Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case BC684856 2022-12-21 Tentative Ruling

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

The court denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits A and B.

The court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibit C. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

The court rules on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections, filed on December 7, 2022, as follows:

The court rules on Defendant’s evidentiary objections, filed on December 16, 2022, as follows:

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

“A cause of action for damages for breach of contract is comprised of the following elements: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.” (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1173.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the first cause of action for breach of contract has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (Defendant’s breach of the contract) cannot be established. Specifically, Defendant introduces evidence to show that Defendant (1) did not offer Bargaining Unit 612 an “across-the-board” salary increase, such that Defendant did not breach the parties’ across-the-board provision, and (2) offered to Plaintiff’s bargaining unit the same supervisory bonus offered to Bargaining Unit 612, such that Defendant did not breach the parties’ economics enhancement clause. Defendant introduces the following evidence.

In November of 2015, Plaintiff and Defendant executed a “Memorandum of Understanding for Joint Submission Regarding the Peace Officers” (the “MOU”) on behalf of Plaintiff’s unit, Bargaining Unit 611 (“Unit 611”). (UMF No. 1; Pescatello Decl., ¶ 7.) The MOU includes two relevant provisions: (1) the provision entitled “Cost of Living Adjustments (COLA), General Salary Movement (GSM), Across-the-Board Adjustments (ATB)” (the “ATB Clause”), and (2) the provision entitled “Economic Enhancements” (the “Economic Enhancements Clause”). (Def. Compendium of Evidence (Def. COE) Ex. 1, MOU, pp. 13-14.)

The ATB Clause provides that, “should any recognized County safety bargaining unit reach a signed agreement that results in a higher across-the-board (ATB) percent increase for any given year, than provided to members of Unit 611 by this Agreement, the County agrees to adjust the salary of Unit 611 members by an equivalent percent increase, effective the same year of the contract and the same time as the increase in the other safety bargaining unit.” (Def. COE Ex. 1, MOU, Article 6.) The Economic Enhancements Clause provides that, “should any recognized County safety bargaining unit reach a signed agreement that results in an economic enhancement, greater than provided to members of Unit 611 by this Agreement for any year of its contract, the County agrees to pay Unit 611 members the same economic enhancement for the same year.” (Def. COE Ex. 1, MOU, Article 6.)

On May 2, 2017, Defendant’s Board of Supervisors approved an amendment to the Professional Peace Officers Association (“PPOA”) Memorandum of Understanding (“PPOA MOU”), which implemented the “Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Supervisory Bonus” (the “POST Supervisory Bonus”) for members of Bargaining Unit 612. (UMF Nos. 15, 17; Pescatello Decl., ¶ 12.) Members of Unit 612 could become eligible for the POST Supervisory Bonus in two ways: (1) by possessing (i) a POST Supervisory Certificate and (ii) two years of law enforcement experience as a permanent first-level supervisor or higher with the County of Los Angeles, or (2) by (i) possessing or becoming eligible to possess a POST Intermediate Certificate, and (ii) possessing a minimum of two years of law enforcement experience as a permanent first-level supervisor or higher with the County of Los Angeles, and (iii) successfully completing a POST certified 80-hour supervisory course, and (iv) completing a minimum of 60 semester units, an accredited degree, or 1,200 POST certified training hours. (UMF Nos. 18-20; Pescatello Decl., ¶ 13; Def. COE Ex. 3, Section 11, pp. COUNTY000200-201.) Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of contract alleges that Defendant breached the parties’ MOU by failing to provide its unit with like across-the-board increases in pay or, alternatively, equivalent economic enhancements. (FAC ¶ 13.)

First, as set forth above, the ATB Clause requires Defendant to adjust the salary of Unit 611 members by an equivalent percent increase in the event that a County bargaining unit reaches “a signed agreement that results in a higher across-the board (ATB) percent increase….” (UMF No. 6; Def. COE Ex. 1, p. 13.) Defendant contends that the POST Supervisory Bonus does not provide for a general increase in salary as to all Unit 612 members; instead, Unit 612 members are eligible to receive the POST Supervisory Bonus only if they meet the criteria set forth in the amendment. (UMF Nos. 18-20.)

