Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV18772, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV18772 Hearing Date: April 30, 2025 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
53
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Case
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24STCV18772 |
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Hearing
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April
30, 2025 |
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[tentative]
Order RE: defendant’s motion to strike portions of
complaint for damages |
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Authority
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Carlos Vasquez
Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint for Damages
The court
considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with
this motion.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff Carlos Vasquez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on July 29,
2024, alleging against defendants County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority two causes of action for (1) motor
vehicle negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent
undertaking, negligent retention, negligent supervision and negligent training,
and (2) negligence per se.
Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(“Defendant”) now moves the court for an order striking from the Complaint the
allegations of negligent and reckless entrusting, managing, maintaining,
driving, operating, owning, leasing, controlling, retaining, and training, as
set forth in portions of paragraphs 11, 14, 15, 16, 17B, 17C, and 17D.
The court grants Defendant’s motion to strike because Plaintiff
has not alleged facts establishing that Defendant may be held liable for
negligent entrustment, hiring, undertaking, retention, supervision, and
training since Plaintiff has not identified a statutory basis for Defendant’s
liability on those grounds, such that the allegations regarding Defendant’s
liability under those theories are improper.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Gov. Code, §§ 815, 815.2; de
Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 252 (de
Villers) [“We find no relevant case law approving a claim for direct
liability based on a public entity’s allegedly negligent hiring and supervision
practices”], 253 [“there is no statutory basis for declaring a governmental
entity liable for negligence in its hiring and supervision practices”].)
The court notes that, in his
opposition papers, Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court clarified, in C.A.
v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, that public
entities may be held liable for negligent hiring, training, and supervision in
certain circumstances under Government Code section 815.2. (Opp., p. 5:14-19.) The court acknowledges that the C.A. Court
concluded that the public entity defendant could be vicariously liable under
section 815.2 on the ground that the plaintiff alleged that its employees knew
or should have known of the subject guidance counselor’s dangerous propensities,
but nevertheless hired, retained, and failed to properly supervise her. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp.
865, 875.) But the Supreme Court (1)
noted that de Villers was distinguishable because, there, no employee
had the responsibility, within the scope of their employment, to prevent the
subject murder, but (2) in contrast, school personnel have a duty to protect
students from harm, including an obligation to exercise ordinary care in
hiring, training, supervising, and discharging school personnel, such that a
school district is liable for the negligence of an administrator who hires a
known child molester as a guidance counselor and fails to provide adequate training,
supervision, or termination when faced with ongoing sexual misconduct. (de Villers, supra, 156
Cal.App.4th at p. 249 [“When assessing a claim for vicarious liability against
a government employer based on the acts or omissions of its employee, a court
must examine whether the employee who acted or failed to act would have been
personally liable for the injury.
[Citations.] We are convinced
Rossum’s coworkers would not have been liable for de Villers’s death because
they had no duty to prevent Rossum from murdering de Villers, and therefore
plaintiffs’ claim of vicarious liability is not viable”] [internal citations
omitted]; C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 874.) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts
establishing that any of Defendant’s employees are liable for Plaintiff’s
injuries based on a duty owed to Plaintiff to exercise ordinary care in hiring,
training, supervising, or discharging the Metro bus driver. (Ibid.) Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations of Defendant’s
alleged negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision are not viable
and therefore are improper.
ORDER
The court grants defendant Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s motion to strike
portions of plaintiff Carlos Vasquez’s Complaint.
The court grants plaintiff Carlos
Vasquez 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the defects
set forth in this order.
The court orders defendant Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority to give notice of this
ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court