] [emphasis
added].) Thus, Plaintiffs must still
present evidence, on the second prong, sufficient to show that they have a
likelihood of success on the merits, such that the discovery requested is
necessary to oppose Defendants’ special motion to strike. (Ibid.)
The court therefore grants Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to conduct
limited discovery to take the depositions of Meredith Abood and Juliet Oh,
limited to questioning on the “internal, behind-the-scenes City policies,
practices, actions taken, reasons why actions were taken or not taken, and
formal and informal orders from leadership” as it relates to the Venice Dell
Community Project. (Larson Decl., ¶ 15;
Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (g).)
ORDER
The court grants plaintiffs
LA Forward Institute, Sylvia Aroth, Kathleen L. Coates, and Gary Williams’s
motion for leave to conduct limited discovery.
The court orders that plaintiffs LA
Forward Institute, Sylvia Aroth, Kathleen L. Coates, and Gary Williams may take
the depositions of Meredith Abood and Juliet Oh regarding internal,
behind-the-scenes City policies, practices, actions taken, reasons why actions
were taken or not taken, and formal and informal orders from leadership as it
relates to the Venice Dell Community Project.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (g).)
The court orders plaintiffs LA
Forward Institute, Sylvia Aroth, Kathleen L. Coates, and Gary Williams to give
notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1] The
court notes that, although the declaration filed in support of the reply was
filed on November 1, 2024, the reply brief was not filed with the court until
November 5, 2024. However, because the
moving plaintiffs served their reply brief on the parties on November 1, 2024,
i.e., five court days before the hearing on this motion, the court has
considered the reply. (Nov. 1, 2024
Proof of Service.)