Defendant introduces deposition testimony from PPOA’s previous president, Brian Moriguchi, who stated that an estimated 70 percent of Unit 612 members was expected to receive the bonus pay. (Def. COE Ex. 15, Moriguchi Dep., pp. 62:16-24, 82:24-83:2; Hashmall Decl., ¶ 17.) Moriguchi further testified that, while 100 percent of sergeants could eventually be eligible to receive the bonus, there would never be a time when all members would receive the POST Supervisory bonus, because PPOA would “always have those who were promoted within the last two years who are not qualified to get it[,]” and because others may not have the training hours or units required. (Def. COE Ex. 15, Moriguchi Dep., pp. 83:8-22, 118:20-119:5.) Finally, Moriguchi testified that he “did not view this as an across-the-board pay increase.” (Def. COE Ex. 15, Moriguchi Dep., pp. 83:23-25, 84:10-11.)

The court finds that the evidence presented by Defendant establishes that (1) the POST Supervisory Bonus did not constitute an “across-the-board” percent increase as contemplated by the MOU, and (2) since it did not constitute an across-the-board increase, Defendant did not breach the MOU by providing the POST Supervisory Bonus to Unit 612.

Second, Defendant presents evidence establishing that Defendant offered to extend the POST Supervisory Bonus to Plaintiff.

As set forth above, the Economic Enhancements Clause requires Defendant to pay Unit 611 members “the same economic enhancement” that Defendant agrees to pay another County safety bargaining unit for the same year. (Def. COE Ex. 1, Article 6.) “Economic enhancements” are defined to include, inter alia, bonuses, stipends, and incentive pay or lump sum payments. (Ibid.)

On May 11, 2017, Plaintiff, through Derek Hsieh, sent a letter (1) advising Defendant that Plaintiff became aware of the POST Supervisory Bonus amendment, (2) excerpting the Economics Enhancement Clause, and (3) requesting a meeting to address the parties’ rights and responsibilities under the MOU. (UMF No. 24; Def. COE Ex. 6.) Defendant, by letter dated June 26, 2017, offered to extend the same bonus to qualifying members of Unit 611. (UMF Nos. 26-27; Def. COE Ex. 7.) Specifically, Defendant stated as follows: “The County acknowledges that on May 2, 2017, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors approved a Supervisory POST Bonus for Bargaining Unit 612 (Supervisory Peace Officers) members. [¶] In an effort to resolve this issue, the County agrees to extend the same Supervisory POST Bonus to qualifying members of the Association of Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriffs Unit-611.” (Def. COE Ex. 7; UMF No. 27.) Plaintiff, through Hsieh, “did not follow up regarding implementation.” (Pescatello Decl., ¶ 17.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant breached the MOU, because Defendant has introduced evidence establishing that it offered to Plaintiff the same POST Supervisory Bonus to qualifying members of Plaintiff’s unit, whether as the “same economic enhancement,” or as the same across-the-board increase.

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of Defendant’s breach of the contract.

First, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden of showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether the POST Supervisory Bonus constitutes an across-the-board increase that triggered the ATB Clause.

Plaintiff contends that the terms of the ATB Clause are ambiguous, and should be construed to find “that an ‘across-the-board percent increase’ includes those increases in salary or bonuses to which all members are or will become entitled.” (Opp., p. 16:20-23.)

“A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.” (Civ. Code, § 1636.) When “the language used is fairly susceptible to one of two constructions, extrinsic evidence may be considered, not to vary or modify the terms of the agreement, but to aid the court in ascertaining the true intent of the parties.” (Butler v. Vons Companies, Inc. v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 943, 949.) Further, “a contract apparently unambiguous on its face may still contain a latent ambiguity that can only be exposed by extrinsic evidence.” (Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1133 (“Wolf”).) “‘The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties’ intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties.’” (Wolf v. Superior Court (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357.) “Interpretation of a written instrument becomes solely a judicial function only when it is based on the words of the instrument alone, when there is no conflict in the extrinsic evidence, or when a determination was made based on incompetent evidence.” (City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 395 ((“Genentech”).)

The court has considered the evidence submitted by Plaintiff and finds that there is no conflict in the extrinsic evidence. The interpretation of the term across-the-board is therefore a question for the court. (Genentech, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 395; Wolf, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 [“Absent a conflict in the evidence, the interpretation of the contract remains a matter of law”].) Upon consideration of the arguments presented by the parties and the evidence to which objections were not sustained, the court finds that the term “across-the-board (ATB) percent increase” is not ambiguous, and does not have the meaning that Plaintiff contends it has in its opposition. (See Opp., p. 16:21-23 [stating that an across-the-board percent increase should be interpreted to include increases in a salary or bonus “to which all members are or will become entitled”].) The court finds that Defendant’s proffered interpretation of the term “across-the-board (ATB) percent increase” is correct, and refers to an increase in pay that applies to an entire bargaining unit at the same time.

