Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 24STCV19763, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV19763, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

The court rules on defendant Ross Stores, Inc.’s evidentiary objection, filed on April 23, 2025, as follows:

Defendant Ross Stores, Inc. (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order (1) compelling plaintiff Carlos Hardy (“Plaintiff”) to submit the claims alleged in his Complaint to binding arbitration, and (2) staying this action pending completion of arbitration.

As a threshold matter, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C § 1 et seq.) governs this motion because the arbitration agreement that is the subject of this motion expressly states that it “is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act . . . .”[1] (Cheng Decl., Ex. A, Dispute Res. Agreement, p. 1; Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 345 [parties may, in accordance with choice-of-law principles, adopt the more restrictive procedural provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act]; Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 222, 241, rev. granted Aug. 21, 2024, S285696 [finding that the statement “‘this agreement is governed by the FAA’” “is broad, encompassing both the procedural and substantive provisions of the FAA”].) The court, however, notes that it applies general California contract law to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties. (Mar v. Perkins (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 201, 212 [“[T]he existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement is established under state law principles involving formation, revocation and enforcement of contracts generally”] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; Weeks v. Interactive Life Forms, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1089 [“The FAA ordinarily defers to state law on questions of contract formation, unless state law fails ‘to place arbitration agreements “on equal footing with all other contracts”’”].)

“‘ “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, while the party opposing the petition bears the burden of establishing a defense to the agreement’s enforcement.” ’”¿ (Beco v. Fast Auto Loans (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 292, 302.)¿ To determine the existence of an arbitration agreement, the court uses “a three-step burden-shifting process.”¿ (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755.)¿ “The arbitration proponent must first recite verbatim, or provide a copy of, the alleged agreement.¿ [Citations.]¿ A movant can bear this initial burden ‘by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signature.’”¿ (Ibid. [internal citations omitted].)¿ “If the movant bears its initial burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to identify a factual dispute as to the agreement’s existence . . . .”¿ (Ibid.)¿ If the opposing party meets its burden to “submit sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute” as to the existence of the agreement, the burden shifts back to the arbitration proponent, who retains the ultimate burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.¿ (Ibid.)

First, the court finds that Defendant has met its initial burden to attach a copy of an arbitration agreement that purports to bear the electronic signature of Plaintiff because Defendant has submitted its Dispute Resolution Agreement (the “Agreement”), which (1) states that the parties agree to resolve any covered disputes by binding arbitration, and (2) sets forth the typed name of Plaintiff. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755; Cheng Decl., Ex. A, Agreement, pp. 1, 2 [signature page].)

Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to identify a factual dispute as to the validity of his electronic signature on the Agreement. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.)

In his opposition to this motion, Plaintiff contends that he did not agree to arbitration because (1) he did not sign the Agreement as required by its express terms, such that assent cannot be presumed, and (2) he did not agree to be bound by the Agreement since he “printed,” rather than “signed,” his name. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (Alchemy Filmworks, Inc.) (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 359 [“when the parties to a proposed contract have themselves fixed the manner in which their assent is to be manifested, an assent thereto, in any other or different mode, will not be presumed”] [internal emphasis, quotation marks, and citation omitted].) The court disagrees.

The court acknowledges, as raised by Plaintiff, that the Agreement states that, “by me [i.e., Plaintiff’s] electronically signing this and [Defendant’s] printed name below, both [Defendant] and I [i.e., Plaintiff] agree to comply with and be bound to such.” (Cheng Decl., Ex. A, Agreement, p. 2.) The court further acknowledges that Plaintiff’s name appears only above the line stating “Print Name[,]” and that Plaintiff has asserted that he did not intend to sign the Agreement by printing his name above that line. (Ibid.; Hardy Decl., ¶ 2.) However, Defendant has submitted evidence showing that Plaintiff intended that the act of typing his name on the Agreement was intended to be his legal signature, which Plaintiff did not rebut with competent evidence and adequate argument, analysis, and authority.

