Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV21251, Date: 2025-01-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV21251 Hearing Date: January 23, 2025 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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24STCV21251 |
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January
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[tentative]
Order RE: defendant’s motion (1) to expunge notice of
pendency of action, or alternatively, (2) to maintain the notice of pendency
of action conditioned upon an undertaking, and (3) for an award of attorney’s
fees |
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Mandeep Sidhu
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Peter Trifunovich
Motion (1) to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action or Alternatively,
(2) to Maintain the Notice of Pendency of Action Conditioned Upon an
Undertaking, and (3) for an Award of Attorney’s Fees
The court
considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with
this motion.
DISCUSSION
Defendant Mandeep Sidhu (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order (1)
expunging the Notice of Pendency of Action, recorded by plaintiff Peter
Trifunovich (“Plaintiff”) on September 17, 2024, or in the alternative, (2)
maintaining the Notice of Pendency of Action conditioned upon Plaintiff posting
a bond in the amount of $485,857.55, and (3) awarding attorney’s fees in favor
of Defendant and against Plaintiff in the amount of $3,500. (Sidhu Decl., Ex. 6, Notice of Pendency of
Action.)
“‘A lis pendens is a recorded document giving constructive notice that
an action has been filed affecting title or right to possession of the real
property described in the notice.’”¿ (Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004)
33 Cal.4th 642, 647.)¿ Any time after a notice of pendency of action has been
recorded, any party or nonparty with an interest in the real property affected
thereby may move the court in which the action is pending to expunge the
notice.¿ (Code Civ. Pro., § 405.30.) The court must order the notice expunged
if the court finds any of the following: the pleading on which the notice is
based does not contain a real property claim; the claimant has not established
by preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property
claim; or the real property claim has probable validity, but adequate relief
can be secured by the giving of an undertaking.¿ (Code Civ. Pro., §§
405.31-405.33.)¿
The court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of his real property claims
for quiet title and declaratory relief based on the existence of an oral
partnership agreement between himself and Defendant to purchase the subject
property, pursuant to which Plaintiff would remain the beneficial owner thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32; De Martini v.
Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1269, 1279 [“Unlike other motions,
nonmoving parties must demonstrate the existence or probable validity of their
real property claims”]; Compl., ¶¶ 23-24 [requesting declaratory relief to
ascertain rights and duties with respect to the subject property], 26 [seeking
quiet title to the property].)
Plaintiff has submitted his declaration, the declaration of Jack Benudiz,
the mortgage broker for the subject short sale, and the declaration of Josh
Trifunovich, who participated in the mortgage origination and the short sale of
the property. Based on the assertions
made in those declarations, Plaintiff has shown that he and Defendant entered
into an agreement regarding the sale of the property, pursuant to which the
parties agreed that (1) they would place Defendant’s name on title and the
mortgage paperwork for the property via a short sale, (2) Plaintiff would make
the initial down payment and subsequent mortgage payments, (3) Plaintiff would
occupy and own the property, and (4) Defendant “would hold title in trust for”
Plaintiff. (Pl. Trifunovich Decl., ¶ 4;
Benudiz Decl., Ex. A, p. 2 [listing broker’s representative to be Jack
Benudiz]; Benudiz Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, 4 [Benudiz explained to Defendant that,
pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Plaintiff was and would be the beneficial
owner of the property]; J. Trifunovich Decl., ¶¶ 3-4, 6-8.) Plaintiff further asserts that the parties
agreed that Defendant would receive a tax break while Plaintiff would occupy
and own the property. (Pl. Trifunovich
Decl., ¶ 4.)
Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff
has met his burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he will
prevail on his real property claims by showing that the parties entered into a
joint venture or partnership agreement for the sale of the subject property,
pursuant to which Plaintiff would remain the beneficial owner of the property.[1] (Pl. Trifunovich Decl., ¶ 4; Benudiz Decl.,
¶¶ 2-4; J. Trifunovich Decl., ¶¶ 3-4, 6-8; Water for Citizens of Weed
California v. Churchwell White LLP (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 270, 281 [“The
purpose of a quiet title action is to establish title against any adverse
claims to property or any interest therein”].)