Next, Plaintiff introduces evidence regarding Defendant’s purpose for implementing the POST Supervisory Bonus to support its argument that Defendant intended to make the bonus as broadly available as possible such that it could be considered an across-the-board increase. Although Plaintiff contends that Defendant intended for the POST Supervisory Bonus to be applied to all Unit 612 members to address compaction, any evidence regarding (1) Defendant’s intent, and (2) whether Defendant actually concluded that compaction existed does not show that there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the POST Supervisory Bonus constitutes an across-the-board increase.

Further, although there is a possibility that all members of Unit 612 could eventually become eligible to receive the POST Supervisory Bonus, it is undisputed that the members of Unit 612 are still required to satisfy various requirements in order to benefit from the bonus. (UMF Nos. 18-20.) Plaintiff presents no evidence establishing that (1) all Unit 612 members received the POST Supervisory Bonus at the time it was implemented, or (2) because all Unit 612 members have the opportunity to become eligible to receive the POST Supervisory Bonus, that all Unit 612 members will take all the steps necessary (i.e., obtaining all required course units or an accredited degree) to obtain the benefits of the POST Supervisory Bonus.

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to establish that the POST Supervisory Bonus constitutes an across-the-board increase in pay to Unit 612 that would trigger the ABT Clause.

Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that Defendant breached the MOU by offering to Plaintiff the same POST Supervisory Bonus to Plaintiff’s members.

Plaintiff contends that the Economic Enhancements Clause cannot be construed to mean that Defendant need only provide the same enhancement to Plaintiff’s members with the exact same conditions in order to comply with its terms. Plaintiff contends that the term “same economic enhancement” is ambiguous as to whether it requires providing to Plaintiff “the same benefit with the same restrictions instead of simply paying the value of the enhancement.” (Opp., p. 5:25-28 [italics in original]; Def. COE Ex. 1, Article 6, Economic Enhancements Clause [if another bargaining unit reaches an agreement resulting in an economic enhancement greater than those provided to Plaintiff, Defendant is required “to pay to Unit 611 members the same economic enhancement for the same year”].)

Plaintiff appears to refer to the same extrinsic evidence to support this interpretation of the Economic Enhancements Clause. As set forth above, extrinsic evidence may be considered if the language of a contract is fairly susceptible to one of two constructions, or to expose a latent ambiguity. (Butler, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 949; Wolf, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133.)

The court finds that there is no conflict in the extrinsic evidence, and therefore finds that the construction of the Economic Enhancements Clause is a question for the court. (Genentech, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 395; Wolf, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134.) The court finds that the Economics Enhancement Clause, and specifically, the term “same economic enhancement” is not ambiguous. The court further finds that Plaintiff’s proffered interpretation of the term—construing the provision to require Defendant to offer to pay only the value of the monetary enhancement without the ability to set forth the same qualifying criteria—is incorrect. The court finds that Defendant’s interpretation of the Economic Enhancements Clause is correct, and requires only that Defendant agree to pay Plaintiff’s members the same economic enhancement for the same year as another safety bargaining unit, subject to the same qualifications.

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant offered to extend “the same Supervisory POST Bonus to qualifying members of” Plaintiff’s bargaining unit. (UMF No. 27; Def. COE Ex. 7.) The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant breached the Economic Enhancements Clause by offering to pay to Plaintiff’s members “the same economic enhancement.”

After considering the evidence and argument presented by the parties, the court finds that (1) Defendant has met its burden to show that it did not breach the terms of the parties’ MOU, because (i) it did not offer an across-the-board percent increase to another bargaining unit and therefore did not trigger, or breach, the obligations set forth in the ATB Clause, and (ii) it complied with the obligations set forth in the Economic Enhancements Clause by offering to Plaintiff the same economic enhancement (i.e., the POST Supervisory Bonus) provided to PPOA, and (2) Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to Defendant’s breach of the MOU, because Plaintiff has not shown a triable issue of material fact as to (i) whether Defendant implemented an across-the-board increase to PPOA, or (ii) whether Defendant offered Plaintiff the POST Supervisory Bonus to its qualifying members.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the first cause of action for breach of contract.

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the second cause of action for breach of contract has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (Defendant’s breach of the contract) cannot be established.

The MOU provides that “[n]o agreement, alteration, understanding, variation, waiver or modification of any of the terms or provisions contained herein shall in any manner be binding upon the parties hereto unless made and executed in writing by all parties hereto and, if required, approved and implemented by the County’s Board of Supervisors.” (Def. COE Ex. 1, Article 27.) Plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of contract alleges that Defendant breached the MOU when it repudiated the ATB Clause and Economics Enhancement Clause, thereby “modifying the terms of the [] MOU” in violation of its terms. (FAC ¶ 17.)

