Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV21251, Date: 2025-01-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV21251    Hearing Date: January 23, 2025    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

 

 

peter trifunovich ;

 

Plaintiff,

 

 

vs.

 

 

mandeep sidhu , et al.;

 

Defendants.

Case No.:

24STCV21251

 

 

Hearing Date:

January 23, 2025

 

 

Time:

10:00 a.m.

 

 

 

[tentative] Order RE:

 

defendant’s motion (1) to expunge notice of pendency of action, or alternatively, (2) to maintain the notice of pendency of action conditioned upon an undertaking, and (3) for an award of attorney’s fees

 

 

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendant Mandeep Sidhu    

 

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Peter Trifunovich

Motion (1) to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action or Alternatively, (2) to Maintain the Notice of Pendency of Action Conditioned Upon an Undertaking, and (3) for an Award of Attorney’s Fees

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

DISCUSSION

Defendant Mandeep Sidhu (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order (1) expunging the Notice of Pendency of Action, recorded by plaintiff Peter Trifunovich (“Plaintiff”) on September 17, 2024, or in the alternative, (2) maintaining the Notice of Pendency of Action conditioned upon Plaintiff posting a bond in the amount of $485,857.55, and (3) awarding attorney’s fees in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff in the amount of $3,500.  (Sidhu Decl., Ex. 6, Notice of Pendency of Action.)

“‘A lis pendens is a recorded document giving constructive notice that an action has been filed affecting title or right to possession of the real property described in the notice.’”¿ (Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642, 647.)¿ Any time after a notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party or nonparty with an interest in the real property affected thereby may move the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice.¿ (Code Civ. Pro., § 405.30.) The court must order the notice expunged if the court finds any of the following: the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim; the claimant has not established by preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim; or the real property claim has probable validity, but adequate relief can be secured by the giving of an undertaking.¿ (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 405.31-405.33.)¿ 

The court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of his real property claims for quiet title and declaratory relief based on the existence of an oral partnership agreement between himself and Defendant to purchase the subject property, pursuant to which Plaintiff would remain the beneficial owner thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32; De Martini v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1269, 1279 [“Unlike other motions, nonmoving parties must demonstrate the existence or probable validity of their real property claims”]; Compl., ¶¶ 23-24 [requesting declaratory relief to ascertain rights and duties with respect to the subject property], 26 [seeking quiet title to the property].)

Plaintiff has submitted his declaration, the declaration of Jack Benudiz, the mortgage broker for the subject short sale, and the declaration of Josh Trifunovich, who participated in the mortgage origination and the short sale of the property.  Based on the assertions made in those declarations, Plaintiff has shown that he and Defendant entered into an agreement regarding the sale of the property, pursuant to which the parties agreed that (1) they would place Defendant’s name on title and the mortgage paperwork for the property via a short sale, (2) Plaintiff would make the initial down payment and subsequent mortgage payments, (3) Plaintiff would occupy and own the property, and (4) Defendant “would hold title in trust for” Plaintiff.  (Pl. Trifunovich Decl., ¶ 4; Benudiz Decl., Ex. A, p. 2 [listing broker’s representative to be Jack Benudiz]; Benudiz Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, 4 [Benudiz explained to Defendant that, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Plaintiff was and would be the beneficial owner of the property]; J. Trifunovich Decl., ¶¶ 3-4, 6-8.)  Plaintiff further asserts that the parties agreed that Defendant would receive a tax break while Plaintiff would occupy and own the property.  (Pl. Trifunovich Decl., ¶ 4.)

            Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he will prevail on his real property claims by showing that the parties entered into a joint venture or partnership agreement for the sale of the subject property, pursuant to which Plaintiff would remain the beneficial owner of the property.[1]  (Pl. Trifunovich Decl., ¶ 4; Benudiz Decl., ¶¶ 2-4; J. Trifunovich Decl., ¶¶ 3-4, 6-8; Water for Citizens of Weed California v. Churchwell White LLP (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 270, 281 [“The purpose of a quiet title action is to establish title against any adverse claims to property or any interest therein”].)

            The court notes that, in her reply papers, Defendant has argued that Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to meet his burden to establish the probable validity of his real property claims because (1) Plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption in favor of Defendant, who is the owner of legal title to the property, (2) the oral agreement described above is barred by the statute of frauds, and (3) Plaintiff committed mortgage fraud.  The court disagrees.

            First, the court acknowledges that the Grant Deed recorded on July 15, 2011 states that the property was granted to Defendant.  (Sidhu Decl., Ex. 2.)  The court further acknowledges Evidence Code section 662, which states that “[t]he owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title[,]” which “may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof[,]” “codifies the common law rule [citations] that oral trusts in derogation of title are disfavored and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”  (Evid. Code, § 662; People v. Semaan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 79, 88 [internal citations omitted].)  However, the court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden to present evidence to rebut that presumption. 

            Second, the court finds that, because Plaintiff has shown that he and Defendant entered into an oral agreement that formed a partnership or joint venture for the purchase of the subject property, the statute of frauds does not apply.  (Jacobs v. Locatelli (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 317, 328, n. 10 [“there are only three elements to show the existence of a joint venture, which are similar to a general partnership: (1) joint interest in a common business; (2) with an understanding to share profits and losses; and (3) a right to joint control”]; Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3) [contracts for the sale of real property or an interest therein are invalid unless they or some memorandum thereof are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged]; Sadugor v. Holstein (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 477, 480 [“A partnership for the purpose of buying land may be formed by an oral agreement and such an agreement is valid”]; Jaffe v. Heffner (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 512, 516 [“a joint venture agreement to sell realty need not be in writing, and . . . such an undertaking by joint venturers is not within the statute of frauds”].)

            Third, although Defendant argues that Plaintiff has committed mortgage fraud pursuant to Penal Code section 532f, Defendant did not (1) cite evidence establishing each element of that crime, including that Plaintiff misrepresented to the mortgage lenders the nature of their agreement with the intent that it be relied on by the mortgage lender, or (2) present adequate analysis to show that Plaintiff committed mortgage fraud.  (Pen. Code, § 532f, subd. (a)(1).)  Moreover, even if Defendant had shown that Plaintiff engaged in mortgage fraud, Defendant did not present argument or authority to establish that such commission of mortgage fraud would preclude Plaintiff from maintaining this action against Defendant.

            Thus, for the reasons set forth above, the court denies Defendant’s motion for an order expunging the Notice of Pendency of Action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.)

            The court exercises its discretion to deny Defendant’s request that the court require Plaintiff to post a bond in the amount of $485,857.55.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.34 [“the court may, upon motion by any person with an interest in the property, require the claimant to give the moving party an undertaking as a condition of maintaining the notice in the record title”].)

            In light of the court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to expunge the Notice of Pendency of Action, the court denies Defendant’s request for an award of attorney’s fees.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.38 [the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the other party acted with substantial justification or other circumstances make the imposition unjust].)

ORDER

            The court denies defendant Mandeep Sidhu’s motion (1) to expunge notice of pendency of action, or in the alternative, (2) to maintain the notice of pendency of action conditioned upon posting a bond, and (3) for an award of attorney’s fees.

            The court orders plaintiff Peter Trifunovich to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

DATED:  January 23, 2025

 

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court



[1] Because Plaintiff has met his burden on this ground, the court does not discuss whether Plaintiff has shown that he will prevail on this real property claims on the ground that he has established title to the property by adverse possession.