The court notes that, in her reply
papers, Defendant has argued that Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to meet
his burden to establish the probable validity of his real property claims
because (1) Plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption in favor of Defendant,
who is the owner of legal title to the property, (2) the oral agreement
described above is barred by the statute of frauds, and (3) Plaintiff committed
mortgage fraud. The court disagrees.
First, the court acknowledges that
the Grant Deed recorded on July 15, 2011 states that the property was granted
to Defendant. (Sidhu Decl., Ex. 2.) The court further acknowledges Evidence Code
section 662, which states that “[t]he owner of the legal title to property is
presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title[,]” which “may be
rebutted only by clear and convincing proof[,]” “codifies the common law rule
[citations] that oral trusts in derogation of title are disfavored and must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.”
(Evid. Code, § 662; People v. Semaan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 79, 88
[internal citations omitted].) However,
the court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden to present evidence to rebut
that presumption.
Second, the court finds that,
because Plaintiff has shown that he and Defendant entered into an oral
agreement that formed a partnership or joint venture for the purchase of the
subject property, the statute of frauds does not apply. (Jacobs v. Locatelli (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 317, 328, n. 10 [“there are only three elements to show the
existence of a joint venture, which are similar to a general partnership: (1)
joint interest in a common business; (2) with an understanding to share profits
and losses; and (3) a right to joint control”]; Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3)
[contracts for the sale of real property or an interest therein are invalid
unless they or some memorandum thereof are in writing and subscribed by the
party to be charged]; Sadugor v. Holstein (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 477, 480
[“A partnership for the purpose of buying land may be formed by an oral
agreement and such an agreement is valid”]; Jaffe v. Heffner (1959) 173
Cal.App.2d 512, 516 [“a joint venture agreement to sell realty need not be in
writing, and . . . such an undertaking by joint venturers is not within the
statute of frauds”].)
Third, although Defendant argues
that Plaintiff has committed mortgage fraud pursuant to Penal Code section
532f, Defendant did not (1) cite evidence establishing each element of that
crime, including that Plaintiff misrepresented to the mortgage lenders the
nature of their agreement with the intent that it be relied on by the mortgage
lender, or (2) present adequate analysis to show that Plaintiff committed
mortgage fraud. (Pen. Code, § 532f,
subd. (a)(1).) Moreover, even if Defendant
had shown that Plaintiff engaged in mortgage fraud, Defendant did not present
argument or authority to establish that such commission of mortgage fraud would
preclude Plaintiff from maintaining this action against Defendant.
Thus, for the reasons set forth
above, the court denies Defendant’s motion for an order expunging the Notice of
Pendency of Action. (Code Civ. Proc., §
405.32.)
The court exercises its discretion
to deny Defendant’s request that the court require Plaintiff to post a bond in
the amount of $485,857.55. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 405.34 [“the court may, upon motion by any person with an interest in
the property, require the claimant to give the moving party an undertaking as a
condition of maintaining the notice in the record title”].)
In light of the court’s order
denying Defendant’s motion to expunge the Notice of Pendency of Action, the
court denies Defendant’s request for an award of attorney’s fees. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.38 [the prevailing
party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of making or
opposing the motion unless the other party acted with substantial justification
or other circumstances make the imposition unjust].)
ORDER
The court denies defendant Mandeep
Sidhu’s motion (1) to expunge notice of pendency of action, or in the
alternative, (2) to maintain the notice of pendency of action conditioned upon
posting a bond, and (3) for an award of attorney’s fees.
The court orders plaintiff Peter
Trifunovich to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1] Because Plaintiff has met
his burden on this ground, the court does not discuss whether Plaintiff has
shown that he will prevail on this real property claims on the ground that he
has established title to the property by adverse possession.