Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV18772, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV18772    Hearing Date: April 30, 2025    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

 

 

carlos vasquez ;

 

Plaintiff,

 

 

vs.

 

 

county of los angeles , et al.;

 

Defendants.

Case No.:

24STCV18772

 

 

Hearing Date:

April 30, 2025

 

 

Time:

10:00 a.m.

 

 

 

[tentative] Order RE:

 

defendant’s motion to strike portions of complaint for damages

 

 

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Authority           

 

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Carlos Vasquez

Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint for Damages

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Carlos Vasquez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on July 29, 2024, alleging against defendants County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority two causes of action for (1) motor vehicle negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent undertaking, negligent retention, negligent supervision and negligent training, and (2) negligence per se.

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Defendant”) now moves the court for an order striking from the Complaint the allegations of negligent and reckless entrusting, managing, maintaining, driving, operating, owning, leasing, controlling, retaining, and training, as set forth in portions of paragraphs 11, 14, 15, 16, 17B, 17C, and 17D.

The court grants Defendant’s motion to strike because Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendant may be held liable for negligent entrustment, hiring, undertaking, retention, supervision, and training since Plaintiff has not identified a statutory basis for Defendant’s liability on those grounds, such that the allegations regarding Defendant’s liability under those theories are improper.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Gov. Code, §§ 815, 815.2; de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 252 (de Villers) [“We find no relevant case law approving a claim for direct liability based on a public entity’s allegedly negligent hiring and supervision practices”], 253 [“there is no statutory basis for declaring a governmental entity liable for negligence in its hiring and supervision practices”].)

 The court notes that, in his opposition papers, Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court clarified, in C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, that public entities may be held liable for negligent hiring, training, and supervision in certain circumstances under Government Code section 815.2.  (Opp., p. 5:14-19.)  The court acknowledges that the C.A. Court concluded that the public entity defendant could be vicariously liable under section 815.2 on the ground that the plaintiff alleged that its employees knew or should have known of the subject guidance counselor’s dangerous propensities, but nevertheless hired, retained, and failed to properly supervise her.  (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 865, 875.)  But the Supreme Court (1) noted that de Villers was distinguishable because, there, no employee had the responsibility, within the scope of their employment, to prevent the subject murder, but (2) in contrast, school personnel have a duty to protect students from harm, including an obligation to exercise ordinary care in hiring, training, supervising, and discharging school personnel, such that a school district is liable for the negligence of an administrator who hires a known child molester as a guidance counselor and fails to provide adequate training, supervision, or termination when faced with ongoing sexual misconduct.  (de Villers, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 249 [“When assessing a claim for vicarious liability against a government employer based on the acts or omissions of its employee, a court must examine whether the employee who acted or failed to act would have been personally liable for the injury.  [Citations.]  We are convinced Rossum’s coworkers would not have been liable for de Villers’s death because they had no duty to prevent Rossum from murdering de Villers, and therefore plaintiffs’ claim of vicarious liability is not viable”] [internal citations omitted]; C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 874.)  Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that any of Defendant’s employees are liable for Plaintiff’s injuries based on a duty owed to Plaintiff to exercise ordinary care in hiring, training, supervising, or discharging the Metro bus driver.  (Ibid.)  Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations of Defendant’s alleged negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision are not viable and therefore are improper.

ORDER

            The court grants defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff Carlos Vasquez’s Complaint.

            The court grants plaintiff Carlos Vasquez 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the defects set forth in this order.

            The court orders defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

DATED:  April 30, 2025

 

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court





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