As set forth above, Defendant met its burden of showing that the first cause of action for breach of contract has no merit by establishing that it did not breach (1) the ATB Clause by providing the POST Supervisory Bonus to Unit 612, or (2) the Economic Enhancements Clause, since Defendant offered Plaintiff the same bonus to qualified employees. Plaintiff’s second cause of action is based on the allegation that Defendant unlawfully modified the terms of the MOU by “failing to adhere to the terms of the ATB Clause and [Economic Enhancement] Clause….” (FAC ¶ 17.) Because Defendant met its burden of showing that it did not fail to adhere to the terms of those provisions, Defendant has met its burden to show that it did not modify the terms of the MOU, and therefore has shown that it did not breach the MOU as alleged.

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of Defendant’s breach of the contract based on its alleged modification of the MOU. As set forth above, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant breached either the ATB Clause or Economic Enhancements Clause. The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant failed to adhere to the terms of the ATB Clause or Economic Enhancements Clause and, as a result of that failure, wrongfully modified the MOU. (FAC ¶ 17.)

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the second cause of action for breach of contract.

“Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another . . . may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights . . . including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief has no merit because Defendant has shown that an element of the cause of action (Plaintiff’s right to the requested declarations) cannot be established.

Plaintiff requests that the court issue the following two declarations. First, Plaintiff requests a declaration “that providing additional Supervisory POST pay to individuals represented by PPOA without providing equivalent across-the-board salary increases to individuals represented by [Plaintiff] triggers the ATB Clause.” (FAC ¶ 29.) Second, Plaintiff requests a declaration “that providing additional Supervisory POST pay to individuals represented by PPOA without providing equivalent economic enhancements to individuals represented by [Plaintiff] triggers the [Economic Enhancements] Clause.” (Ibid.) The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that Plaintiff is not entitled to these two declarations because, as set forth more fully above, Defendant has met its initial burden to show that (1) the POST Supervisory Bonus was not an across-the-board salary increase and therefore does not trigger the ATB Clause, and (2) Defendant’s conduct was not in violation of the Economics Enhancement Clause, because Defendant offered the same benefit to the members of Plaintiff’s unit.

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of Plaintiff’s entitlement to the judicial declarations described above. The court has granted summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action for breach of contract on the ground that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show a triable issue of material fact as to whether (1) Defendant offered an across-the-board increase to PPOA, or (2) Defendant breached the Economic Enhancement Clause. The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show a triable issue of material fact exists as to its entitlement to the declarations requested in its First Amended Complaint.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief.

4. Fifth Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

“‘ “The [implied] covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . [is] implied by law in every contract . . . .” ’” (Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. The Americana at Brand, LLC (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1244.) “In general, the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] imposes a duty upon a party to a contract not to deprive the other party of the benefits of the contract.” (Sutherland v. Barclays American/Mortgage Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 299, 314.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the fifth cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has no merit because Defendant has shown that elements of the cause of action (Defendant’s breach of a duty to not deprive Plaintiff of the benefits of the MOU, and damages) cannot be established. First, as set forth above, Defendant has met its burden to show that the POST Supervisory Bonus did not constitute an across-the-board salary increase. Thus, Defendant has met its burden of showing that this cause of action has no merit, because it is based on the allegation that Defendant breached its duty to notify Plaintiff “any time any across-the-board salary increases” were provided to another bargaining unit. (FAC ¶ 33.) Second, as to damages, Defendant presents evidence establishing that Plaintiff communicated with Defendant about the POST Supervisory Bonus on May 11, 2017, nine days after the POST Supervisory Bonus was approved. (UMF Nos. 97, 102 [amendment was submitted on May 2, 2017 and approved], 109 [Hsieh sent a letter to Defendant’s Chief Executive Office].) Although Plaintiff’s Executive Director stated that he learned of the POST Supervisory Bonus through other means, Defendant’s evidence establishes that Plaintiff knew of the POST Supervisory Bonus nine days after the approval, and therefore was not damaged by any failure on the part of Defendant to notify Plaintiff of the POST Supervisory Bonus before that time. (UMF No. 110.)

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of Defendant’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or the element of damages. First, Plaintiff does not present any evidence or argument establishing that Defendant had a duty to notify Plaintiff of the POST Supervisory Bonus or that Defendant breached any such alleged duty by failing to notify Plaintiff within the nine days it took for Plaintiff to learn about the POST Supervisory Bonus. (See FAC ¶ 33 [Defendant breached its duty to notify Plaintiff of any across-the-board salary increase or economic enhancement].) Second, Plaintiff does not present evidence to show that it suffered any damages as a result of Defendant’s failure to notify Plaintiff of the POST Supervisory Bonus.

