Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 24STCV25376, Date: 2025-04-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV25376    Hearing Date: April 29, 2025    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                 Defendant General Motors LLC        

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Jeannette Carranza

(1)   Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

(2)   Motion to Strike Punitive Damages

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with the demurrer and motion to strike.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jeannette Carranza (“Plaintiff”) filed the operative First Amended Complaint on November 4, 2024, alleging against defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”) seven causes of action for (1) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (2) breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (4) breach of express warranty under Commercial Code section 2-313; (5) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; (6) fraudulent concealment; and (7) violation of Civil Code section 1750 et seq.[1]

Defendant now moves the court for an order (1) sustaining its demurrer to the sixth and seventh causes of action, and (2) striking from the First Amended Complaint Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.

DEMURRER

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent concealment because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since (1) it is not barred by the economic loss rule because it based on conduct independent of Defendant’s alleged breach of the subject warranties, and (2) Plaintiff has alleged facts, with the requisite particularity, to establish each element of this cause of action because Plaintiff has alleged that (i) Defendant knew of, but failed to disclose, the fact that certain 2023 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 vehicles are predisposed to defects in the transmission that result in dangerous functional failures and impairment of use, including by concealing this information in its marketing materials (FAC ¶¶ 15, 17-18, 37, 61, 67, 70, 77), (2) Defendant had a duty to disclose the material facts to Plaintiff since the facts regarding the defective transmission were known only to Defendant and Defendant knew they were not known or reasonably discoverable by Plaintiff (FAC ¶¶ 37, 52, 54-55, 125); (3) Defendant intentionally concealed and suppressed the material facts regarding the defective transmission with the intent to defraud Plaintiff (FAC ¶¶ 35, 67-68, 77, 126, 131); (4) Plaintiff was unaware of the facts and would not have purchased the subject vehicle had she known of the facts (FAC ¶¶ 23, 33, 63); and (5) as a result of Defendant’s concealment, Plaintiff has sustained damage (FAC ¶¶ 24-25, 129-130).  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 841, review dism. Dec. 18, 2024 [“a defendant’s conduct in fraudulently inducing someone to enter a contract is separate from the defendant’s later breach of the contract or warranty provisions that were agreed to”], 843 [concluding that, “under California law, the economic loss rule does not bar plaintiffs’ claim here for fraudulent inducement by concealment”]; Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 923 [tort claims for monetary losses between contractual parties are barred by the economic loss rule “when they arise from—or are not independent of—the parties’ underlying contracts”]; Nissan Motor Acceptance Cases (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 793, 826 [elements of fraudulent concealment].)

The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action for violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (the “CLRA”) because it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

First, the court finds that Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff did not comply with the notice requirements of Civil Code section 1782.

The court acknowledges, as Defendant points out, that (1) “[t]hirty days or more prior to the commencement of an action for damages pursuant to [the CLRA], the consumer shall” send a written notice to the defendant that includes the information set forth by statute, and (2) Plaintiff alleges that they notified Defendant of the subject violations of the CLRA on October 1, 2024, i.e., the date that Plaintiff filed the original Complaint in this action and not 30 days before that date.  (Civ. Code, § 1782, subd. (a); FAC ¶ 143.)  However, an action for injunctive relief under the CLRA may be maintained without complying with the notice requirement, and a consumer in an action for injunctive relief may, after compliance with the notice requirement, amend the complaint to include a request for damages.  (Civ. Code, § 1782, subd. (d).)  Defendant did not cite any allegations in the original Complaint to show that Plaintiff initiated this action for damages without complying with this requirement.  Moreover, Plaintiff has cited paragraphs 143-144 of the original Complaint,[2] in which Plaintiff stated that (1) Plaintiff simultaneously, with the filing of the Complaint, notified Defendant of the alleged violations, and (2) Plaintiff would amend the Complaint to state a claim for damages upon expiration of 30 days after the notice was given.  (Compl., ¶¶ 143-144.)

Second, the court finds (1) that, for the reasons set forth in connection with the court’s ruling on Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for fraudulent concealment, and (2) that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant violated the CLRA by representing that the transmission in the subject vehicles were of a particular standard, quality, or grade despite its knowledge that the transmissions are defective.  (Civ. Code, § 1770, subds. (a)(5), (a)(7); FAC ¶¶ 32-33, 138-139.)

MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendant moves the court for an order striking Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages (FAC Prayer, ¶ E).

The court denies Defendant’s motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages because Plaintiff has alleged facts establishing that Defendant is guilty of fraud.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)

ORDER

            The court overrules defendant General Motors LLC’s demurrer to plaintiff Jeannette Carranza’s First Amended Complaint.

            The court denies defendant General Motors LLC’s motion to strike punitive damages.

            The court orders defendant General Motors LLC to file an answer to plaintiff Jeannette Carranza’s First Amended Complaint within 10 days from the date of this order.

            The court orders plaintiff Jeannette Carranza to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  April 29, 2025

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court