Defendant has submitted the declaration of its Senior Director of Human Resources Information Systems & Analytics, Dan Stock, in which Stock states the following: (1) new hires are sent a link to Defendant’s onboarding system and are thereafter prompted to create a new personal password for the onboarding process that is different from the password created for the online applicant process; (2) neither Stock nor any of Defendant’s personnel have access to those passwords; (3) new hires electronically sign various documents, including Defendant’s Dispute Resolution Agreement; (4) to electronically sign Defendant’s on-boarding documents, “new hires must agree to sign the required documents using electronic technology[,]” which they do by “checking the box marked: [¶] I [employee’s name] agree to sign these electronic PDF documents using ‘click’ signature technology. I understand that a record of each document and my signing of it will be stored in electronic code. I intend both the signature I inscribe with the ‘click’ signature technology and the electronic record of it to be my legal signature to the document[;]” and (5) after a new hire has “checked” his agreement to sign the on-boarding documents electronically, the on-boarding system presents to the new hire the on-boarding documents that must be reviewed and signed. (Stock Decl., ¶¶ 1, 4-5.)

Plaintiff did not refute, in his declaration, that (1) he checked the box on the “Electronic Signature” agreement page stating that he intended that any signature inscribed with the click signature technology be his legal signature on the documents, or (2) he used the click signature technology to input his name on the Agreement. (Cheng Decl., Ex. A, p. 3 [page stating that the Dispute Resolution Agreement task was “Completed”]; Stock Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7 [a completed notation only attaches to an onboarding document “if the employee clicked his or her electronic agreement to that document during the on-boarding process after inputting his or her personal on-board password on the system’s ‘Electronic Signature’ agreement page”].) Plaintiff also did not submit evidence establishing that he was able to access and sign the on-boarding documents (including the Agreement) without clicking the box on the Electronic Signature agreement page, such that the court could determine that Plaintiff did not check that box, and therefore did not intend for the inscribed signature to constitute his legal signature, before electronically typing his name on the Agreement.

In light of the evidence described above and Plaintiff’s failure to adequately rebut such evidence, the court finds that Plaintiff’s statement that he “did not intend to sign the subject arbitration agreement by printing [his] name above the ‘Print Name’ line” is not credible. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 2.) The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that (1) he did not intend to sign the Agreement, such that the electronic typing of his name does not constitute a signature thereon, and (2) he did not assent to the Agreement in the manner fixed thereby, since the court concludes that Plaintiff’s act of typing his name constitutes his electronic signature. (Civ. Code, § 1633.2, subd. (h) [electronic signature is an electronic symbol attached to or logically associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted “by a person with the intent to sign the electronic record”].)

Third, the court finds that Defendant has shown that the Agreement encompasses the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint because (1) the Agreement defines covered claims to include “any and all disputes between [Plaintiff] and [Defendant] and between [Plaintiff] and any other [Defendant] Associate, agent, or employee of [Defendant], arising out of or related to [Plaintiff’s] employment or separation of employment from [Defendant], regardless of who initiates the claim[,]” and (2) Plaintiff’s causes of action for employment discrimination and failure to prevent discrimination arise out of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant.[2] (Cheng Decl., Ex. A, Agreement, p. 1; Compl., ¶¶ 26 and 38 [Defendant refused to promote Plaintiff due to his race, color, ethnicity, ancestry, and hair style], 38 [Defendant failed to prevent and remedy discrimination to which Plaintiff was subjected as Defendant’s employee].)

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there exists an agreement to arbitrate this controversy. The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion.

The court grants defendant Ross Stores, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration and stay or dismiss proceedings.

The court orders (1) defendant Ross Stores, Inc. and plaintiff Carlos Hardy to arbitrate the claims alleged in plaintiff Carlos Hardy’s Complaint, and (2) this action is stayed until arbitration is completed.

The court sets for hearing an Order to Show Cause re completion of arbitration on December 9, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 53.

[1] Plaintiff does not argue that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply in his opposition papers.

[2] The court disagrees with Plaintiff’s assertion that the Agreement omits from its scope claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act due to its reference to discrimination claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because (1) the Agreement expressly provides, as set forth above, that it includes any and all disputes between the parties relating to Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, and (2) the covered claims listed in the Agreement are illustrative, not exclusive. (Cheng Decl., Ex. A, Agreement, p. 1 [“Covered Disputes include, but are not limited to . . . discrimination and claims based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964”] [emphasis added].)

carlos hardy ; Plaintiff, vs. ross stores, inc. , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	24STCV19763

	Hearing Date:	April 30, 2025

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[tentative] Order RE: defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay or dismiss proceedings