The court notes that Plaintiff contends that this cause of action is also based on the allegation that Defendant “deliberately attempted to conceal the salary adjustments approved for members of the PPOA….” (Opp., p. 22, fn. 1.) In support of that argument, Plaintiff cites the complaint filed in Case No. 19STCP01070, which was consolidated with this action on September 2, 2020 “for all purposes….” (September 2, 2020 Minute Order, p. 2.)

A complete consolidation of cases, or consolidation for all purposes, merges two actions “into a single proceeding under one cause number and result[s] in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.) After consolidation of this action, on September 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint, which includes substantially identical causes of action and is based on substantially similar allegations as the original complaint filed in Case No. 19STCP01070 by Plaintiff, Ronald Hernandez, and Jennifer Martin. (April 4, 2019 Petition and Complaint, Case No. 19STCP01070, ¶¶ 6-8, 36-39 [first cause of action for breach of contract based on Defendant’s alleged failure to provide across-the-board salary increases and the economic enhancements to plaintiffs], ¶¶ 47-51 [third cause of action for declaratory relief requesting declarations that Defendant’s provision of Supervisory POST pay and economic enhancements to PPOA and not ALADS or individual plaintiffs violated the MOU], ¶¶ 52-56 [fourth cause of cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on Defendant’s alleged failure to notify plaintiffs of the salary increases or economic enhancements and Defendant’s alleged concealment of the adjustments].) The court therefore finds that the First Amended Complaint became Plaintiff’s operative complaint and superseded all other complaints filed in this action. (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1130-1130.)

The court cannot deny summary adjudication on a ground pleaded in a superseded complaint. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253 [the pleadings delimit the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment, and “the plaintiff cannot bring up new, unpleaded issues in his or her opposing papers”].) The court therefore finds that any evidence of concealment is insufficient to show a triable issue of material fact exists as to Defendant’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the fifth cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Because the court has granted summary adjudication on all of the causes of action alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, the court finds that all of the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that defendants County of Los Angeles, Alex Villanueva, as Los Angeles County Sheriff, and Arlene Barrera, in her capacity as Auditor-Controller of Los Angeles County, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.[1] (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

The court notes that, as set forth above, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint against Defendant on September 29, 2020, following consolidation of this action with Case No. 19STCP01070. The operative complaint names only plaintiff Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, and omits individual plaintiffs Ronald Hernandez and Jennifer Martin. This omission results in a dismissal of plaintiffs Hernandez and Martin. (Cf. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1142 [“an amended complaint that omits defendants named in the original compliant operates as a dismissal as to them”].)

The court therefore finds that defendant County of Los Angeles, including defendants Alex Villanueva, Los Angeles County Sheriff, and Arlene Barrera, in her capacity as Auditor-Controller of Los Angeles County, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the operative First Amended Complaint filed by sole remaining plaintiff Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs.

The court grants defendant County of Los Angeles’s motion for summary judgment.

The court orders defendant County of Los Angeles to prepare, serve, and lodge a proposed judgment for defendants County of Los Angeles, Alex Villanueva, as Los Angeles County Sheriff, and Arlene Barrera, in her capacity as Auditor-Controller of Los Angeles, no later than 15 days from the date of this order.

The court orders that the trial set for January 18, 2023, and the final status conference set for January 6, 2023, are vacated.

The court sets an Order to Show Cause re entry of judgment for hearing on ____________________, 2023, at 11:00 a.m., in Department 53.

[1] In its First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as defendants the County of Los Angeles, Alex Villanueva, as Los Angeles County Sheriff, and Arlene Barrera, in her capacity as Auditor-Controller of Los Angeles. The individuals defendants were added pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s December 2, 2019 ruling, which ordered that Plaintiff was granted leave to amend to add County officials in support of its writ cause of action. As noted by Defendant in its motion, actions against persons in their official capacity are, “in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity[.]” (Pierce v. San Mateo County Sheriff’s Dept. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 995, 1018; Mot., p. 19, fn. 6.) The court therefore construes Defendant’s motion as seeking summary judgment on behalf of defendants Villanueva and Barrera, as Plaintiff’s action against these defendants is properly considered to be a suit against Defendant.

association for los angeles deputy sheriffs ; Plaintiff, vs. county of los angeles , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	BC684856

	Hearing Date:	December 21, 2022

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[Tentative] Order RE: motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication